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In Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
Congress recognized that the fears, misperceptions, and
stereotypes about disabled individuals are so pervasive that
employment discrimination reaches beyond those who actually
possess substantially limiting impairments. Accordingly, the ADA
protects not only employees with actual disabilities, but also those
nondisabled employees who mistakenly are "regarded as"
disabled by their employers. In this Article, Professor Travis
analyzes to what extent those with "perceived disabilities" should
receive the same substantive safeguards as those who are actually
disabled. Specifically, Professor Travis argues that applying the
traditional forms of the ADA's "reasonable accommodations"
and "essential functions" rules to perceived disabilities exceeds the
ADA's narrow conception of equal employment opportunity.
Because abandoning these protections would, in contrast, fall
short of the ADA's objectives, the Article proposes a middle-
ground alternative. This alternative uses a remedy analysis to
reconceptualize the rules in a way that provides the broadest scope
possible for the ADA's "regarded as" prong, while remaining
consistent with the statute's fundamental goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade ago, Congress attempted to "level the playing
field" for disabled individuals by enacting Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).1 Congress's goal was to create a
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
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"comprehensive national mandate" to eliminate disability
discrimination in the workplace In taking this historic step,
Congress recognized that fears, misperceptions, and stereotypes
about the disabled were so pervasive that employment discrimination
reached beyond the class of people who actually possess a
substantially limiting impairment.' Accordingly, Congress drafted the
ADA to protect not only people with actual disabilities, but also
those who mistakenly are "regarded as" having a disability that they
do not actually possess.4 The ADA achieves this result by applying
the same general antidiscrimination protection to those with
"perceived disabilities" as it does to those whose disabilities are
"real."5 Unfortunately, the ADA is far less clear about whether and
to what extent individuals who are only "regarded as" disabled are
entitled to the same specific substantive safeguards as individuals who
are actually disabled.' This Article addresses this question for two
12117 (1994)); 136 CONG. REc. 10,874 (1990) (statement of Rep. lvatsui) (explaining that
the ADA "will make the playing field a little more even for those with disabilities to
compete in the workplace" because "[s]o many doors are now closed.., simply because
their needs do not conform to the current rules of the game"); 136 CONG. REC. 10,856
(1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (stating that the ADA "guarantees a level playing field"
for individuals with disabilities); see also Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA)
198, 199 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that Congress enacted the ADA "in order to level the
playing field for disabled individuals in the workplace"), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d
138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th
Cir. 1995) ("Congress enacted the ADA to level the playing field for disabled people."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 5 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y 1.1/5:101-116) (explaining the ADA's objective).
3. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7; see also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N, A TECHNICAL AssISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILrrIES Acr § 2.2(c), at H-10 to -11 (1992)
(Sup. Docs. No. Y 3.Eq2:8T22) [hereinafter EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL]
("Such protection is necessary, because, as the Supreme Court has stated and the
Congress has reiterated, 'society's [.. ] myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairments [sic].'"
(quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (alterations in
original))).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C).
5. See id. §§ 12102(2), 12112(a); see also Smaw v. Virginia Dep't of State Police, 862
F. Supp. 1469, 1472 (E.D. Va. 1994) (explaining that claims under the ADA's "regarded
as" prong are "commonly referred to as 'perceived disability' cases").
6. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 199 ("[T]he extent to which individuals who are
merely 'regarded as' disabled are entitled to be treated as though they are actually
disabled was left far from clear."); Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some
Reflections on the Interpretation of Disability Discrimination Statutes, 13 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 345, 348 (1996) ("[T]he legal principles pertaining to perceived disabilities have been
described as 'elusive, at best.'" (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. West Va. Human Rights
Comm'n, 383 S.E.2d 64, 66 n.* (W. Va. 1989))).
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core elements of the ADA: the reasonable accommodations right
and the essential functions limit.
As with other antidiscrimination statutes, the ADA requires a
plaintiff to be "qualified" for the job in order to state an employment
discrimination claim.7 To be "qualified," however, a person with an
actual disability need not perform every job function as originally
conceived by the employer.' The ADA gives employees with
disabilities a right to "reasonable accommodation" through changing
the workplace to enable job performance, and the ADA deems
disabled employees qualified as long as they can perform the
"essential functions" of the job.9 This Article analyzes how these
qualification standards should apply to employees who are "regarded
as" disabled. A plaintiff who is only regarded as disabled does not
have the functional limitations that the ADA uses to distinguish
persons with actual disabilities from those without; a plaintiff who is
regarded as disabled is distinguished from other nondisabled
individuals solely because of an employer's misperception.
Nevertheless, most courts have assumed that the ADA's qualification
standards apply identically to both perceived and actual disability
claims.10 By applying the qualification standards for actual disabilities
identically to perceived disabilities, this interpretation treats
perceived disability plaintiffs differently from all other nondisabled
workers, who may be required to perform all job duties without
changes in the work environment.
Of course, not every type of differential treatment is unfair or
unjust. Sometimes, when individuals are different from others in a
relevant way, treating them the same as others can itself be a form of
discrimination." This principle justifies the right to reasonable
accommodations and the essential functions limit for individuals with
actually disabling impairments. Individuals with actual disabilities
face inequality not just from stereotypes, prejudice, and
misperceptions. Because the workplace itself is often designed
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (1999)
(explaining how the ADA, "[l]ike the Civil Rights Act of 1964," bases employment
opportunities on merit).
8. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
10. See infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
11. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (separate
opinion of Blackmun, J.) ("[I]n order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."). Justice Blackmun also joined an opinion concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part. See id. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.,
concurring in the judgement in part and dissenting in part).
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arbitrarily "around the unstated norm of an able-bodied worker,' 12
individuals with actual disabilities also may face a form of "structural"
and/or "dynamic" discrimination that imposes additional employment
barriers. 3 The ADA's reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules address this additional form of discrimination by
providing those with actual disabilities the access necessary to
compete on level ground with the nondisabled workforce. Thus, for
those with actual disabilities, the reasonable accommodations right
and the essential functions limit are a form of equal opportunity, not
a form of advantage.
But can such differential treatment be justified as a form of equal
opportunity for individuals whose disabilities are merely perceived?
This Article argues that applying the difference-based qualification
standards identically to perceived disability claims gives perceived
disability plaintiffs an advantage over other nondisabled employees,
as well as over those whose disabilities are real. This advantage is
"unfair" in the very narrow sense that such treatment recognizes a
difference between perceived disability plaintiffs and other
nondisabled individuals that need not be recognized in order to
achieve equal opportunity. Unlike employees with actual disabilities,
employees with perceived disabilities have no equality-based claim to
the use of the ADA's difference-based qualification standards: the
only relevant distinction between employees with perceived
disabilities and other nondisabled employees is an employer's
mistaken beliefs. Employees with perceived disabilities are not
affected by the pervasive forms of structural or dynamic
discrimination faced by individuals with substantially limiting
impairments. As a result, perceived disability claims should be
governed by neither the reasonable accommodations right nor the
essential functions limit-at least not in their traditional forms.
Accordingly, this Article begins by opposing the current majority
12. Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment
Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
1607,1609 (1991).
. 13. For a discussion of the origins of the term "structural discrimination," which refers
to inequality created by the physical design and social organization of the workplace, see
David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECrIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 147,176-79 (1998). I take
the term "dynamic discrimination" from work by Mark Kelman, who uses the term to
describe employment decisions based on differences in employees' marginal productivity
when those differences "are solely a function of readily changeable practices (generally
work organization practices) that the employer should be obliged to alter." Mark Kelman,
Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1157,
1160 (1991).
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approach that applies the ADA's reasonable accommodations and
essential functions rules identically to both perceived and actual
disabilities. Part I explains the majority's "all" approach to perceived
disability claims, which grants a cause of action and the full array of
statutory remedies to perceived disability plaintiffs who seek
workplace accommodation. By analyzing the statutory text, agency
guidelines, and legislative history, as well as by comparing perceived
disability claims to other forms of actionable employment
discrimination under statutes that do not provide a right to
accommodation or limit performance to essential job tasks, Parts II
and III demonstrate how the "all" approach goes beyond the ADA's
equal opportunity objective for perceived disability claims. By
mandating differential treatment based on irrelevant individual
differences, the "all" approach exceeds the ADA's level playing field
goal and stacks the deck for perceived disability plaintiffs over other
nondisabled individuals and those who are actually disabled.
While Parts II and III conclude that the majority's "all" approach
improperly applies the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules to perceived disability claims, these rules should not
be jettisoned altogether. A handful of courts have rejected the
majority position in favor of an equally improper "nothing"
approach-an approach that denies a cause of action and, therefore,
any remedy at all for perceived disability plaintiffs who seek
accommodation on the job. Part IV explains the problems with this
"nothing" approach, which ends up falling short of the ADA's level
playing field objective by leaving some forms of invidious
discrimination unchecked. Disability-based employment
discrimination is still improper conduct, even if the employer's belief
about the disability is incorrect and even for perceived disability
plaintiffs who are "unqualified" for the job when they are correctly
perceived by the employer. Individuals with perceived disabilities
face very real inequality, and the law should provide recourse to
punish the employer, deter the use of improper employment criteria,
and facilitate more accurate perceptions.
Accordingly, Part IV proposes an alternative way to interpret the
reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules for
perceived disability claims. There are two main reasons why the
current all-or-nothing approaches miss the ADA's equal opportunity
target. First, those approaches assume that the only way to
conceptualize accommodations is in terms of the operational work
environment. Under this traditional approach, courts have
envisioned accommodations narrowly as involving changes only to
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physical, structural, procedural, or organizational aspects of the
workplace that limit a disabled person's access and ability to
compete. 4 While perceived disability plaintiffs do not need these
types of traditional workplace modifications to eliminate barriers
created by discriminatory operational designs, achieving equal
opportunity for such people may require a different form of
accommodation: accommodation involving the perceptual or social
work environment, which can create very real barriers of its own.
Second, the all-or-nothing approaches frame the
accommodations question solely as a liability issue by deciding either
to grant or deny a cause of action to perceived disability plaintiffs
who seek workplace accommodations. Part IV explains that the
accommodations question is better framed as a remedies issue by
deciding which remedies should and should not be available to
perceived disability plaintiffs who do experience discrimination, but
who do not experience the same type of harm as a plaintiff with an
actual disability claim. Unlike the all-or-nothing approaches used
today, this proposal would allow the largest number of perceived
disability claims possible, while still remaining true to the ADA's goal
of equal employment opportunity. By shifting the focus from liability
to remedies, this proposal not only provides a more effective
resolution to this specific ADA problem, but also illustrates the
general power of judicial remedy analysis. The alternative set forth in
this Article demonstrates how analytical line drawing at the remedy
stage can be a far more precise instrument for achieving the exact size
and shape of an intended substantive right than the rather blunt tools
available through decisionmaking solely at the liability stage.
I. THE SOURCE OFTHE "UNFAm ADVANTAGE" CRITIQUE OF
PERCEIVED DISABILITY CLAIMS
Understanding the "unfair advantage" critique of perceived
disability claims first requires an explanation of the ADA's core
concepts, requirements, and objectives. This Part describes the
relevant statutory framework and illustrates the two current judicial
interpretations of the ADA for perceived disability claims: the "all"
and the "nothing" approaches.
14. For examples of traditional forms of reasonable accommodation, see infra notes
40-41 and accompanying text.
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A. The Framework of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
"Level Playing Field" Objective
Title I of the ADA prohibits most private employers from
engaging in disability-based employment discrimination. 15 Described
as one of the century's most significant pieces of civil rights
legislation, 6 the ADA greatly expanded federal protection for the
disabled. Prior to 1990, federal protection was limited largely to the
ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,7 which prohibits
disability discrimination only by federal agencies, s large federal
contractors, 9 and programs or activities receiving federal financial
aid?° Although the Rehabilitation Act made some strides in reducing
disability discrimination, Congress recognized that the Rehabilitation
Act missed much of the "day-to-day" discrimination faced by
disabled individuals2 ' The ADA therefore extended the
15. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994). Since July 26, 1992, Title I of the ADA has
applied to all private employers that are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce" and
that employ "15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. § 12111(5)(A); see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(e)(1) (1999) (defining which employers are covered by the ADA).
16. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. 17,376-77 (1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) (discussing
the final passage of the ADA); John A. Conway, Comment, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: New Challenges in Airline Hiring Practices, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 945, 945
& n.2 (1994) (quoting a statement by President Bush's press secretary Marlin Fitzwater
emphasizing the importance of the ADA as a civil rights law); see also 136 CONG. REC.
17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin, chief sponsor of the ADA) (describing the ADA
as the "Emancipation Proclamation" for the disabled); 135 CONG. REC. 19,807 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (asserting that the ADA "has the potential to become one of
the great civil rights laws of our generation").
17. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
I& See 29 U.S.C.A. § 791(b) (1999) (requiring affirmative action for disabled
employees by "[e]ach department, agency, and instrumentality (including the United
States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch and the
Smithsonian Institution"). Courts consistently have interpreted this statute's affirmative
action requirement to include an antidiscrimination mandate. See ROBERT L. BURGDORF
JR., DIsABULIry DIsCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 38 (1995).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1994) (requiring businesses having federal contracts of
$10,000 or more to "take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
qualified individuals with disabilities"). Courts consistently have interpreted this statute's
affirmative action requirement to include an antidiscrimination mandate. See
BURGDORF, supra note 18, at 38.
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination by "any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or ... any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service").
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) (explaining that the purpose of exercising
congressional authority was "to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day
by people with disabilities"); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y 1.1/5:101-116) (finding that disability discrimination "still persists in such critical areas as
[Vol. 78
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Rehabilitation Act's antidiscrimination provisions to cover most of
private sector employment
Through this expansion, Congress hoped to establish a
"comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."23 To achieve this
objective, the ADA broadly prohibits employers from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual," with regard to all terms
and conditions of employment, including hiring, training,
compensation, advancement, and termination?4  This general
prohibition translates into three specific requirements for stating a
disability discrimination claim.' First, the plaintiff must have a
"disability." Second, the plaintiff must be a "qualified individual" for
the job. Third, the employer must take an adverse employment
action against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's disability.
An individual may establish a "disability" to meet the first ADA
requirement either by (1) having a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities2 6 or (2)
employment in the private sector").
22- See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Because the ADA was viewed in some ways as an
extension of the Rehabilitation Act, relevant case law developed under the Rehabilitation
Act has been deemed generally applicable in interpreting analogous portions of the ADA.
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (1999). This Article therefore cites to
Rehabilitation Act cases where helpful to analyze the ADA.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 5.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (providing specific examples of the
types of employment decisions that may not be colored by an individual's disability
status).
25. See Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1996) (defining
the requirements of a prima facie case under the ADA); Benson v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 62 F.3d 1108,1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (same).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
regulations define three of the terms in this statutory definition of an actual disability. A
"physical or mental impairment" includes:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h); see id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (explaining the definition of a
physical or mental impairment). "[S]ubstantially limits" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to
the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
2000] 909
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being regarded as having such an impairment.2 7 The first definition
covers those with "actual" disabilities: individuals who currently
experience a substantially limiting impairment. The second definition
covers individuals who do not have, and typically have never had, an
actual disability. Instead, the second definition covers individuals
who are mistakenly "regarded as" being disabled by their employer.
It is this second definition-the "perceived disability" prong-that is
the focus of this Article's critique.
To establish a perceived disability, a plaintiff must prove that an
employer regarded the plaintiff as having the type of disability
covered by the actual disability prong. In other words, the plaintiff
must show that the employer mistakenly regarded the plaintiff as
having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities. 28 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has described three general types of perceived
disabilities:2 9
population can perform that same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.20)(1). To assess whether an individual is "substantially limited," the EEOC
directs courts to consider "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration
or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or
the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." Id.
§ 1630.20)(2); see id pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) (explaining the definition of a substantial
limitation). Finally, the term "major life activity" is defined as "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." Id pt. 1630 § 1630.2(i). Major life activities include the "basic
activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no
difficulty." Id. app. § 1630.2(i) (adding sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching to the list of
major life activities set forth in the statute).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The ADA also provides a third way to meet the
disability requirement: by showing that the plaintiff has a "record of" a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Id § 12102(2)(B). The "record
of" prong of the disability definition applies to individuals who previously had-but no
longer have-an actual disability as defined in § 12102(2)(A). Because individuals
covered under the ADA's "record of" prong are similar to individuals covered under the
ADA's "regarded as" prong in that neither face the pervasive structural or dynamic
discrimination faced by individuals with actual disabilities, see infra notes 179-80 and
accompanying text, the arguments about perceived disabilities in Parts II and III should
apply to claims under the "record of" prong as well.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(0; Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139,2150 (1999).
29. The ADA authorized the EEOC to issue implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 12116, and those regulations appear at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999). The EEOC also
prepared an "Interpretive Guidance" for Title I, which appears in an appendix to the
EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1999). To date, the United States Supreme
Court has declined to rule on the weight of the EEOC regulations and has suggested that
the regulations interpreting the term "disability" may be due no weight at all. See Sutton,
119 S. Ct. at 2145. Lower courts, however, generally give "substantial deference" to the
regulations. See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 203 n.10 (3d
[Vol. 78
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(1) The individual may have an impairment which is not
substantially limiting but is perceived by the employer.., as
constituting a substantially limiting impairment;
(2) The individual may have an impairment which is only
substantially limiting because of the attitudes of others
toward the impairment; or
(3) The individual may have no impairment at all but is
regarded by the employer ... as having a substantially
limiting impairment."
The EEOC also has provided an example of each type of
perceived disability.31 The first type covers an employee who has
controlled high blood pressure that does not limit the employee
substantially in any major life activities but that the employer
mistakenly views as substantially limiting.32 If the employer reassigns
the employee to less strenuous work based on unsubstantiated fears
that the employee would suffer a heart attack, the employee has the
first type of perceived disability.33 The second type covers an
employee who has a prominent facial scar or disfigurement or a
condition that periodically causes an involuntary jerk of the head but
that does not limit the person substantially in any major life
activities? 4 If the employer treats the employee differently by
reassigning the employee to a night shift because of customers'
Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). Although the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance is "not part of the regulations, but is, instead, the EEOC's
interpretation of those regulations," Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191
n.3 (5th Cir. 1996), most courts still give the Interpretive Guidance "'considerable
weight' " when the statute is ambiguous, unless the statute or legislative history indicates
that Congress intended an alternative position. E.g., Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.,
102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). The EEOC also has published a
technical assistance manual to assist employers with compliance problems. See EEOC
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3. Although courts do not give the
technical assistance manual the "substantial deference" given to regulations that are
adopted formally under the Administrative Procedures Act, courts generally give the
manual at least a modest degree of deference when interpreting the ADA. See, e.g.,
Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 213 n.5.
30. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2() (explaining the scope of the perceived disability
prong); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2.2(c), at II-10 to -11;
see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452-53 (describing the three types of perceived
disability claims); id., pt. 2, at 53, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335-36 (same); S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 23 (1989) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (same).
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negative reactions, the employee would have the second type of
perceived disability.35 The third type covers an employee who has no
history of illness but who is discharged because of the employer's
mistaken belief that the individual has an infectious disease.36
These three types of perceived disabilities share one
commonality: the plaintiff lacks a condition that, absent the
misperceptions of others, substantially limits any of the plaintiff's
major life activities. In other words, a perceived disability plaintiff
lacks an actual disability,37 just like all other nondisabled employees
who, in contrast, are not protected by the ADA. The first two types
of perceived disabilities also share another common feature.
Individuals in the first two categories possess some physical or mental
"impairment" that may limit job performance, although the
impairment does not constitute an actually disabling condition. This
common feature of the first two types of perceived disabilities is also
shared with many nondisabled workers, who may have physical or
mental impairments that impact performance but that do not rise to
the level of a substantially limiting condition.38 What makes these
perceived disability plaintiffs different from other nondisabled
individuals is employers' mistaken perception that they possess actual
disabilities (or the employers' ratification of the misperceptions of
others). These mistaken perceptions by the employers-not any
physical or mental characteristic of the employees-allows these
individuals to meet the "disability" requirement for an ADA
discrimination claim.
After proving the first requirement of having a "disability,"
either actual or perceived, the plaintiff must establish the second
ADA requirement: that the plaintiff is a "qualified individual" for
the job. Rather than providing different definitions of a "qualified
individual" to correspond with the different types of disabilities, the
ADA has only a single definition. A "qualified individual" is "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires."39 This
single definition, which appears to apply to both actual and perceived
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2160 (1999); EEOC
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANuAL, supra note 3, § 2.2(c), at I1-10.
38. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.20) ("Many impairments do not impact an
individual's life to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.").
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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disabilities, is the genesis of the "unfair advantage" critique. To
understand the potential advantage for perceived disability plaintiffs
requires an explanation of the two core components of this single
definition: (1) the right given to the employee to receive "reasonable
accommodations"; and (2) the limit placed on the employer to
require performance of only the "essential functions" of the job.
In general, reasonable accommodations include any type of
modification or adjustment to the operational work environment,
including the manner or circumstances in which the position is
customarily performed, to allow a disabled employee to do the job.4°
Typically, a reasonable accommodation involves "job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters, and other similar accommodations."'" These typical
accommodations focus on eliminating the performance impact that
results when an employee with a substantially limiting impairment is
required to perform a job in an operational environment constructed
around the narrow vision of an able-bodied employee.
Individuals with disabilities not only are entitled to reasonable
accommodations to enable job performance, but they also are
required to perform only the "essential" functions of the job.
Essential job functions are the "fundamental job duties of the
employment position."'4 For a duty to be an essential function, the
employer actually must require the employee to perform the duty,
and removing the duty must alter the position fundamentally.43 Thus,
a particular duty may be essential if the reason that the position exists
is to perform that function, or if the task is highly specialized and the
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i)-(iii).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(i)-(ii) (identifying typical
accommodations, including facility modification and job restructuring); id. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.2(o) (listing other forms of reasonable accommodation, including "permitting the
use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment,"
"[p]roviding personal assistants, such as a page turner for an employee with no hands or a
travel attendant to act as a sighted guide to assist a blind employee on occasional business
trips," or "making employer provided transportation accessible, and providing reserved
parking spaces"); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.10, at III-
16 to -33 (providing detailed examples of reasonable accommodations). An
accommodation is not considered "reasonable" if it would impose an "undue hardship" on
the employer. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(p), 1630.15(d); id.
pt. 1630 app. §§ 1630.2(p), 1630.15(d).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
43. See id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n).
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applicant is hired specifically for the ability to perform the task, or if a
limited number of employees exist to whom the employer could
redistribute the task.' Duties that fall outside the essential job
functions are considered "marginal." 45 Under the ADA's definition
of a "qualified individual," a plaintiff must be able to perform only
the essential job functions to satisfy the second requirement of an
ADA claim.46 Disabled employees are still considered "qualified"
even if they cannot perform marginal job tasks.
Because the ADA affirmatively obligates employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to allow disabled employees to perform
essential job functions, the failure to do so is considered a form of
disability discrimination.47 The ADA prohibits seven types of
"discrimination," 48 all but one of which mirror the types of
discrimination covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII") and the case law interpreting that statute.49 The one
additional type is the failure to reasonably accommodate. An
employer commits unlawful discrimination by "not making
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is
an applicant or employee" or by "denying employment opportunities
to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such
44. See iL § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n). Courts must give
"consideration" to the employer's judgment about which job functions are essential and
treat prior written job descriptions as "evidence" in making that assessment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(ii); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(n). The EEOC also
instructs courts to consider: "[1] The amount of time spent on the job performing the
function; [2] the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; [3]
The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; [4] The work experience of past
incumbents in the job; and/or [5] the current work experience of incumbents in similar
jobs." Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii)-(vii); see id app. § 1630.2(n) (providing examples of these
criteria).
45. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2.3(2), at 11-12.
46. See29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 ("The obligation
to make reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination."); see also Pamela S.
Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1996) (explaining that the concept of reasonable
accommodation is not only "integral to defining the class of protected individuals," but
also "constitutes a separate species of discrimination").
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(7).
49. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 5-6 & nn.18-21 (explaining in detail
the parallel discrimination provisions in the ADA and Title VII). Title VII prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
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covered entity to make reasonable accommodation." 0
By constructing the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules as part of the ADA's antidiscrimination provisions,
Congress envisioned them as a means of providing equal opportunity,
not as a way to advantage individuals with disabilities over those
without.' As one court has noted, "[w]ith the passage of the ADA,
Congress intended not to erect impenetrable spheres of protection
around the disabled, but hoped merely 'to level the playing field' for
them."52 A level playing field means "an opportunity to attain the
same level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits and
privileges of employment as are available to the average similarly
situated employee without a disability."53 Congress recognized that a
simple antidiscrimination mandate would fall short of a "level playing
field" for some individuals with actual disabilities who may have
vocationally relevant characteristics that impact performance in the
arbitrarily designed, conventional workplace.54 As will be explained
in Parts ll.C and lI.C, the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules are needed to achieve equal opportunity for those
individuals.
This theory of equal opportunity runs into some difficulty in the
context of perceived disability claims. Objectively, a perceived
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)-(b) (explaining the
prohibition against failing to provide reasonable accommodation).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,462 ("This reasonable accommodation requirement is
central to the non-discrimination mandate of the ADA."); id., pt. 2, at 55, 71, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337, 353-54 (describing the essential functions limit as a means of
eliminating bias); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31 (1989) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116)
(describing the accommodations duty as "a form of non-discrimination").
52. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 208 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995)), rev'd on other
grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
53. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (stating that the
ADA's goal is to "assure equality of opportunity"); id. § 12101(a)(9) (explaining that
discrimination "denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (stating that the ADA "seeks to ensure access
to equal employment opportunities based on merit" and to allow the disabled "to receive
equal opportunities to compete"); id ("The ADA is a federal antidiscrimination statute
designed to remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from
enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available to persons without
disabilities."); id pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a) (describing the ADA as an "anti-
discrimination" statute that "requires that individuals with disabilities be given the same
consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are given").
54. See 136 CONG. REc. 10,874 (1990) (statement of Rep. Matsui) (explaining that the
ADA "will make the playing field a little more even for those with disabilities to compete
in the workplace" because "[s]o many doors are now closed.., simply because their needs
do not conform to the current rules of the game"); infra Parts II.C and III.C.
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disability plaintiff is the same in vocationally relevant ways as a
"similarly situated employee without a disability."5 5 As a group,
perceived disability plaintiffs do not face the structural discrimination
faced by individuals with actual disabilities. Those with perceived
disabilities, along with the rest of the nondisabled workforce, make
up the able-bodied majority around which the operational workplace
was designed. The only relevant difference between a perceived
disability plaintiff and any other nondisabled worker is an employer's
subjective misperception. Unfortunately, the ADA does not explain
whether someone who is only perceived to be disabled should be
subject to the same "qualified individual" test as someone with an
actual disability, even though the perceived disability plaintiff has no
substantially limiting impairment. This issue matters most for
individuals in the first two categories of perceived disabilities-
individuals who do possess some type of nondisabling physical or
mental impairment that may make them unable to perform some
required job functions without accommodation. The question is
whether the employer's misperception-which is what qualifies these
otherwise nondisabled employees for ADA protection-should
entitle perceived disability plaintiffs to the same reasonable
accommodations right and essential functions limit as those who are
actually disabled.
B. Challenge to the "Level Playing Field" Assumption in Perceived
Disability Cases
To illustrate the potential advantage that results from applying
the same qualification standards for actual disability claims to
perceived disability claims-and to illustrate the difference between
the two-consider a hypothetical employer and three hypothetical
employees. Employees A, B, and C all work as nursing assistants for
ABC Company. Employee A is the only one who has an actual
disability, lower body paralysis, which requires the use of a
wheelchair. Lower body paralysis substantially limits Employee A in
at least the major life activities of walking and standing,56 which
creates additional employment barriers for Employee A in many
conventional workplaces that are designed around the unstated norm
of an employee who can work while standing. Because of Employee
55. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (describing this standard for assessing equal
opportunity).
56. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i), (j); see also id. § 1630.2(h) (defining
"impairment"); cf. id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i) (explaining that "[a]n individual who uses
artificial legs would likewise be substantially limited").
[Vol. 78
PERCEIVED DISABILITIES
A's lower body paralysis, Employee A is unable to climb a ladder to
restock supplies on the top shelf of the storeroom. Restocking the
top shelf is a required, but nonessential, function of a nursing
assistant's job. 7 Employee A is also unable to lift a post-operative
patient from a transport gurney into a regular hospital bed.
Employee A has sufficient upper body strength and dexterity to
perform this task, but the transport gurney was designed at a height
that makes it difficult for Employee A to reach, precluding Employee
A from exhibiting A's skill in this essential lifting task. Employee A
could perform the task if the transport gurney was designed at a lower
height or equipped with an adjustable height mechanism, or
Employee A could perform the task with the help of another nursing
assistant. Employee A can perform all of the other functions of the
job.
Unlike Employee A, Employee B does not have an actual
disability. Employee B has mild carpal tunnel syndrome in one wrist,
which does not limit Employee B substantially in any major life
activities.58 But Employee B's nondisabling impairment does impact
Employee B's ability to do the nursing assistant's job. Because of
Employee B's carpal tunnel syndrome, Employee B has exactly the
same performance limits as Employee A. Employee B is unable to
climb the ladder to restock the top shelf because that nonessential
task requires both hands to perform sustained gripping-one hand
grasping the ladder rail and the other replacing items on the shelf.
Employee B is also unable to lift a post-operative patient from a
transport gurney into a regular hospital bed because the carpal tunnel
syndrome prevents Employee B from manipulating very heavy
objects at a certain height. Just like Employee A, Employee B could
57. For an explanation of the difference between essential and nonessential functions,
see supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
58. While courts have reached different outcomes on whether carpal tunnel syndrome
constitutes an actual disability, many have held that it does not. See Kathleen M. Sheil,
Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Are Your Wrists Protected?, 23 J. CORP. L. 325,
331-41 (1998) (summarizing the case law on this issue). The other facts for the
hypothetical Employee B are based loosely on the facts in Deane v. Pocono Medical
Center, 7 AD Cases (BNA) 189, 199-202 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d
138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). In Deane, the plaintiff had a nondisabling wrist injury that
prevented her from performing the essential lifting tasks of her position as a registered
nurse on the medical/surgical floor of a medical center. See id. at 199-200. Even though
Deane's wrist injury imposed some lifting restrictions, the wrist injury did not constitute an
actual disability because it did not substantially limit Deane's ability to lift or to do other
major life activities. See id. at 199-202. Deane was not substantially limited in her ability
to work because there were many registered nursing jobs on floors other than the
medical/surgical floor (e.g., in pediatrics or oncology) for which heavy lifting was not
required. See id.
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perform the essential lifting function with a redesigned gurney or with
another nursing assistant's help, and Employee B can perform all of
the other functions of the job.
Like Employee B, Employee C also lacks an actual disability.
Employee C has a knee injury that only affects Employee C's leg
strength within a certain range of motion. Although Employee C is
not actually disabled because the knee injury does not limit Employee
C substantially in any major life activities, Employee C's knee injury
impacts Employee C's ability to do the nursing assistant's job in
exactly the same way as Employees A and B. Employee C is unable
to climb the step ladder to restock the top shelf because the narrow
rungs and steep incline exceed Employee C's comfortable range of
motion. Employee C is also unable to lift a patient from a transport
gurney into a regular hospital bed because of the pivoting motion
required. Just like Employees A and B, Employee C could perform
the essential lifting function with a redesigned gurney or another
nursing assistant's help, and Employee C can perform all of the other
job functions.
Employees B and C both have nondisabling conditions that
impact their ability to perform the job in exactly the same way. While
Employees B and C are physically identical for purposes of the job,
assume that ABC Company's perception of them is not the same.
ABC Company incorrectly views Employee B's mild carpal tunnel
syndrome as a disability-in other words, the company believes that
mild carpal tunnel syndrome is always a substantially limiting
impairment, even though it is not. In contrast, ABC Company
accurately perceives Employee C's knee injury as a limiting but
nondisabling condition.
ABC Company wants to fire all three employees. Because
Employee A's lower body paralysis is an actual disability, Employee
A is protected by the ADA. If ABC Company fired Employee A,
Employee A could state a viable discrimination claim. To be
"qualified" for the job, the ADA would require Employee A to
perform only the essential lifting function (not the marginal
restocking function), and ABC Company could be required either to
redesign the transport gurney or to provide an assistant to help
Employee A perform the lifting task. 9 In contrast, Employee C
59. Cf. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) ("Providing personal assistants, such as a
page turner for an employee with no hands ... may also be a reasonable
accommodation."). For an explanation of conventional forms of reasonable
accommodation, see supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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would not have an ADA claim. Because Employee C has neither an
actual nor a perceived disability, Employee C is not protected by the
ADA. ABC Company could fire Employee C for not performing the
marginal restocking function or for not performing the essential
patient-lifting function, and ABC would be under no obligation to
modify workplace operations to assist Employee C in the essential
lifting task.' °
What about Employee B, who has a nondisabling condition like
Employee C, but whom the employer perceives to be disabled like
Employee A? Although Employee B's mild carpal tunnel syndrome
is not an actual disability, Employee B has a perceived disability and
therefore meets the "disability" requirement of an ADA claim. If
courts interpret the "qualified individual" requirement to apply
identically to perceived and actual disabilities, then Employees B and
A would fare exactly the same. If ABC Company fired Employee B,
then Employee B would have a viable claim and the full array of
statutory remedies, just like Employee A. Although Employee B's
disability is perceived, rather than actual, the traditional qualification
rules would require Employee B to perform only the essential lifting
function (not the marginal restocking function), and ABC Company
could be required to provide a redesigned gurney or an assistant to
enable Employee B to perform the lifting task. This would be the
case even if ABC's misperception was not shared by a single other
employer.6' Even though Employees B and C are objectively the
most similar, such an interpretation would place Employee B in a far
better position than Employee C, solely because of ABC Company's
incorrect perception of Employee B.
The ADA intends the divergent outcome between Employee A
(the worker with an actual disability) and Employee C (the correctly
60. This Article does not argue that the outcome for Employee C (who may face
adverse employment decisions for the inability to perform a marginal job function or for
needing accommodations to perform an essential job function) is necessarily a desirable,
morally just, or even an economically efficient outcome. This Article simply notes that
such an outcome is permissible under current law. As long as the employee is not a
member of an identifiable and legally protected class, employers currently are free to
make those types of employment decisions. Similarly, this Article ultimately argues that
treating Employee B identically to Employee A is "incorrect" only in the narrow sense
that such treatment would be inconsistent with the ADA's stated goals and legislative
intent.
61. See EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (holding
that the ADA's perceived disability prong applies "whether or not the employer's
perception was shared by others in the field"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2() (stating
that an employee could be covered by the perceived disability prong "whether or not the
employer's or other covered entity's perception were shared by others in the field").
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perceived, nondisabled worker), which results from applying the
difference-based qualification standards to Employee A. Employee
A is a member of a "discrete and insular minority who have been
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment," and systematically excluded from the
conventional workplace 62-in this case, because most workplaces are
designed arbitrarily around the unstated norm of an employee who
can work while standing. The question is whether courts should
interpret the ADA to create the same divergent outcome between
Employee B (the misperceived but otherwise nondisabled worker)
and Employee C (the correctly perceived, nondisabled worker). Can
a divergent outcome between Employees B and C be justified by the
ADA's goal of equal opportunity, just like the divergent outcome
between Employees A and C? While almost no court has taken time
to analyze this justification question, the vast majority of courts have
answered the basic interpretation question in the affirmative. This
majority approach-the "all" approach-equates a misperceived
Employee B with a disabled Employee A, granting both employees a
cause of action and all available statutory remedies.
Some courts explicitly have adopted this "all" interpretation by
directly applying the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions elements of the "qualified individual" test identically to
actual and perceived disability claims. In Katz v. City Metal Co.,63 for
example, a scrap metal salesperson claimed that his employer failed
to accommodate his perceived disability. Although the plaintiff had
physical limitations after a heart attack, including "great difficulty
breathing," the need to "keep his stress to a minimum," and being
"extremely limited in his ability to walk," he did not have an actual
disability.' 4 Nonetheless, the First Circuit denied the employer's
summary judgment motion and allowed the case to go forward on a
perceived disability theory, even though the plaintiff could not
perform all of the job duties as originally designed.65 The court
explained that while the perceived disability prong does protect
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct.
2139, 2152 (1999) (Ginsberg, J, concurring) (relying on the "discrete and insular minority"
concept to determine the proper scope of the ADA's actual disability prong).
63. 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996). For general discussions of Katz, see Michael D.
Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the Bag: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate Perceived
Disabilities, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 603, 612-14 (1998), and Allen Dudley, Comment, Rights to
Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for "Regarded As"
Disabled Individuals, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 389,398-99 (1999).




individuals who are not "disabled at all," Congress "had principally in
mind the more usual case in which a plaintiff has a long-term medical
condition of some kind, and the employer exaggerates its
significance."' The court therefore held that the "second element of
proof" for perceived disability claims is the "ability to perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation," just like it is for actual disability claims.67 Because
the employer arguably perceived the plaintiff as disabled after his
heart attack, the court denied the employer's summary judgment
motion and gave the plaintiff the opportunity to prove that he could
perform the essential job functions of a scrap metal salesperson with
accommodations, such as an initial limited-capacity position or part-
time work.68
The Katz court thereby endorsed the use of the ADA's
difference-based qualification standards for someone whose
"disability" exists solely in the employer's mind. If the employer had
perceived the plaintiff's nondisabling impairments correctly, the
plaintiff would have been like our hypothetical Employee C and
would have lacked recourse for termination. But because the
employer incorrectly perceived the plaintiff's impairments as
disabling, the employee was entitled to reasonable accommodations
and was not required to perform marginal job duties, just like our
actually disabled Employee A. While the Katz court thus interpreted
the ADA to apply the qualification standards identically to actual and
perceived disabilities, the opinion conspicuously lacked an analysis of
whether that interpretation was consistent with the ADA's level
playing field objective for perceived disability claims.
Several district courts have reached the same conclusion as Katz
by similarly applying the reasonable accommodations right and the
essential functions limit identically to actual and perceived
disabilities. For example, in Stradley v. Lafourche Communications,
Inc.,69 the plaintiff claimed that he was fired because the employer
mistakenly viewed his depression and acute anxiety as disabling.
Although the plaintiff's disability was only perceived, the plaintiff
needed accommodation to perform the essential job function of
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id; see also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1527 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that prison officials who perceived HIV-positive inmates as disabled had an "affirmative
obligation under the [Rehabilitation] Act to pursue and implement such alternative,
reasonable accommodations as are possible").
69. 869 F. Supp. 442,443 (E.D. La. 1994).
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regular attendance.7 ° The court applied the same definition of a
"qualified individual" as for actual disabilities and denied the
employer's summary judgment motion.71  Although the plaintiff's
limitations did not stem from an actual disability, the court still
analyzed whether the plaintiff "was able to perform his job with
reasonable accommodation," such as restructuring the company's
paid and unpaid leave rules or transferring the employee to a less
stressful position.72 As in Katz, if the employer's perception of the
plaintiff's condition had been accurate, the plaintiff would have been
similar to our hypothetical Employee C and lawfully could have been
terminated for poor attendance. However, as in Katz, the Stradley
court applied the "qualified individual" test identically for the
perceived disability, thereby equating the plaintiff with our
hypothetical Employee A. As in Katz, the Stradley court reached this
conclusion without analyzing whether the difference-based
qualification standards were consistent with the ADA's equal
opportunity goal.73
While many courts ultimately dismiss perceived disability claims,
even losing claims provide support for the pervasive view that the
reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules apply
identically to actual and perceived disabilities. In some cases, courts
dismiss perceived disability claims because accommodating the
70. See id.
71. See id. at 444, 445.
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id.; see also Pinkerton v. City of Tampa, 981 F. Supp. 1455, 1457 (M.D. Fla. 1997)
(applying the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules to a perceived
disability claim by a police officer with a nondisabling hand impairment and denying the
employer's summary judgment motion because "[m]aterial issues of fact remain as to
whether the City regarded Plaintiff as disabled, whether Plaintiff can perform the essential
functions of her position, and if not, whether a reasonable accommodation by the City of
Tampa would enable her to do so"); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 950 F.
Supp. 693, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("Since a jury could find that plaintiff was regarded as
having a disability, ... [and] plaintiff was capable of performing his job with the
accommodations defendant made[,] ... plaintiff meets the test for a 'qualified individual
with a disability.' "), rev'd in part on other grounds, 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997); Muller v.
Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1406, 1408, 1411-12 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (applying the
reasonable accommodations and essehtial functions rules to a perceived disability claim by
a plant foreperson with a nondisabling spinal injury and denying the employer's summary
judgment motion because the plaintiff "raised material fact question[s]" regarding
accommodations for her perceived disability); Spath v. Berry Plastics Corp., 900 F. Supp.
893, 903-04 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (applying the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules to a perceived disability claim by a sales representative with a nondisabling
ankle injury and denying the employer's summary judgment motion in part because the
employer "produced no evidence of its inability to accommodate [the employee's]
perceived disability" by allowing her to work from home).
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plaintiffs' nondisabling impairments is impossible,74 and in other
cases, courts dismiss because the employer provided all reasonable
accommodations available. 5 Although the perceived disability claims
were unsuccessful in these cases, courts in both scenarios first had to
accept the threshold proposition that perceived disability plaintiffs
are entitled to reasonable accommodations to perform the essential
functions of their jobs in order to dismiss the cases on
accommodation-related grounds.
Gerdes v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc.76 is a typical case in which the court
dismissed a perceived disability claim, but nevertheless assumed that
the "qualified individual" standards apply. In Gerdes, a maintenance
supervisor at a meat-processing plant claimed that "his employer
failed to accommodate his perceived disability" by not modifying his
job to meet the physical limits imposed by his nondisabling coronary-
artery disease.7 The court agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to the
74. See, e.g., McAlpin v. National Semiconductor Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1518, 1523-26
(N.D. Tex. 1996) (applying the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules
to a perceived disability claim by an employee with nondisabling sarcoidosis, but denying
the claim because reassignment was the only possible accommodation and no other jobs
were available); Adams v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., No. C-95-1140 DLU, 1996 WL
549399, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1996) (applying the reasonable accommodations and
essential functions rules to a perceived disability claim by a customer service
representative with nondisabling tendinitis, but dismissing the claim because all requested
accommodations were unreasonable or were not shown to improve performance); Lamury
v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1225-PFK, 1995 WL 643835, at *6 (D. Kan. Oct. 5, 1995) (applying
the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules to a perceived disability
claim, but denying the claim because "[e]ven if [the plaintiff] is regarded as disabled under
the ADA, there is no evidence that [the employer] could have made reasonable
accommodation for her in her former position of sheet metal assembler"); see also Joe v.
West, No. 97-1975, 1998 WL 77770, at *1-2 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1998) (affirming the lower
court's application of the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules to a
perceived disability claim by a medical data technician with eye strain and holding that the
plaintiff failed to create a triable issue of fact concerning whether she could perform the
essential functions with an accommodation).
75. See, e.g., Porter v. Mesquite Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 96-CV-3311-BF, 1998 WL
329361, at *5-9 (N.D. Tex. June 11, 1998) (applying the reasonable accommodations and
essential functions rules to a perceived disability claim by a music teacher with a
nondisabling knee and back injury, but denying the claim because, inter alia, the employer
adequately accommodated by rearranging the teacher's class schedule and by limiting her
classes and extracurricular activities); see also Corrigan v. Perry, No. 97-1511, 1998 WL
129929, at *7 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1998) (applying the reasonable accommodations and
essential functions rules to a material handler's perceived disability claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, but dismissing the claim because the plaintiff "failfed] to establish that
he was denied reasonable accommodation" for his nondisabling back and neck injuries
and because the employer adequately accommodated through limited duty and job
restructuring).
76. 949 F. Supp. 1386,1399 (N.D. Iowa 1996), affd, 125 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 1997).
77. Id.
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reasonable accommodations right and the essential functions limit.7"
Although the court ultimately granted the employer summary
judgment because, among other things, no reasonable
accommodations would allow the employee to perform the job, the
court assumed that the employee had a right to reasonable
accommodations in the first place, 9 rather than treating the plaintiff
like our nondisabled Employee C and dismissing the claim at the
outset.
Many other courts, while not yet holding explicitly that the
reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules apply to
perceived disability claims, have at least reached this conclusion
implicitly. They have done so by providing a single analysis of the
"qualified individual" test when a plaintiff brings alternative claims of
actual and perceived disability discrimination in the same case. 0 In
78. See id. at 1401-02 (holding that even if the employee "could generate a genuine
issue of material fact as to perceived disability, he would still be required to show that he is
... a 'qualified individual with a disability' in order to invoke protection under Title I of
the ADA" and that "[t]he ADA defines a 'qualified individual with a disability' as 'an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires' "
(internal citations and emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)
(1994))).
79. See id. at 1399. The Eighth Circuit affirmed because the plaintiff could not prove
that a perceived disability existed; therefore, the court did not need to address the
appropriate qualification standards. See Gerdes, 125 F.3d at 637-38. Nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit indicated in dicta that the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules would apply. See id. at 636-37. Even though the court noted that the
plaintiff "does not assert that he is actually disabled, but rests his ADA claim on the
premise that [the employer] regarded him as such," id. at 637 n.5, the court still stated that,
"[t]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, [the plaintiff] must
show ... that he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without
accommodation," id. at 637 & n.4 (citation omitted).
80. See, e.g., Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 802, 805-09 (5th Cir.
1997) (providing a single analysis of the "qualified individual" test for both the actual and
perceived disability claims of an "expediter," who assisted manufacturers by delivering
supplies, unloading trucks, and storing inventory, but dismissing both claims because the
job alterations or new job that the plaintiff sought for his heart problems were
unreasonable accommodations as a matter of law); Rogers v. International Marine
Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759-60 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff's
failure to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to perform a
mechanic's job with an ankle injury required dismissal of his actual disability claim and
"also dispose[d] of" his perceived disability claim); Pellack v. Thorek Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 9
F. Supp. 2d 984, 988-90 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (providing a single analysis of the "qualified
individual" test for both the actual and perceived disability claims of a medical assistant
with foot impairments, but dismissing both claims because, inter alia, the employer
reasonably accommodated the plaintiff by reassigning her to a receptionist job);
Kalekiristos v. CTF Hotel Management Corp., 958 F. Supp. 641, 655-64 (D.D.C. 1997)
(providing a single analysis of the "qualified individual" test for both the actual and
perceived disability claims of a laundry attendant with back pain, but dismissing both
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Doll v. Brown,81 for example, an electrician who lost his larynx from
cancer claimed that his employer discriminated against him by
denying him a promotion because of his actual disability, or, in the
alternative, because of his perceived disability. The court denied the
employer's summary judgment motion on both claims because a
triable question of fact existed as to whether the employer "excluded
plaintiff from promotion without ever considering whether or not he
could perform the position of foreman with accommodation. ' ' 2
Similarly, in Smith v. Kitterman, Inc.,' the court found a triable issue
of fact as to whether the plaintiff could perform the essential manual
functions of a secondary operator with reasonable job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment, or modified
equipment or devices to accommodate her carpal tunnel syndrome.
That finding precluded the employer's summary judgment motion on
both the plaintiff's actual and perceived disability claims, indicating
the court's implicit view that the reasonable accommodations and
essential functions rules apply identically to both.84
In an even greater number of cases, courts at least have taken
this interpretational stance in dicta. These courts referred to the
"qualified individual" definition as the governing test for a perceived
disability claim (or for both an actual and a perceived disability
claim), but did not apply the test because the case could be decided
on other grounds. In some cases, courts did not apply the difference-
based qualification standards to perceived disability claims because
the plaintiffs failed to prove that the employers regarded them as
truly, disabled.85 In other cases, courts did not apply the difference-
claims because, inter alia, the employer provided a reasonable accommodation), aff'd, 132
F.3d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Marschand v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 876 F. Supp. 1528, 1537-44 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (providing a single analysis of the
"qualified individual" test for both the actual and perceived disability claims of a train
engineer with post-traumatic stress disorder, but dismissing both claims because, inter alia,
the employer provided all accommodations required), affd, 81 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 1996);
see also Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 26-28 & 27 n.11 (1st Cir. 1993) (providing a
single analysis of the Rehabilitation Act's "qualified individual" test for both the actual
and perceived disability claims of an institutional attendant who was terminated for being
morbidly obese); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390-91, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993)
(providing a single analysis of the Rehabilitation Act's "qualified individual" test for both
the actual and perceived disability claims of a plaintiff with insulin-dependent diabetes and
a plaintiff with poor eyesight who both sought driver positions).
81. No. 93-C-4410, 1994 WL 323307, at *4-5, *7 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1994), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 75 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. 897 F. Supp. 423,429-30 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 596, 598-99
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based qualification standards to the perceived disability claims
because the plaintiffs alleged the ability to do the job without
accommodation. 6 Nevertheless, these cases are significant. They
illustrate the overwhelming tendency for courts automatically to
apply the terms of the "qualified individual" test identically to actual
and perceived disability claims. Thus, these cases provide further
evidence that the majority of courts would treat our hypothetical
Employee B (the misperceived but otherwise nondisabled worker)
(8th Cir. 1998) (noting in dicta that the ADA's reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules applied to both the actual and perceived disability claims of a nurse with
depression and anxiety, but not applying the rules to the latter claim because the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate a perceived disability); Walker v. Consolidated Biscuit Co., No. 96-
3747, 1997 WL 359054, at *3-4 (6th Cir. June 26, 1997) (same decision for a plaintiff with
rosacea); Webb v. Mercy Hosp., 102 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1996) (same decision for a
nurse who was dismissed for disruptive behavior); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc.,
100 F.3d 907, 911, 915 (11th Cir. 1996) (same decision for a plaintiff with malignant
lymphoma); MacDonald v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 94 F.3d 1437,1443 (10th Cir. 1996) (same
decision for an airplane mechanic with impaired vision); Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F.
Supp. 331, 336 (D. Kan. 1997) (same decision for a courtesy clerk with asthma); McIntosh
v. Brookdale Hosp. Med. Ctr., 942 F. Supp. 813, 819-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same decision
for a registered nurse with hypertension), aff'd, 125 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished
table decision); see also Partlow v. Runyon, 826 F. Supp. 40, 43, 46 (D.N.H. 1993) (noting
in dicta that the Rehabilitation Act's reasonable accommodations and essential functions
rules applied to the perceived disability claim of an auto mechanic with degenerative joint
disease, but finding it "unnecessary to address the availability of reasonable
accommodations" because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a perceived disability).
Arguably, the United States Supreme Court recently made this same implicit assumption
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999) (citing the single definition
of a "qualified individual with a disability" and, "[i]n turn," citing to both the actual and
perceived disability portions of the "disability" definition).
86. See, e.g., Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1998)
(noting in dicta that the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules applied
to both the actual and perceived disability claims of a monocular-visioned truck driver, but
having no need to apply the rules because the plaintiff could do the job without
accommodation), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999); Doane v. City of Omaha,
115 F.3d 624, 625-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (same decision for a police officer who was blind in
one eye), overruled on other grounds by Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143; EEOC v. Texas Bus
Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 969-74 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (same decision for a morbidly obese van
driver); see also Polesnak v. R.H. Management Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 95-1705, 1997 WL
109245, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 1997) (noting in dicta that the reasonable accommodations
and essential functions rules applied to both the "real or perceived disability" claims of an
obese restaurant manager, but finding no need to apply at least the accommodations rule
because the plaintiff "was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a
restaurant manager" without accommodation); Schnake v. Johnson County Community
College, 961 F. Supp. 1478, 1481-82 (D. Kan. 1997) (same decision for an administrative
secretary with erratic behavior); Lee v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 958 F. Supp. 37,
40, 43-45 (D.N.H. 1997) (noting in dicta that the Rehabilitation Act's reasonable
accommodations and essential functions rules applied to the plaintiff's perceived disability




just like Employee A (the worker with an actual disability), rather
than like Employee C (the correctly perceived, nondisabled worker).
This majority assumption that the "qualified individual" test applies
identically to actual and perceived disabilities appears to be shared by
plaintiffs (and the plaintiffs' bar) as well. 7
Very recently, however, a small minority of courts have started
to reject this majority interpretation.8 Despite the ADA's single
definition of a "qualified individual," these courts have questioned
the appropriateness of mechanically applying the reasonable
accommodations and essential functions rules to perceived disability
claims. Instead, these courts have interpreted the ADA to reach an
87. In some cases, courts did not issue dicta on whether the qualification rules applied
to perceived disability cases when the case could be dismissed on other grounds.
Nevertheless, those cases at least illustrate the plaintiffs' consistent belief that the
reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules apply to their perceived
disability claims. See, e.g., Witter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir.
1998) (dismissing a perceived disability claim by a pilot with psychological conditions for
failure to demonstrate a perceived disability and, therefore, not addressing the plaintiff's
allegation that the employer "discriminated against him on the basis of a perceived
disability by ... not offering a reasonable accommodation"); Yinger v. City of Dearborn,
No. 96-2384, 1997 WL 735323, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 1997) (dismissing on res judicata
grounds a perceived disability claim by a police officer with a paranoid personality
disorder and, therefore, not addressing the plaintiff's allegation "that defendants ... failed
to accommodate his perceived disability in violation of the ADA"); Schluter v. Industrial
Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1441 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (noting arguments by both parties
that assumed that the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules would
apply identically to the plaintiff's actual and perceived disability claims, but not addressing
the qualification issue because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his diabetes was an
actual or perceived disability); see also Lewin v. Medical College of Hampton Rds., 910 F.
Supp. 1161, 1170-71 (E.D. Va. 1996) (dismissing a perceived disability claim by a medical
student with psychological conditions because the alleged perceived disability did not
meet the Rehabilitation Act's requirements and, therefore, not addressing the plaintiff's
allegation that the school discriminated by not "attempting to make a reasonable
accommodation for that perceived disability"), affd, 131 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 1997)
(unpublished table decision); Biddle v. Rubin, No. 95-C-1505, 1996 WL 14001, *10-11
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 9,1996) (dismissing a perceived disability claim by a national bank examiner
who was fired for sexual harassment because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a
perceived disability under the Rehabilitation Act and, therefore, not addressing the
plaintiff's allegation that the employer "was obligated to determine ... whether a
reasonable accommodation of the perceived condition was possible").
88. See, e.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915-17 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S. Ct 794 (2000); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 199, 208 (3d
Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Keck v. New York State Office of
Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (dicta);
Wilson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Coleman v.
Keebler Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102, 1119 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Balliett v. Heydt, Nos. Civ. A. 95-
5184, 95-7182, 1997 WL 611609, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1997) (mem.), affd sub nom.
Balliet v. Heydt, 176 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 186 (1999); Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 475 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (dicta).
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
outcome at the opposite extreme by altogether denying the claims of
perceived disability plaintiffs who seek accommodation on the job.
This new interpretation-the "nothing" approach-leaves the
Employee Bs of the workforce without any remedy at all.
The most significant of these cases is the Third Circuit's decision
in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center. 9 Stacy Deane's situation was in
many ways like that of our hypothetical Employee B, the
misperceived but otherwise nondisabled worker. Deane was working
as a registered nurse at the Pocono Medical Center when a patient
grabbed and twisted her wrist, causing a sprain and tearing cartilage."
After Deane took time off to rehabilitate the injury, her physician
released her back to "light duty," but her residual injury left her
unable to lift more than fifteen to twenty pounds.9' The Medical
Center decided that it could not accommodate Deane's limitations in
her old position.92 Because there were no alternative job openings for
a registered nurse, the Medical Center told Deane that she could not
return to work because of her "handicap" and terminated her
employment. 93  Deane sued the Medical Center for disability
discrimination under the ADA.94
By the time Deane's case reached the Third Circuit, she had
abandoned any claim of actual disability.9 Although Deane's wrist
injury was clearly an "impairment, '96 the injury did not substantially
limit any major life activities. 7  Instead, Deane argued that the
Medical Center mistakenly "regarded her" as disabled by viewing her
limitations as "far worse than they actually were."9" Although she
agreed that she could not do her old nursing job as designed, Deane
89. 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 199-200, 208 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir.
1998) (en banc). For a general discussion of Deane, see Dudley, supra note 63, at 399-408.
90. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 200.
91. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Deane was also unable to perform
repetitive manual tasks, such as typing, see id., but that limit did not play a role in the
court's analysis.
92. See id.
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1999) (defining physical impairment).
97. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 201.
98. Id. Specifically, Deane alleged that the Medical Center incorrectly
believed that she was unable to lift more than ten pounds, push or pull anything,
assist patients in emergency situations, move or assist patients in the activities of
daily living, perform any patient care job at [the Medical Center] or any other
hospital, perform CPR, use the rest of her body to assist patients, work with
psychiatric patients, or use medical equipment.
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claimed that she could do the job with a reasonable accommodation
for her lifting restriction. 9 Deane claimed that the Medical Center
discriminated against her on the basis of a perceived disability by
failing to accommodate her and by terminating her employment.100
Although Deane conceded that she was not actually disabled, she
nevertheless claimed that she was entitled to an accommodation for
her nondisabling wrist injury in order to perform the job's essential
lifting tasks.10' As in most perceived disability cases, neither the
defendant-employer nor the district court questioned this
fundamental assertion."
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit panel decided to raise the issue
sua sponte. The court correctly noted first that the ADA requires the
plaintiff to show a disability-which Deane could do by proving that
the Medical Center regarded her as disabled-and, second, that the
ADA requires the plaintiff to be a "qualified individual" for the
job.0 3 While the court correctly quoted the ADA's definition of a
"qualified individual" as one who, " 'with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position,' "104 the majority did not apply that definition
mechanically to the plaintiff's case, as nearly all prior courts had
done.
The Deane court began with the "common sense notion" that
any employee, "disabled or otherwise," must be able to perform all
job functions, unless the law removes that obligation.05 The court
99. See id. at 201, 207, 210. Specifically, Deane suggested that the Medical Center
should have provided her with one of the following accommodations:
(1) the use of an assistant to help her move or lift patients; (2) the
implementation of a functional nursing approach, in which nurses would perform
only certain types of nursing tasks; and (3) the use of a Hoyer lift to move or lift
patients ... [or] transfer] to another unit within the medical center such as the
pediatrics, oncology, or nursery units, which would not have required heavy
lifting.
Id. at 201.
100. See id. at 200.
101. See id. at 201.
102. See id. at 211 (Becker, J., dissenting) (noting that the issue of whether "a
'regarded as' plaintiff is not statutorily entitled to an accommodation ... was not briefed
by the parties"). The district court granted summary judgment to the Medical Center on
grounds unrelated to the accommodations or essential functions issues. See id. at 204. The
district court held, among other things, that Deane failed to establish the first ADA
requirement of a "disability" because she could not show that the Medical Center
erroneously believed that her wrist injury substantially limited a major life activity. See id.
103. See id. at 202,205.
104. Id. at 205 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994)).
105. Id. at 206.
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had no doubt that the ADA removed that obligation for individuals
with actual disabilities. For such individuals, the court explained,
"Congress recognized that reasonable accommodations would often
be necessary to, in a sense, compensate for the individual's disability
and allow him or her to compete with the non-disabled."'' 6 The court
viewed the essential functions limit as one such accommodation.l1 7 In
other words, excusing an employee from performing marginal job
functions was itself a form of reasonable accommodation that helped
"'level the playing field' "for the actually disabled. 08
Because Deane's impairment did not "rise to the level of being
a[n actual] disability," the court viewed Deane as "at most statutorily
disabled."'1 9 The court explained that, were it not for her employer's
misperception, Deane would not have been protected by the ADA at
all."0 Even though Deane had a nondisabling impairment that
affected her job performance, the court did not believe that her's was
the type of impairment that needed accommodating in order to
achieve equal opportunity."' Accordingly, the court held that the
reasonable accommodations right and the essential functions limit do
not apply to perceived disability claims at all." The court held that
"if an individual is perceived to be but is not actually disabled, he or
she cannot be considered a 'qualified individual with a disability'
unless he or she can, without accommodation, perform all the
essential as well as the marginal functions of the position held or
106. Id. at 208.
107. See id. at 206.
10& Id. at 206, 208 (quoting Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666
(7th Cir. 1995)).
109. Id. at 208.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 207-08 (explaining that, because "the ADA requires an employer to
accommodate only those limitations caused by the individual's disability," "[ojnce
accommodated .... an individual should be on an equal playing field with others and
thereafter would be on his or her own to deal with any non-disabling impairments just as
would any similarly impaired person without a disability").
112. See id. at 209. Judge Becker dissented on the essential functions issue. See id. at
211-16 (Becker, J., dissenting). On the reasonable accommodations issue, he agreed to
"assume arguendo that the majority is correct that a 'regarded as' plaintiff is not
statutorily entitled to an accommodation." Id. at 211 (Becker, J., dissenting).
Nevertheless, he noted his "uncertainty" about the question, which was "not briefed by
the parties" and which could have "wider, unforeseen ramifications that would render this
holding unwise." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). The parties' silence did not deter Judge
Becker from taking a position on the essential functions issue, on which he disagreed with
the majority opinion. Judge Becker concluded that the plain language of the statute
required the court to apply the essential functions limit to perceived disability claims. See




sought.""' To hold otherwise, the court concluded, would give a
perceived disability plaintiff an "undeserved windfall. '1 4 Therefore,
because Stacy Deane needed accommodations to do her nursing job,
the court affirmed summary judgment for the Medical Center.115
Thus, for purposes of the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules, the Deane panel holding would treat our hypothetical
Employee B, whose only disability is in the employer's mind, just like
our nondisabled Employee C, rather than our actually disabled
Employee A, thereby leaving Employee B with neither a claim nor a
remedy under the ADA.
The Deane panel's groundbreaking decision ultimately did not
prevail. The Third Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and the en
banc court unraveled the panel's decision."6 The en banc court first
reversed the panel's holding on the essential functions rule, instead
adopting the mainstream view that a perceived disability plaintiff
need only perform the essential job functions, just like a plaintiff who
has an actual disability."7 Based on that decision, the court only had
to decide the reasonable accommodations issue if the task that Deane
could not perform (lifting patients) was an essential function of her
nursing job. The en banc court remanded for a ruling on that
essential functions question, thereby avoiding a decision on whether
plaintiffs with perceived disabilities have a right to reasonable
accommodation." 8
113. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 209.
114. Id. at 208.
115. See id. at 205,207,210.
116. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138,142-49 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
117. See id. at 140,146-47 (holding "that the plain language of the ADA requires proof
only of a [perceived disability] plaintiff['s] ability to perform a position's essential
functions"). Interestingly, neither party supported the panel's position that a perceived
disability plaintiff must perform all job functions to be deemed qualified. See id. at 140.
For further discussion of the statutory interpretation arguments, see infra Part III.A.
118. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 140-41, 148 n.12 ("[A]s resolution of [the reasonable
accommodations] issue is not necessary to final disposition of this appeal, we will not
decide it."). Judge Greenberg dissented from this portion of the en banc decision. See id.
at 150 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). He would have taken the opportunity to decide the
reasonable accommodations issue, and he would have concluded, as the vacated panel
majority had, that "Congress did not pass the ADA to permit persons without a disability
to demand accommodations." Id. (Greenberg, J., dissenting). Deane is not the only case
in which a court has "decided not to decide" when confronted head-on with the "unfair
advantage" question. See, e.g., Lee v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., No. 95-40474-RH, 1998
WL 344377, at *4 n.11 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 1998) (acknowledging that "[t]here is some
question as to whether [the plaintiff] would be entitled to reasonable accommodation if he
did not in fact suffer from a disability, but was merely perceived as being disabled," but
declining to answer the question); see also Mitchell v. Crowell, 966 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 n.9
(N.D. Ala. 1996) (stating that "the court need not decide the issue of whether one who is
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
After the Third Circuit's en banc decision, there is not a single
circuit court that has accepted the so-called "unfair advantage"
critique. Only one circuit court has declined to apply the reasonable
accommodations rule to perceived disabilities," 9 and no circuit court
has questioned the applicability of the essential functions rule.
Although district courts within the Third Circuit were bound to
follow the Deane panel decision before it was vacated en banc, 2 ° their
application of the reasonable accommodations rule to perceived
disability claims has now lost its foundation, and their application of
the essential functions rule is now defunct. Of the very small number
of district courts in other circuits that have questioned the
mainstream interpretation, most have done so by using the reasoning
of the later-vacated Deane panel decision. Only a few district
courts have concluded without reference to the Deane panel opinion
that the reasonable accommodations right does not apply to
perceived disabilities, and those courts have done so without
meaningful analysis.' - No district court independently has reached
perceived as 'disabled' is entitled to reasonable accommodation" under the Rehabilitation
Act because, even if the right existed, there was no way to reasonably accommodate a
public safety officer whose psychological problems prevented her from obtaining security
clearance).
119. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
district court did not err in failing to give the jury a "reasonable accommodation"
instruction for the plaintiff's perceived disability claim because "an employer need only
accommodate actual disabilities"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 794 (2000). Whether the right to
reasonable accommodations applies to perceived disability claims remains unresolved in
the Third Circuit. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1999)
(stating that "[w]e have yet to resolve" the issue of "whether a 'regarded as' plaintiff is
entitled to accommodation even though he is not disabled"); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch.
Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[I]t remains an open question in this circuit
whether employees are entitled to accommodations if they can only satisfy the 'regarded
as' prong for demonstrating a disability.").
120. See, e.g., Balliett v. Heydt, Nos. Civ. A. 95-5184, 95-7182, 1997 WL 611609, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1997) (mem.) (dismissing a claim by a police officer seeking
accommodations for a perceived mental disability because, "[p]ursuant to Deane, ...
defendants are not required to provide a reasonable accommodation for 'regarding'
plaintiff as disabled"), aff'd sub nom. Baliet v. Heydt, 176 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1999)
(unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 186 (1999); Kotas v. Eastman Kodak
Co., No. Civ. A. 95-CV-1634, 1997 WL 570907, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1997) (mem.)
(noting in dicta the Deane panel's rule that perceived disability claims are not governed by
the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules), afjd, 166 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir.
1998) (unpublished table decision).
121. See, e.g., Coleman v. Keebler Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102, 1119 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing
the Deane panel decision, as quoted in Balliett, 1997 WL 611609, at *6, to support the
position that perceived disability claimants are not entitled to reasonable
accommodations).
122. See, e.g., Matlock v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-2735, 1999 WL 1032601,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 1999) (mem.) (following Weber, 186 F.3d at 917, to deny a claim
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the Deane panel's conclusion that the essential functions limit does
not apply to perceived disability claims. Thus, the overwhelming
weight of current authority supports an identical application of the
difference-based qualification standards to both actual and perceived
disability claims (the "all" approach); a very limited amount of
authority supports an absolute bar on applying the rules to perceived
disabilities (the "nothing" approach); and virtually no authority exists
for any position in between those two extremes.
Courts have reached these conclusions largely without the
guidance of the EEOC. The EEOC "has not taken an official
position" on whether the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules should apply to perceived disability claims under the
ADA.Z3 But the EEOC has taken a stance on perceived disability
claims under the portion of the Rehabilitation Act that prohibits
disability discrimination by federal agencies." In a series of EEOC
decisions on appeal from federal agencies, the EEOC adopted half of
the "all" approach and half of the "nothing" approach by holding
(without developed analysis) that a perceived disability plaintiff is
entitled to the essential functions limit, but is not entitled to the
reasonable accommodations right.125 With respect to the
by a police officer seeking accommodation for his perceived hearing disability); Keck v.
New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating in dicta, without analysis or authority, that there "can be no
claim of discrimination based on failure to accommodate a disability where there is no
actual disability"); Wilson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (N.D. Ga.
1998) (holding that "where the employee informs the employer that he can no longer
perform all of his job duties, the employer does not 'regard' plaintiff as disabled," and
rather than triggering a duty to accommodate, "the 'regarded as disabled' component
should generally disappear"); Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 475
(N.D. Tex. 1997) (citing a Rehabilitation Act case to conclude, in dicta, that "the duty to
make a reasonable accommodation arises only when the individual is disabled" and that
"no such duty arises when the individual merely is 'regarded as' being disabled as defined
under the ADA"); see also Burch v. Henderson, No. 97-1095-CV-W-6, 2000 WL 97184, at
*18 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 27, 2000) (relying on Weber, 186 F.3d at 917, to note in dicta that
perceived disability plaintiffs do not have a right to accommodation under the
Rehabilitation Act).
123. Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12 (citing the EEOC's Amicus Curiae Brief).
124. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 791 (1999); supra note 18 (explaining the scope of this
provision).
125. See, e.g., Clair v. Apfel, No. 01961246, 1998 WL 56612, at *2 (EEOC Feb. 4, 1998)
(stating that "an individual who is merely regarded as having a disability, and does not
actually have such a substantially limiting impairment, does not require a reasonable
accommodation" under the Rehabilitation Act); Huddy v. Runyon, No. 01953454, 1997
WL 348684, at *2 (EEOC June 19, 1997) (stating the same); Schultz v. Runyon, No.
01943634, 1996 WL 562981, at *10 (EEOC Sept. 26, 1996) (stating the same); Olsen v.
Runyon, No. 01943977, 1995 WL 710567, at *6 (EEOC Nov. 29, 1995) (stating the same);
Bookspan v. Dalton, No. 01933203, 1995 WL 384514, at *8 n.2 (EEOC June 22, 1995)
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accommodations rule, the EEOC used the same liability focus as the
majority's "all" interpretation, denying a cause of action altogether to
perceived disability plaintiffs who need accommodations to perform
the job.126
The next two Parts of this Article explain what is wrong with the
majority's "all" approach, which interprets the ADA's qualification
tests identically for actual and perceived disability claims. Part II
argues that applying the reasonable accommodations right to
perceived disability claims in exactly the same way as actual disability
claims creates an unfair advantage that is inconsistent with the
ADA's equal opportunity goal, and Part III makes the same
argument for the essential functions rule.
II. DOES THE ADA UNFAIRLY ADVANTAGE PERCEIVED
DISABILITY PLAINTIFFS BY GIVING THEM A RIGHT TO
"REASONABLE ACcoMMODATIONS"?
The right to reasonable accommodations, as traditionally
conceptualized, should not apply to perceived disability claims in
exactly the same way that it applies to claims of actual disability.
Although most courts have reached the opposite conclusion by
cursory reference to the plain language of the statute, Section A
demonstrates that a thorough analysis of the statute, the EEOC's
regulations and guidelines, and the legislative history does not
provide such a definitive answer. To the contrary, these sources
support the view that perceived disability plaintiffs are not entitled to
(stating the same); Adams v. Reno, No. 03940156, 1995 WL 56878, at *6 (EEOC Feb. 2,
1995) (stating the same); Crisostomo v. Bentsen, No. 01933372, 1994 WY/L 745883, at *6
(EEOC Sept. 1, 1994) (stating the same); Brown v. Runyon, No. 01934737, 1994 WL
746185, at *7 n.3 (EEOC Aug. 16, 1994) (stating the same); Howard v. Widnall, No.
01931905, 1994 WL 747979, at *5 (EEOC May 12, 1994) (stating the same); see also
Cannizzaro, 979 F. Supp. at 475 (citing EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
ADA CASE STUDY TRAINING: TRAINERS MANUAL, CASE STUDY 6 (1996), to support a
holding that perceived disability plaintiffs have no right to reasonable accommodations).
Some have argued incorrectly that the Supreme Court already reached the
opposite conclusion in a 1987 Rehabilitation Act case. See, e.g., Deane, 142 F.3d at 148
n.12 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288-89 (1987)). That
argument is incorrect because Arline did not address the issue. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89.
Arline was decided under the "record of" prong of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 280-81.
Although the Court commented at length on the "regarded as" prong, the case did not
decide a perceived disability claim. See id. Although a portion of the Rehabilitation Act
relied on by Arline has since been amended, see Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831-32
(3d Cir. 1996), the amendment also fails to address the issue of accommodating perceived
disabilities, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994).
126. See, e.g., Huddy, 1997 WL 348684, at *2 (holding that a perceived disability claim
by a plaintiff needing workplace accommodations "would fail").
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traditional forms of workplace accommodation. Section B bolsters
this conclusion by comparing perceived disability claims to other
forms of actionable employment discrimination under Title VII,
which provides no equivalent right to accommodation. Section C
explains why applying the accommodations right identically to
employees with perceived and actual disabilities unfairly advantages
perceived disability plaintiffs by singling them out on the basis of
irrelevant individual characteristics, thereby exceeding the ADA's
equal opportunity goal.
A. Lessons from the Statutory Text, Agency Guidelines, and
Legislative Intent
As explained above, most courts have granted perceived
disability plaintiffs the right to reasonable accommodations by
mechanically applying the definition of a "qualified individual" to all
discrimination claims, whether actual or perceived.1 27 In fact, the
statutory language is far more ambiguous. Most significantly, the
statute does not indicate whether an employer must accommodate
any performance limitation of a protected employee or only those
limitations that are caused by the disability itself." The ADA's
general antidiscrimination rule prohibits employers from
"discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability.'' 2 9  One form of discrimination is "not
127. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text. The ADA's general
antidiscrimination rule says that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability" regarding the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The ADA defines an "individual with a disability" to include
those with substantially limiting impairments that are either actual or perceived. Id.
§ 12102(2)(A), (C). In turn, an individual with a disability is "qualified" if the individual
can perform the essential job functions "with or without reasonable accommodation." Id
§ 12111(8). By simply substituting the definitions for the terms in the general
antidiscrimination rule, courts and commentators have concluded that an employer may
not discriminate against a perceived disability plaintiff who can do the job with reasonable
accommodations and that the failure to reasonably accommodate a perceived disability is
a form of actionable discrimination. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 634 (arguing that the
statutory language "strongly suggests that the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement extends to some individuals who are protected under the perceived disability
theory"); John M. Vande Walle, Note, In the Eye of the Beholder. Issues of Distributive
and Corrective Justice in the ADA's Employment Protection for Persons Regarded as
Disabled, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 919 & nn.191-92 (1998) (citing the definition of
"qualified individual" in 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) as the only support for concluding that "the
act of perceiving the employee as disabled obligates the employer to make reasonable
accommodation").
128. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 207 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd
on other grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added).
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making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. '130
Even if "disability" includes perceived disabilities, these two
provisions arguably limit the employer's accommodation duty to only
those limitations that are caused by the disability-either actual or
perceived.131  A perceived disability is defined by an employer's
mistaken belief, not by any physical or mental characteristic of the
employee. Accordingly, any performance limitations from a
nondisabling impairment are not caused by the perceived disability,
even if the nondisabling impairment is what triggered the employer's
misperception. 32 Thus, an employer may not be discriminating
against a perceived disability plaintiff "because of the disability"
when the employer refuses to accommodate a nondisabling
impairment that is not the statutory basis for the plaintiff's protected
status.'33
Because the statutory terms cannot answer this question
definitively," 4 courts should look to additional interpretational
sources. 35  The EEOC has issued implementing regulations,
interpretive guidelines, and a technical assistance manual to help
courts decipher Title I of the ADA.36 As with the statute itself, a
cursory reading of the EEOC's documents provides superficial
130. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
131. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 207; cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n.
v. 203 N. Lasalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1420 (1999) (interpreting the phrase "on
account of" in the Bankruptcy Code consistent with its common meaning, "because of,"
which identifies "a causal relationship").
132. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208.
133. See id.; see also Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12 (noting the "considerable force" of the
employer's argument that "it simply makes no sense to talk of accommodations for any
physical impairments because, by definition, the impairments are not the statutory cause
of the plaintiff's disability"); Alderson v. Postmaster Gen., 598 F. Supp. 49, 54-55 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (citing similar language in the Rehabilitation Act to hold that the
Rehabilitation Act does not require employers to accommodate limitations of a perceived
disability plaintift).
134. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 641 ("Among the issues that cannot be resolved
simply by reviewing the statutory language is the extent to which the employer's duty to
accommodate extends to individuals who, while not actually disabled, are erroneously
perceived to have a disability."); id. at 634 (noting that the statutory language "may not
definitively resolve the issue").
135. A court may refer to legislative intent when the statutory language is ambiguous.
See Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949). When the statute and congressional intent are
unclear, courts should give effect to permissible constructions of the statute by
administrative agencies. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
136. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1999); id. pt. 1630 app.; EEOC TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE
MANUAL, supra note 3. For a discussion of the weight that courts give to these EEOC
publications, see supra note 29.
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support for applying the reasonable accommodations rule to
perceived disabilities. 37 The EEOC regulations and guidelines both
parrot the statutory definitions that seem to apply the single
"qualified individual" test to both actual and perceived disability
claims.3 8 Upon closer inspection, however, the same ambiguities
appear in the EEOC documents as in the statute itself.
Although the EEOC has not stated specifically whether plaintiffs
with perceived disabilities have the same right as plaintiffs with actual
disabilities to receive the traditional forms of operational workplace
accommodation,'139 all of the EEOC's documents indicate that the
answer is "no." The EEOC materials suggest, in even stronger terms
than the statute, that an employer is obligated to accommodate only
those vocational limitations that are caused by the disability. Like the
statute, the EEOC regulations begin by articulating the general
prohibition against "discriminat[ing] on the basis of disability against
a qualified individual."'" The EEOC's interpretive guidelines then
restate the qualification test with even more explicit causal language
than the statute.' 4' According to the EEOC, "[a]n individual with a
disability is 'otherwise qualified,' ... if he or she is qualified for a job,
except that, because of the disability, he or she needs a reasonable
accommodation."' 42 The EEOC then translates this qualification test
into a description of the employer's obligations, explaining that
"[e]mployers are obligated to make reasonable accommodation only
to the physical or mental limitations resulting from the disability of a
qualified individual with a disability."'43 When a qualified individual
with a disability requests a reasonable accommodation, the EEOC
directs the employer to ascertain "the precise job-related limitations
imposed by the individual's disability" and to determine a way to
137. See, e.g., Lee v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 958 F. Supp. 37,43 (D.N.H. 1997)
(applying the reasonable accommodations rule to a perceived disability claim because the
"regulations define a 'qualified handicapped person' as one who, 'with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position' " (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)).
138. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (prohibiting employment discrimination "against a qualified
individual with a disability"); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(m) (same); id- § 1630.2(g) (defining
an individual with a "disability" to include those with either actual or perceived
disabilities); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g) (same); id. § 1630.2(m) (defining a "[q]ualified
individual with a disability" to include those who can perform the essential job functions,
"with or without reasonable accommodation"); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (same).
139. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(citing the EEOC's Amicus Curiae Brief).
140. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (emphasis added).
141. See id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9.
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
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accommodate and overcome only those particular performance
limitations.144  As the EEOC explains further in its technical
assistance manual: "The reasonable accommodation obligation
applies only to accommodations that reduce barriers to employment
related to a person's disability; it does not apply to accommodations
that a disabled person may request for some other reason. '145
While these EEOC documents make no explicit distinction
between actual and perceived disabilities, the connection between
accommodations and disability-based limitations creates a very
different result when applied to each type of disability. For
individuals with actual disabilities, the "disability" is defined by the
employee's substantially limiting impairment. Because the
conventional workplace is designed unnecessarily around an able-
bodied norm that excludes the different performance modes of
employees with substantially limiting impairments, the employee's
performance limitations are "because of," "resulting from," or
"imposed by" the actual disability, thereby triggering the right to
accommodation. That is not the case for individuals whose
disabilities are only perceived. For perceived disability plaintiffs, the
"disability" is defined by the employer's misperception, not by the
employee's physical or mental impairment. If a perceived disability
plaintiff happens to have a nondisabling impairment that limits job
performance, those limitations are not "because of," "resulting from,"
or "imposed by" the plaintiff's "disability," which exists only in the
form of the employer's misperception. Therefore, any such
limitations should not trigger the right to traditional forms of
operational workplace accommodation. The EEOC's link between
accommodations and disability-based limitations should require
perceived disability plaintiffs to deal with any nondisabling
impairments on their own, "just as would any similarly impaired
person without a disability."' 46
Although the statute and EEOC materials thus indicate that
perceived disability plaintiffs should not have a right to traditional
forms of workplace accommodation, neither source makes this
conclusion explicit. Therefore, it is useful to analyze the legislative
intent and statutory purpose to help clarify this ambiguity.147
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. EEOC TECHNCAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.4, at 111-4 (emphasis
omitted).
146. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198,208 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142
F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en bane).
147. See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (stating, in a Federal Employees
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Unfortunately, the legislative history of the perceived disability prong
is sparse,14 and, like the statute, it fails to address the issue directly.
Legislative silence on this issue may be traced back to the
piecemeal development of the ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.149 The Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability
discrimination in much of the public sector,150 originally defined the
protected category to include only those with actually disabling
impairments.' 51 The Rehabilitation Act required that the employee
be "otherwise qualified"5 for the job, and the implementing
regulations defined "otherwise qualified" to mean that the individual
must be able to perform the essential job functions "with or without
reasonable accommodation."'153
One year after enacting the Rehabilitation Act, Congress
correctly recognized that individuals who mistakenly are regarded as
disabled also face unequal employment opportunities, so Congress
amended the Act to add perceived disabilities to the protected
category. 54 Nevertheless, when Congress expanded the definition of
who is "handicapped," it made no other substantive changes to the
Act or its implementing regulations. The authors apparently assumed
that once an employee with a perceived disability was deemed to be
"handicapped," the rest of the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations
would apply just as appropriately as for actual disabilities. There is
no evidence that Congress considered whether the qualification
Liability Act claim, the general principle that legislative history is instructive when
statutory language is ambiguous).
148. See Risa M. Mish, "Regarded as Disabled" Claims Under the ADA: Safety Net or
Catch-All?, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159, 160 (1998); see also Deane, 7 AD Cases
(BNA) at 202 (noting that there is "little legislative history to assist" courts in determining
"the meaning and application of vague terms and concepts" in the ADA).
149. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
150. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
151. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355, 361
(originally codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)(a) (1976)).
152. Id. § 504,87 Stat. at 394 (originally codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
153. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1999).
154. See Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a),
88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i)-(iii) (1999)). The
Joint Conference Report for the 1974 Amendments explained that
the new definition clarifies the intention to include those persons who are
discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact
handicapped, just as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the person discriminated
against is in fact a member of a racial minority.
S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389; see also
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1987) (discussing the intent
behind the 1974 Amendments).
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standards made sense for perceived disabilities, even though the core
concept of "reasonable accommodations" had been created solely
with actual disabilities in mind. Evidently, Congress assumed that,
because people with perceived disabilities face unequal employment
opportunities, all of the Rehabilitation Act's substantive provisions-
which originally were designed to provide equal opportunity to those
with actual disabilities-would advance that goal just as well for those
whose disabilities were only perceived.
Because Congress's primary objective for the ADA was to
expand the Rehabilitation Act's protection into the private sector,
Congress adopted the core structure, terms, and requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act. 5  Although the ADA replaced the word
"handicapped" with the word "disabled," the ADA otherwise
incorporated the primary definitions directly from the amended
Rehabilitation Act and its regulations. 56 Thus, the question of
whether the reasonable accommodations aspect of the qualification
test should apply to perceived disability claims remained
unaddressed. While the drafters of both statutes clearly intended the
reasonable accommodations rule as part of the "level playing field"
155. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28, 50, 54-55 (1990) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y 1.1/8:101-485), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 310, 332, 336-37 (emphasizing the
need to eliminate discrimination in private sector employment); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 5-
6, 18-19 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (same); id. at 21, 26 (explaining that the
definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" is comparable to the definition in the
Rehabilitation Act's implementing regulations); 135 CONG. REc. 8520 (1989) (statement
of Sen. Jeffords) (describing the ADA's goal to extend application of the Rehabilitation
Act and other federal statutes into the private sector).
156. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 50-51, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 332-33; 136
CONG. REC. 10,857 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); 136 CONG. REC. 10,856 (1990)
(statement of Rep. Hoyer); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2153
(1999) ("The [ADA's] definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2) (1994) (defining the protected categories to include actual and perceived
disabilities), with 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B) (1999) (same). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(defining a qualified individual as one who could perform essential job tasks "with or
without reasonable accommodations"), with 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6) (1999) (same), 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.2(t) (1999) (same), and 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1999) (same). Congress
used the word "disabilities" in the ADA, rather than the word "handicaps" that was used
in the Rehabilitation Act, in order to "reflect[] the preference of persons with disabilities."
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a). Subsequently, the same change was made to the
Rehabilitation Act. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-220,
sec. 403, § 6(9), 112 Stat. 1092, 1101 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9) (1999)).
Congress, however, intended the ADA's definition of a "disability" to be the same as the
Rehabilitation Act's definition of an "individual with handicaps," and Congress intended
case law under the Rehabilitation Act to apply to the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. 3, at 27, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 450; id. pt. 2, at 50, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 332; S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 21; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(g).
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objective for actual disabilities, they apparently did not consider
whether that provision would have the same effect for perceived
disability claims. 157
Congress's failure to consider the ramifications of applying the
reasonable accommodations rule to perceived disability claims was
made all the more likely by the shared congressional image of a
"prototypic" perceived disability. Throughout the congressional
discussions, legislators repeatedly referred to a limited number of
easily understood illustrations to explain the need for the "regarded
as" prong. Those examples all involved nondisabled individuals with
misperceived impairments that did not otherwise impact the
individuals' ability to perform any job functions . 5  For instance,
legislators described adverse employment decisions taken against
people with cosmetic impairments, such as burn scars, or with
asymptomatic conditions, such as a symptomless back anomaly
discovered on an x-ray. 59 As these examples illustrate, there is no
indication that Congress "gave any thought whatsoever to individuals
who ... are not actually disabled but who are impaired to the extent
that they would require accommodation,"' 16 which makes it
157. If courts had addressed this issue under the Rehabilitation Act prior to Congress's
enactment of the ADA, one could argue that Congress implicitly accepted the judicial
interpretation by adopting the same language for the ADA. This argument fails, however,
because there was virtually no case law on perceived disability claims under the
Rehabilitation Act prior to the ADA's enactment. See Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17,
22 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that cases on perceived disability claims were "hen's-teeth
rare"). The EEOC also had not taken a position on perceived disability plaintiffs' right to
reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act until after Congress enacted the
ADA. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
158. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 203 n.11, 210 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting that "none of the examples provided by Congress indicates a concern for
nondisabled individuals who are impaired so as to require accommodation"), rev'd on
other grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). But see id. at 213 (Becker, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that discrimination against an individual with a nondisabling
impairment that requires accommodation is "exactly the scenario the 'regarded as' claim
was designed to prevent" because Congress viewed those individuals as most at risk of
harm from myths, fears, and misperceptions).
159. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-54; id.
pt. 2, at 53,1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335-36; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24.
160. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 203 n.11 (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-
33, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-56); see also Dudley, supra note 63, at 411 (arguing that an
employee whose nondisabling impairment creates "a discernible work-production
deficiency" does not "fit the 'regarded as' image" that Congress had in mind).
Some commentators have argued that Congress's silence on this issue proves that
Congress affirmatively intended to exclude coverage for nondisabled individuals who have
some form of limiting impairment. See, e.g., Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 210, 203 n.11
(stating that because Congress illustrated the "regarded as" prong with examples of
nondisabled individuals who could perform all job functions on their own, one could argue
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unsurprising that Congress failed to consider the impact of the
reasonable accommodations rule.
Although the legislative history does not answer the question
directly, it does provide some indirect clues. At first blush, the
history superficially supports the mainstream view that equates
perceived and actual disabilities for all purposes, including reasonable
accommodations. Congress acknowledged that a perceived disability
may prevent someone from obtaining equal employment
opportunities and that an employer's misperception can cause harm
that is both real and substantial.161 Through the perceived disability
prong, Congress recognized that " 'society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.' "162 Although
an individual with a perceived disability lacks a substantially limiting
impairment, Congress explained that the "reactions of others may
prove just as disabling," and that the reactions can themselves
"'substantially limit that person's ability to work.' "163
Despite this general connection between actual and perceived
that Congress must not have intended to protect individuals who have nondisabling
impairments that need accommodation); Mish, supra note 148, at 161 (arguing that the
ADA's language and legislative history "make clear that the 'regarded as disabled'
provision is intended to benefit only those employees erroneously perceived to be
disabled, and who are in fact fully able to perform the essential functions of that job");
Dudley, supra note 63, at 410 (arguing that the legislative history shows no intent to
"confer[] protective status on individuals with an impairment that negatively affects their
performance of requisite job functions merely because the employer considered the
impairment in making his decision" and that Congress only intended to protect workers
with impairments that do not "have any negative effect at all on the individual's ability to
perform the functions of the job"). That argument proves too much. While it is correct
that Congress did not consider this class of potential plaintiffs when enacting the
"regarded as" prong, whether that omission was deliberate or not is speculation. See
Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 203 n.11. While this Part of the Article agrees that
perceived disability plaintiffs should not be entitled to traditional forms of
accommodation, Part IV argues that the ADA does protect these individuals, just with a
limited set of remedies.
161. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-53; id.
pt. 2, at 53,1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24.
162. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24 (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 284 (1987)); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-30, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
452-54 (same); id. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335 (same); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630.2() (1999) (same).
163. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 453 (quoting Arline, 480
U.S. at 283-84); see id. pt. 2, at 53, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at
283, to articulate the rationale for the "regarded as" prong, which was based on the
substantially limiting effect that misperceptions can have on otherwise-nondisabled




disabilities, a more comprehensive review of the legislative history
shows that Congress indeed viewed perceived disabilities as quite
different from those that are "real." While one purpose for
protecting employees with actual disabilities was to eliminate the
impact of the conventional workplace design,'6 the principle reason
for protecting employees with perceived disabilities was to eliminate
the impact of an employer's mistaken beliefs.16 The perceived
disability prong "focuses on the reactions and perceptions of the
relevant decisionmakers," not on the functional limitations of the
employee.' 66 For perceived disabilities, the focus is solely on the
employer's state of mind.167
Because perceived disabilities obtain protected status due to the
disabling effects of the employer's misperceptions, perceived
disability cases should not trigger the right to traditional, operational
accommodations."s Congress viewed accommodations as a way "to
164. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 310-11 (stating that
discrimination against people with disabilities "includes harms resulting from the
construction of transportation, architectural, and communication barriers or the adoption
or application of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based on
thoughtlessness or indifference-that discrimination resulting from benign neglect"); S.
REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (same); 136 CONG. REC. 10,874 (1990) (statement of Rep. Matsui)
(explaining that the ADA "will make the playing field a little more even for those with
disabilities to compete in the workplace" because "[s]o many doors are now closed ...
simply because their needs do not conform to the current rules of the game").
165. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-31, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-54 ("The
perception of the covered entity is a key element of this test."); iU. pt. 2, at 53, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335-36 (focusing on the reactions that others have to an otherwise
nondisabled individual); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24 (same).
166. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 172 (4th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), overruled on other grounds by Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); see H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-53 (focusing on the employer
rather than the employee); id. pt. 2, at 53, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335 (focusing on the
reactions that others have to an otherwise nondisabled individual); S. REP. No. 101-116, at
23-24 (same); see also Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 953 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating that an impairment's effect on others is what defines a perceived disability claim);
Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996) (explaining that the analysis of a
perceived disability claim focuses not on the employee's abilities, "but rather on the
reactions and perceptions of the persons interacting or working with him"); Wooten v.
Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The focus [of perceived disabilities] is
on the impairment's effect upon the attitudes of others."); Byrne v. Board of Educ., Sch.
of W. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the perceived
disability prong "focuses on the effect that the physical or mental condition has on
others").
167. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 452-53; see also
ERNEST C. HADLEY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW &
PRACTICE 1007 (1999) (commenting on the Rehabilitation Act and identifying the
employer's state of mind as the core of the "regarded as" prong).
168. See HADLEY, supra note 167, at 1007 ("Because the focus is on the employer's
state of mind, [perceived disability] cases do not raise true issues of reasonable
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remove barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities
from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available
to persons without disabilities."'16 9  This view implies that
accommodations be given only for the actual source of the
employee's statutorily defined "disability."'' 0 Like the EEOC's
documents, the legislative history indicates that a causal link is
needed between the disability and the performance limitations that
the employer is obligated to accommodate.'' For employees with
actual disabilities, the source of the statutorily defined "disability" is
the employee's substantially limiting physical or mental
impairment.7 Accordingly, traditional accommodations for actual
disabilities involve physical, structural, or organizational
modifications to the workplace to allow employees who do have
substantially limiting impairments to compete in a conventional
workplace designed for employees who do not. In contrast, the
disabling attribute that creates unequal employment opportunity for
perceived disability plaintiffs lies in the perceptual or social, rather
than the operational, work environment. What makes a perceived
disability plaintiff disabled "is not the individual's impairment, if
impairment there be, but the employer's unfounded stereotypes, fear
or simple misperception that the impairment is serious enough to be
disabling."'7 3 While the employee's nondisabling impairment may
have triggered the employer's mistaken belief, which in turn limits
equal opportunity, the nondisabling impairment is not the statutorily
defined source of the inequality that Congress intended the ADA to
accommodation."); id. at 1012 ("When an employee is regarded as having a disabling
condition she does not indeed possess there is no need for the agency to accommodate
that condition.").
169. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (1999); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 347-48 ("[T]he reasonable accommodation requirement is best
understood as a process in which barriers to a particular individual's equal employment
opportunity are removed."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (same); see also Vande Walle,
supra note 127, at 928 n.253 (summarizing the legislative history regarding congressional
intent to remove barriers to the integrated participation of disabled individuals in the
workplace).
170. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 208 (3d Cir. 1997)
(concluding that congressional intent "virtually mandate[s]" that accommodations be
given "only for that which actually renders an employee disabled" (citing 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. Background)), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
171. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 66, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 348 (stating
that employers must "identif[y] the barriers to job performance caused by the disability");
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 35 (same).
172- See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
173. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208; see also EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 111-2 (explaining that some people are restricted in




Thus, Congress's focus on the employer's state of mind in
perceived disability cases, in conjunction with the EEOC documents
and statutory provisions linking accommodations to limits that are
caused by the disability, indicates that traditional accommodations of
the operational work environment should not apply to perceived
disability claims. Our hypothetical Employee B, for example, should
not be entitled to a redesigned gurney or an assistant to help lift
patients because Employee B's lifting limitation is caused by
Employee B's nondisabling carpal tunnel syndrome, not by the
employer's disabling misperceptions about Employee B's condition.
That is not to say that individuals with nondisabling but "somehow
limiting" impairments should not be covered by the ADA at all (that
is, Employee B should not necessarily end up with exactly the same
fate as our nondisabled Employee C). As discussed in Part IV, this
critique demonstrates instead that perceived disability claims must be
governed by a different conceptualization of the reasonable
accommodations rule.
B. Comparing Perceived Disability Claims to Other Types of
Actionable Employment Discrimination
Comparing disability discrimination to other types of
employment discrimination provides further support for not granting
reasonable accommodations in exactly the same way to perceived as
to actual disability claims. 75 Although both perceived and actual
disability discrimination have much in common with discrimination
on the basis of other protected categories, perceived disability
discrimination is the most analogous to conduct covered by other civil
rights statutes, which do not provide a right to operational workplace
174. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208.
175. In both Parts I1.B and II.C, I undertake this type of comparison, recognizing the
potentially significant problems in drawing analogies between different forms of
discrimination. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-
Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397, 398-410 (explaining in particular how comparing sex
discrimination to race discrimination inadvertently may marginalize and obscure the role
of race and the unique history of racism). Yet analogies and comparisons are "necessary
tools to teach and explain," to "deepen our consciousness," and to "permit us to progress
in our thinking." Id. at 398, 400. Using analogies is thus a two-edged sword, "provid[ing]
both the key to greater comprehension and the danger of false understanding." Id. at 398.
By focusing primarily on the statutory approach to various forms of employment
discrimination, Parts II.B and II.C represent an admittedly imperfect attempt to wield one
edge of the sword without the other.
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accommodations. 7 6
The ADA and other civil rights statutes share the same goal of
equal employment opportunity. The ADA's preamble begins by
noting some general similarities between disability discrimination and
"discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,
religion, or age."'177  Like the members of those other protected
categories,
individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting
from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the
individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society. 8
Yet despite this sweeping analogy, disability discrimination is in
some ways quite unique. Like the members of Title VII's protected
categories, individuals with actual disabilities face inequality because
of employer bias, myth, and misperception. But unlike members of
Title VII's protected categories, individuals with actual disabilities
also face "structural discrimination," which occurs when physical
structures and social practices that are designed for a single group
effectively exclude the members of another group,'79 and/or "dynamic
discrimination," which occurs when a purportedly objective
performance deficiency results solely from readily changeable
176. Title VII contains a very limited version of an accommodations right for religious-
based discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994) (prohibiting employment decisions
based on religion "unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business"). Because religion
raises constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause that are not raised in the
disability context, however, courts have interpreted Title VII's religious accommodations
provision extremely narrowly. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 6-7. Because
the religious accommodations provision in Title VII places employers "under only a very
slight legal obligation," that provision is not comparable to the unique, broad
accommodations rule in the ADA. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 463 (distinguishing the ADA's "significant" accommodation duty from
Title VII's "insignificant" duty to accommodate religious beliefs).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (1994); see id. § 12101(a)(7) (describing the individuals
with disabilities as "a discrete and insular minority").
178. Id. § 12101(a)(7).
179. Wasserman, supra note 13, at 178; see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 311 (describing structural forms of discrimination); S. REP. NO. 101-
116, at 6 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (same).
[Vol. 78
PERCEIVED DISABILITIES
organizational practices. 180 Thus, unlike other protected categories in
which the defining characteristic of group membership is "rarely if
ever relevant to an individual's ability to perform a given job," the
substantially limiting impairments that define the disabled may, in
some instances, be related to vocational capability.' 8' It is not that
actual disabilities necessarily limit a person's ability to do a job, but
rather that the conventional workplace design often reflects an
unstated "able-bodied" norm, which creates very real-albeit socially
constructed-performance limitations.'82
Because of the structural and/or dynamic discrimination faced by
those with actual disabilities, a simple antidiscrimination mandate is
insufficient to achieve equal employment opportunity for some
individuals with substantially limiting impairments.'83  For that
reason, the ADA's definition of "discrimination" includes the failure
to reasonably accommodate. s4  The ADA's reasonable
accommodations right correctly acknowledges the "social model of
disability," which views the functional deficits associated with
disability as "an alterable cultural artifact."'1 5  The duty to
accommodate was needed to eliminate unnecessary barriers for
180. Kelman, supra note 13, at 1160-61, 1170-83 (describing forms of dynamic
discrimination in general-ability job tests); see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 311 (describing dynamic forms of discrimination that result from
"the adoption or application of standards, criteria, practices or procedures that are based
on thoughtlessness or indifference-that discrimination resulting from benign neglect"); S.
REP. NO. 101-116, at 6 (same).
181. Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The Meaning
of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,1428 (1991).
182. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 1614; see also Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in
DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECrIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 13, at 13, 62 (noting that the "supportiveness,
adaptability, and accessibility of the environment can have an enormous effect on whether
impairment limits function"). As Anita Silvers has explained, individuals with disabilities
face inequality from members of the nondisabled, dominant majority who "impose on
others a social or communal situation that best suits themselves, regardless of whether it is
the most productive option for everyone." Silvers, supra, at 73.
183. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1428-29.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994); Cooper, supra note 181, at 1428-29; see also S.
REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (explaining that disability discrimination "includes harms resulting
from the construction of... architecturalo] and communication barriers and the adoption
or application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures based on
thoughtlessness or indifference-of benign neglect"); 136 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1990)
(statement of Rep. Fish) (asserting that "it is not disability which limits one's ability to
participate in life, but it is societal barriers"); 135 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1989) (statement of
Sen. Harkin) (asserting that it is often not the disability that is limiting, but "the obstacles
placed in the way by an indifferent society").
185. Silvers, supra note 182, at 74-76.
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disabled individuals who objectively could not perform a job as
conventionally designed, but who could perform on level ground with
reasonable redesign of workplace operations to eliminate the
exclusionary impact of hidden, able-bodied assumptions."8 6 In
contrast, accommodations were viewed as unnecessary to equalize
opportunity for members of Title VII's protected categories, who
were expected to compete evenly in the conventional workplace once
employers were prohibited from acting on stereotypical assumptions,
mistaken perceptions, and erroneous beliefs.' 7
While the rationale for reasonable accommodations makes sense
for actual disabilities, the discrimination against employees with
186. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1429-30; see also Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that employment decisions
based on "a vocationally relevant disability" are not analogous to other forms of
employment discrimination, but are nevertheless protected under the ADA's expanded
definition of "discrimination").
187. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 208 n.21 (3d Cir. 1997),
rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); see also Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 1-3, 38-39 (explaining how the ADA offers "a
fundamentally different approach" than Title VII in conceptualizing discrimination
because the ADA "incorporates a more explicit understanding of the contingency of
existing job configurations"). This is not to say that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and other employment discrimination
laws were necessarily correct in their assumption that equal employment opportunity may
be achieved without reasonable accommodations in the conventional workplace. For a
persuasive discussion of the potential benefits of extending the reasonable
accommodations concept to antidiscrimination law more generally, see Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 2-5, 38-41. Indeed, contemporary antidiscrimination norms
can provide compelling arguments for why members of Title VII's protected categories
should be entitled to accommodations to modify aspects of the workplace that are
designed arbitrarily around the dominant group in that particular category-for example,
women may have a plausible antidiscrimination claim for accommodations to modify
aspects of the workplace that are arbitrarily designed around men. See Deborah A.
Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. Rnv. 1, 25-49
(1995) (analyzing how current laws might be used to support accommodations for
pregnant women); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, 2-5, 38-41 (analyzing whether or
not the right to accommodation should apply in some form to women); Wasserman, supra
note 13, at 178-79 (describing how the "structural discrimination" argument has been
made as part of the "feminist critique of earlier civil rights law"). But arguments
grounded in contemporary antidiscrimination norms cannot advance a claim for
accommodations by a member of the dominant group in a particular category-i.e.,
antidiscrimination norms cannot justify granting a nondisabled employee accommodations
to modify aspects of the workplace that are designed around the nondisabled simply
because the nondisabled worker is misperceived as disabled. Such an individual faces
discrimination because of the misperception, but not because the workplace is designed
around a dominant group to whom the individual does not belong, since the individual is
in fact part of the nondisabled majority. To make an argument for accommodations in
that situation would require a theory of nondiscrimination divorced from protected
categories or arguments grounded in something other than antidiscrimination norms.
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perceived disabilities is more analogous to racial and other forms of
invidious discrimination. Congress explicitly recognized this analogy
when it amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1974 to add perceived
disabilities to the list of protected categories, a list that was later
adopted by the ADA.' Because individuals with perceived
disabilities are objectively similar to other nondisabled individuals
(any or all of whom may possess nondisabling impairments),
perceived disability plaintiffs are "analogous to capable workers
discriminated against because of their skin color or some other
vocationally irrelevant characteristic."'18 9  Perceived disability
plaintiffs are only believed to possess a substantially limiting
impairment, and, just like members of other protected categories,
they are denied equal employment opportunities as a result of
"archaic attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths." 190 In claims of
perceived disability discrimination, as with claims of racial and other
forms of invidious discrimination, the barrier to equal employment
opportunity is an employer's reliance on social group biases unrelated
to an individual's actual ability to perform;191 the barrier is an
employer's misperception that an irrelevant attribute makes the
employee somehow inferior."9 Because the only "evil" that the
perceived disability prong is intended to combat is the same "evil"
targeted by other civil rights statutes, the rationale for the ADA's
reasonable accommodations rule breaks down: the structural and/or
dynamic forms of employment discrimination supporting
accommodations for those with actual disabilities are absent from
perceived disability claims. 93
188. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389.
Congress explained that
the new definition clarifies the intention to include those persons who are
discriminated against on the basis of handicap, whether or not they are in fact
handicapped, just as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the ground of race, whether or not the person discriminated
against is in fact a member of a racial minority.
Id.
189. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541; see Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208 n.21.
190. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208 n.21 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541.
191. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1427-28.
192. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208 n.21 (citing Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 541).
193. See id. (concluding that "[b]ecause the type of discrimination faced by those who
are perceived to be disabled so closely resembles discrimination on the basis of race, with
the only significant difference being the object of the misperception, we see no reason not
to treat them in like fashion"). According to Karlan and Rutherglen,
[a] disabled individual who could perform the job in its present form, but whom
the employer refuses to hire because of a mistaken belief that she cannot
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Perceived disability claims are also analogous to discrimination
claims covered under other civil rights statutes because they share the
same underlying concept of justice.194  Title VII and other
employment discrimination statutes are consistent with the
"corrective justice" rationale. 95  Corrective justice focuses on
transactional moral wrongs and attempts to achieve equitable
interactions "without reference to any external criterion that
measures the relative worth of the parties.' 1 96  Under a relational
theory, corrective justice imposes a duty on one individual to correct
a moral wrong inflicted on another.197 Under an annulment theory,
corrective justice seeks to rectify unjust losses caused by the
wrongdoing.198 While the focus of these two theories of corrective
perform the requisite tasks or out of revulsion against the worker's disability
(such as a disfiguring cosmetic condition), is simply a victim of traditional
discrimination and reasonable accommodation is irrelevant to her claim.
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 8.
194. This Article discusses two concepts of justice, corrective and distributive, using
what commentators have described as Aristotle's classic distinction between the two. See,
e.g., Anita L. Allen & Maria H. Morales, Hobbes, Formalism, and Corrective Justice, 77
IOWA L. REv. 713, 731 (1992) (explaining Aristotle's distinction between corrective and
distributive justice); Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in
the Debate over Employment At-Will: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
117, 118 (1992) (citing Book V of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics as the basis for the
classic distinction between corrective and distributive justice); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 404-09 (1992) (analyzing Aristotle's accounts of
justice).
195. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 898, 923-24; see also Anita Bernstein,
Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 495-96 n.308 (1997)
(arguing that Title VII's "quasi-tort concerns" entitle a sexual harassment plaintiff to "a
corrective justice right to have her working environment restored"); Patrick 0. Gudridge,
Title VII Arbitration, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 209, 255-56 (1995) (arguing that at
least Title VII's disparate treatment component involves "a form of corrective justice" to
restore employees' entitlements). But see Malin, supra note 194, at 123 (arguing that,
although Title VII appears to be solely corrective, "much of Title VII is distributive in
nature, going beyond correcting the transactional inequalities that result from deliberately
racist employment decisions").
196. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 898.
197. See Allen & Morales, supra note 194, at 714 (stating that relational conceptions of
corrective justice assert that "personal wrongdoing" imposes reparative or compensatory
obligations on the wrongdoer); Jules L. Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427, 435-36, 439 (1992) (explaining that the relational view of
corrective justice "emphasizes the wrong one does and not the losses that might result as a
consequence"); see also Malin, supra note 194, at 119 (stating that the "key" to correctivejustice is redressing damage caused by a "moral wrong in a particular transaction"); Vande
Walle, supra note 127, at 923 (stating that the concern of corrective justice is whether one
party has inflicted a "moral wrong").
198. See Allen & Morales, supra note 194, at 714-15 (stating that annulment
conceptions of corrective justice require wrongful losses to be compensated); Coleman,
supra note 197, at 429-30, 435-36, 441 (explaining that the annulment view of corrective
PERCEIVED DISABILITIES
justice is slightly different, both theories seek to vindicate a moral
interest:'99 to restore equality between two parties by forcing the
wrongdoer to compensate for the improper harm."' Employment
discrimination covered under Title VII and other civil rights statutes
primarily fits the corrective justice model because the law declares
decisionmaking based on race, color, national origin, or sex to be a
"moral wrong," and it requires compensation for the unjust loss
caused by the employer's wrongdoing.201 By prohibiting actions based
on characteristics that all persons possess, and therefore focusing
solely on restoring the equality that was disturbed by the employer's
improper conduct, these statutes are consistent with a corrective
justice rationale.0l
The ADA, in contrast, arguably goes beyond the concept of
corrective justice to include a component of "distributive justice" as
well. Although both forms of justice strive to create equality,203
distributive justice is not concerned primarily with evaluating the
moral propriety of the parties' behavior.2°4  Rather, distributive
justice emphasizes the parties' broader relationship to society. 5
While corrective justice "joins the parties directly, through the harm
that one of them inflicts on the other," distributive justice relates the
parties indirectly through some external arrangement of societal
benefits and burdens.0 6  Distributive justice evaluates each party
justice does not emphasize the wrongdoing or the wrongdoer, but rather the resulting
"wrongful losses"); see also Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 898 (stating that the concern
of corrective justice is "whether one party has inflicted an unjust loss on another").
Coleman has proposed a "mixed conception" of corrective justice that combines elements
of both the classic annulment and relational theories. See Coleman, supra note 197, at
437-44; see also Stephen R. Perry, Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J.
381, 408 (1992) (criticizing Coleman's conception of corrective justice as "simultaneously
too complex and too simple").
199. See Matthew S. O'Connell, Note, Correcting Corrective Justice: Unscrambling the
Mixed Conception of Tort Law, 85 GEo. LJ. 1717, 1718 (1997) (applying a "mixed
conception" of corrective justice to defamation law).
200. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 923.
201. See supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
202. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 898, 923-24.
203. See Main, supra note 194, at 119.
204. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 923.
205. See Malin, supra note 194, at 119 (explaining that "[d]istributive justice requires
proportional equality whereby each individual has a share in the distribution of goods in
society in proportion to that individual's merit"); Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 923
(explaining distributive justice in terms of societal goals, rather than individual
transactions).
206. Weinrib, supra note 194, at 415; see also Peter Benson, The Basis of Corrective
Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 515, 515-16 (1992)
(arguing that distributive justice traditionally has been viewed "as including those
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against established, external criteria-criteria that not all persons
possess-and judges' equality in relationship to those politically
determined characteristics. 207 Distributive justice identifies a group
that merits a greater distribution of resources because of some
marker of "merit," and it redistributes societal goods accordingly. 211
The ADA's duty to reasonably accommodate, the breach of
which is not a form of actionable discrimination under Title VII, is
arguably consistent with a distributive justice rationale: "[T]he ADA
identifies a criterion (the possession of a disability) against which
individuals are measured and requires a distribution of goods from
the employer to individuals who meet that criterion. '20 9 To achieve
equal opportunity for some disabled individuals, the ADA's
antidiscrimination provisions must go beyond a simple mandate
preventing discriminatory decisions by the employer (i.e., beyond
corrective justice) to remove unnecessary employment barriers (i.e.,
to a redistributive approach). 210  Because some disabled individuals
possess attributes that are vocationally relevant in the nondisabled
majority's conventional workplace, the ADA identifies them as a
group that merits a greater distribution of societal goods in the form
of reasonable accommodations to level the workplace playing field.211
Unlike the forms of compensation required under other civil rights
statutes, the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation requires
redistribution "because of the employee's status, not because the
employer has committed a moral wrong. 212
Some commentators take issue with using the term "distributive
principles that ought to regulate the fair distribution of common burdens and benefits
among individuals or groups of individuals").
207. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 897, 923; Weinrib, supra note 194, at 408;
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 999 (1988); see also O'Connell, supra note 199, at 1720-21 (explaining Weinrib's
theory of distributive justice as one that "allocates costs and benefits in proportion to
some external criterion" that is political in nature).
208. See Allen & Morales, supra note 194, at 731 (explaining that distributive justice
"concerns the proper apportionment or allocation of goods"); Malin, supra note 194, at
119 (explaining that "distributive justice requires the distribution of goods among
individuals in accordance with some mediated criteria of merit"); Weinuib, supra note 194,
at 408 (describing distributive justice as involving an external criterion that "determines
the parties' comparative merit for a particular distribution"). Courts may resolve
distributive justice claims between individuals when each party typifies the classes that are
subject to the redistributional rights and obligations. See Malin, supra note 194, at 120-21,
129.
209. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 897.
210. See id. at 925, 929.




justice" to characterize reasonable accommodations for individuals
with actual disabilities.213  Anita Silvers, for example, argues that
reasonable accommodations are not distributive in nature because,
rather than identifying a class as deserving of certain resources, the
ADA simply commits resources "to correct the disadvantaging
outcomes of exclusionary past practice. '214 Silvers sees a bright line
between direct resource allocation to individuals with disabilities "in
virtue of disability"-which she characterizes as distributive, and to
which she is normatively opposed-and indirect resource allocation
"to rectify the lingering results of the biased past"-which she
characterizes as non-distributive and which she finds entirely
appropriate under a formal justice rationale.215 Yet, to the extent that
reasonable accommodations are viewed as an employer's input cost
into hiring a particular employee and to the extent that the ADA
requires employers to ignore such input costs and ground decisions on
employees' gross rather than net product, the line between formal
and distributive justice seems somewhat less bright. As David
Wasserman has explained, even if the accommodation right is "not
concerned only with who gets what," it still is distributive because it
assesses the fairness of the physical and social organization in terms
of its impact on individual members of society, and it requires some
metric of comparative advantage.216 Thus, regardless of terminology,
entitlement to accommodations requires a normative basis for
directing the commitment of resources. According to Silvers, the
normative basis is one of access, which directs the commitment of
resources to the "biased" and "exclusionary" aspects of the work
environment that were designed unnecessarily around able-bodied
individuals who happen not to possess substantially limiting
impairments.217
Because those with perceived disabilities do not possess any
vocationally relevant characteristics not possessed by some members
of the nondisabled majority and because those with perceived
disabilities do not face any resulting structural or dynamic barriers to
213. See, e.g., Silvers, supra note 182, at 34-35.
214. Id.
215. IM at 34-35, 138-41 (arguing that "conceiving of people with disabilities as equal
and thereby as deserving only such differentiated treatment as is needed to reform social
practice that excludes them" is profoundly different than "thinking of them as deficient
and thereby as deserving of special benefits, entitlements, and exemptions to sustain them
in their exclusion from the mainstream of commercial and civic life").
216. Wasserman, supra note 13, at 190; see also id. at 147-49 (blurring the line between
formal and distributive justice).
217. Silvers, supra note 182, at 34-35,73-76, 120-21.
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equal employment opportunity, there is no basis for applying the
ADA's reasonable accommodations right-under either a distributive
justice or a formal justice rationale. Like the forms of discrimination
addressed by Title VII, the ADA's perceived disability prong
addresses only the internal quality of the employer-employee
transaction: it asks solely whether the employer inflicted an unjust
loss that must be corrected 18 Rather than determining if the
employee fits the statutorily defined criteria, the perceived disability
prong analyzes the employer's perception.219 Just like Title VII
protects those in other enumerated categories, the ADA protects
perceived disability plaintiffs not because of their status as individuals
deserving a greater allocation of societal goods, but because it
condemns the employer's conduct. 20 Thus, the perceived disability
prong shares the same corrective justice rationale as other
employment discrimination statutes, which only provide restorative
compensation, not a right to reasonable accommodationsp l Because
the distributive justice rationale for the ADA's additional form of
antidiscrimination protection does not apply to perceived disability
claims, those claimants should not be entitled to the redistribution or
resource-commitment rights that are granted under the reasonable
accommodations rule.'
Comparing perceived disability claims to other forms of
actionable employment discrimination therefore provides further
support for concluding that traditional forms of workplace
accommodation should not apply to perceived disability claims. Our
hypothetical Employee B, for example, should not be entitled to a
redesigned gurney or an assistant to help lift patients because
Employee B possesses no statutorily relevant characteristics that
21& See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 931.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 897-99.
221. See id.
222. While Vande Walle correctly recognizes that the perceived disability prong is
inconsistent with the distributive justice rationale of the ADA's reasonable
accommodations rule, he reaches a different conclusion. See id. at 937. Vande Walle does
not conclude that the ADA's accommodations rule should only apply to actual disability
claims. Instead, Vande Walle starts with the assumption that the ADA does grant
accommodations to both actual and perceived disability claims, based on the plain
language of the single definition of a "qualified individual." See id. at 919 & nn.191-92.
Vande Walle then tries to justify why the ADA gives that right to perceived disability
plaintiffs who do not fit the external criteria for distributive justice. See id. at 931-37. In
contrast, this Article challenges the underlying assumption that the ADA grants perceived
disability plaintiffs the right to accommodations, and it uses the corrective and distributive
theories of justice as one reason to support that challenge.
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create unique employment barriers; many members of the
nondisabled majority, like our hypothetical Employee C, possess
similarly nondisabling impairments. The only thing that distinguishes
Employee B's nondisabling carpal tunnel syndrome from Employee
C's nondisabling knee injury is the employer's misperception. There
are no external criteria to support a redistribution of resources to
Employee B over Employee C or over other nondisabled individuals.
The employer's conduct is the cause of Employee B's unequal
opportunity, just like employees protected under other
antidiscrimination laws.
Once again, this analysis does not necessarily require that
Employee B be treated identically to our nondisabled Employee C,
who is not covered by the ADA at all. The employer's conduct is just
as morally wrong when directed against Employee B, who is only
mistakenly regarded as disabled, as it is when directed against our
hypothetical Employee A, whose lower body paralysis is an actually
disabling condition. Thus, as with the prior analysis of the ADA's
statutory language and legislative intent, this analysis demonstrates
only that individuals with nondisabling, but vocationally limiting,
impairments must be governed by a different conception of the
reasonable accommodations rule, which is developed in depth in Part
iV.P2
C. Distinguishing Equal Opportunity from Unfair Advantage
While the ADA's reasonable accommodations rule is unique
among employment discrimination statutes, the ADA's fundamental
goal of equal employment opportunity is not. This Section defines
that goal in greater detail and explains how the duty of reasonable
accommodation is consistent with that goal for those with actual
disabilities. This Section then demonstrates that applying the
traditional conception of workplace accommodations to perceived
disabilities goes beyond equal opportunity and advantages perceived
disability plaintiffs over other nondisabled individuals, as well as over
individuals with actually disabling impairments. Thus, applying the
ADA's accommodations rule identically to actual and perceived
disability claims not only would be inconsistent with the
interpretational authorities discussed in Section A and with the
223. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 639-40 (arguing that, even though perceived
disability claims are analogous to Title VII discrimination claims, the ADA still might
impose affirmative obligations on employers to remove barriers for perceived disability
plaintiffs).
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applicable theory of justice discussed in Section B, but also would be
inconsistent with the ADA's fundamental goal.
The ADA is touted-and explicitly touts itself-as equal
opportunity legislation. 224 The ADA judges equal opportunity
narrowly in terms of formal, rather than material, equality, and equal
access is its normative core.? The ADA is not intended to be an
"affirmative action" statute in the way that the term traditionally has
been used in connection with other laws. 6  The ADA does not
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994) (listing "equality of opportunity" as one of the
ADA's goals); id. § 12101(a)(9) (stating that the ADA's goal is to combat discrimination
that "denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis"); 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (1999) (stating that the ADA's purpose is to allow the
disabled "to receive equal opportunities to compete"); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9
(explaining that the ADA's goal is to give the disabled "an opportunity to attain the same
level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits and privileges of employment
as are available to the average similarly situated employee without a disability"); Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 25 (describing "equal opportunity" as "the fundamental goal
of the ADA" and analyzing the appropriate conception of that phrase).
This Article does not argue that equal opportunity should be the only goal of
disability discrimination law, merely that it is the stated goal of the ADA. Other
commentators have set forth arguments advocating broader goals for disability
discrimination law. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 211, 212 (1994) (advocating "an extension of the requirements of the ADA via
explicit hiring quotas and marketable discrimination rights"); Mark C. Weber, Beyond the
Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with
Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REv. 123, 124 (1998) (suggesting "a national employment policy
for persons with disabilities" that would include "strengthened affirmative action
obligations to hire and promote persons with disabilities" and "non-remedial employment
setasides"); Ben Cristal, Note, Going Beyond the Judicially Prescribed Boundaries of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 493, 511 (1996) (advocating that
the Social Security Administration subsidize the cost of accommodations that would
otherwise place undue hardships on employers).
225. See Silvers, supra note 182, at 120-21 ("[T]he ADA constrains the nondisabled
majority from actions that deny the disabled access to the opportunities for social
participation the rest of the population enjoys.").
226. See Daniel B. Frier, Comment, Age Discrimination and the ADA: How the ADA
May Be Used to Arm Older Americans Against Age Discrimination by Employers Who
Would Otherwise Escape Liability Under the ADEA, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 173, 190 (1993)
("[T]he ADA is not meant as an affirmative action program designed to ensure the
employment of disabled employees over that of better qualified, non-disabled
employees."); see also Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:
Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO.
L. REV. 107, 107-08 (1997) ("The ADA was not conceived as an affirmative action
statute, but rather as one of equal opportunity." (footnote omitted)); Murphy, supra note
12, at 1610 ("In the eyes of Congress, reasonable accommodation and affirmative action
are thus quite separate.").
Like commentators, courts have been quick to recognize this distinction. See, e.g.,
Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the
ADA does not require affirmative action in favor of the disabled); Sandison v. Michigan
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Daugherty v. City of
El Paso, 56 F.3d 695,700 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Howard v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 939 F.
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require priority hiring, reassignment, or promotion of the disabled
over the nondisabled, nor does it require active recruitment to
increase the number of disabled individuals in the workplace 27
Having a disability is not a "plus" in the hiring equationl Although
the ADA does impose affirmative obligations on the employer, "[t]he
ADA seeks only to establish a level playing field for disabled and
non-disabled employees alike."2 9
How can the ADA's reasonable accommodations rule be
squared with its overarching goal of equal employment opportunity?
As explained in Part I.A, for most forms of employment
discrimination equal opportunity may be achieved, at least
theoretically, through a simple antidiscrimination mandate. For racial
and other forms of invidious discrimination, employers discriminate
by basing their decisions on traits that are vocationally irrelevant.
Discrimination occurs when employees who are "fundamentally the
same are treated differently for illegitimate reasons."20  In that
scenario, a "sameness model" of antidiscrimination applies.23' A
sameness model requires employers to treat employees identically,
"regardless of the presence or absence of a particular [trait]. ' ' 2
When the trait that defines an individual's protected status is
vocationally irrelevant, prohibiting the employer from considering
Supp. 505, 507 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (same); Emrick v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp.
393,397-98 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (same).
227. See Foreman, 117 F.3d at 810; Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 700; see also 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. Background (explaining that, although the ADA "focuses on eradicating
barriers," employers still may apply the "same performance standards and requirements
that employers expect of persons who are not disabled").
228. Murphy, supra note 12, at 1627; see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26-27 (1989) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) ("[The employer has no obligation under this legislation to
prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis of disability."); 136
CONG. REC. 10,868 (1990) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (stating that the ADA does not
"require employers to give preference to persons with disabilities"); see also 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. § 1630.1(a) (explaining that the ADA "requires that individuals with disabilities
be given the same consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are
given").
229. Frier, supra note 226, at 190; see also Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65
F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining the ADA's "level playing field" objective); 136
CONG. REc. 10,856 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer) ("[The ADA] does not guarantee a
job-or anything else. It guarantees a level playing field."); Bruce A. Miller, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Unionized Workplace, 74 MICH. BJ. 1180, 1180
(1995) ("[The] ADA requires that disabled individuals, otherwise qualified for a job, be
allowed to compete on a level playing field by means of reasonable accommodation
provided by their employers.").
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that trait should, in theory, achieve equal employment opportunity.33
To achieve equal opportunity, the employer simply must treat similar
employees similarly.
While the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation is
obviously inconsistent with a sameness model, it is nevertheless
entirely consistent with the ADA's goal of equal opportunity for
individuals with actual disabilities. For race, color, national origin,
and sex, inequality is created when an employer acts on a difference
that is not relevant; for actual disabilities, inequality also may be
created when an employer fails to act on a difference that is. Unlike
race, color, national origin, and sex, which typically are irrelevant to
job performance, a substantially limiting physical or mental
impairment may be vocationally relevant.' While this vocationally
relevant difference is not intrinsic but rather relational-in other
words, it exists because of the misalignment between a worker with a
disability and a workplace that is designed around the able-bodied
majority-the difference is nonetheless quite realP5  Thus, for some
individuals with actual disabilities, simply prohibiting employers from
considering the disability (in a presumptively immutable workplace)
inevitably will fall short of equal opportunity. 6 In fact, treating some
individuals with disabilities the same as the nondisabled majority may
be a form of oppression in and of itselfP7 Allowing an employer to
233. See id.
234. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1428.
235. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 1613-14 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, ExCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 20 (1990); Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Forword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10, 34-35 (1987); Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Differences.
Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 157, 159,
160, 206); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116)
(explaining that disability discrimination "includes harms resulting from the construction
of transportation, architectural, and communication barriers and the adoption or
application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures based on
thoughtlessness or indifference"); 136 CONG. REC. 10,870 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish)
(asserting that "it is not disability which limits one's ability to participate in life, but it is
societal barriers"); 135 CONG. REC. 19,800 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (asserting
that it is often not the disability that is limiting, but "the obstacles placed in the way by an
indifferent society").
236. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1435 ("Whereas the nondiscrimination mandate
under Title VII may be implemented through equal treatment, the orientation of the
workplace toward individuals who are not disabled means that mere equal treatment will
leave in place substantial barriers to equal opportunity."); Murphy, supra note 12, at 1610
("[D]ifferential treatment is often necessary to eliminate such discrimination.").
237. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 10; see also Silvers, supra note 182, at
126-27 ("[Tireating people similarly will not be treating them equally in cases in which the
actions instrumental to pursuing opportunity are so narrowly or rigidly constrained as to
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require the same output from a nondisabled employee and a disabled
employee whose wheelchair is too wide to pass through the doorway
of the work site, for example, would continue to subordinate an
otherwise equally capable individual.
To achieve equal opportunity between those who possess a
socially constructed, vocationally relevant limitation and those who
do not requires instead a "difference model" of antidiscrimination. A
difference model requires employers to take the relevant trait into
account, rather than ignoring it, in order to eliminate its impact on
employment opportunity. 8 To treat the employee in the wheelchair
the same as the nondisabled employee, for example, would require
the employer to acknowledge their different modes of entering the
work site and to eliminate the impact of that difference by widening
the doorway to allow the disabled employee to perform. In this way,
a difference model of antidiscrimination recognizes that "in order to
treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.' '239
Differential treatment under the ADA's reasonable
accommodations rule does not mean preferential treatment.24 The
reasonable accommodations rule is "a means by which barriers to the
equal employment opportunity of an individual with a disability are
removed or alleviated." 241 Employees with disabilities who may be
unable to perform in a conventional workplace may be able to
exclude people with (certain) impairments.").
238. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 14; see also Cooper, supra note 181, at
1428-29 (explaining that, because a disability "may indeed be directly relevant to an
individual's capabilities," the ADA could only eliminate employment barriers by
modifying the definition of discrimination to include a duty to reasonably accommodate).
239. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (separate opinion
of Blackmun, J.); see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 10 (citing Bakke to
describe the difference model of antidiscrimination); Murphy, supra note 12, at 1620
("Recognizing that equal treatment itself may be discriminatory is a necessary step toward
ending discrimination based on disability.").
240. See Miller, supra note 229, at 1180; Barbara C. Neff, "Reasonable
Accommodation" Under the ADA: Employers' Duties and Defenses, 64 DEF. COJNS. J.
110,111 (1997).
241. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1999); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 347 (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485) ("[T]he
reasonable accommodation requirement is best understood as a process in which barriers
to a particular individual's equal employment opportunity are removed."); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 34 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (same); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(iii)
(stating that the essence of reasonable accommodation is to enable a disabled employee
"to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by a covered entity's
other similarly situated employees without disabilities"); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at I-2 ("[T]he ADA requires reasonable accommodation
as a means of overcoming unnecessary barriers that prevent or restrict employment
opportunities for otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities." (emphasis omitted)).
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perform just as well as or better than nondisabled workers once the
unnecessary barriers of the conventional workplace are eliminated.242
For employees with actual disabilities, accommodations are not part
of an affirmative action program of priorities.243 Accommodations
are simply a unique form of equal opportunity. The ADA requires
employers to view the workplace as mutable and to adjust the
physical or structural work environment, equipment, or operations so
that individuals with disabilities can compete on level ground with the
nondisabled majority, around whom the environment was originally
constructed.244 For that reason, it is incorrect to view a reasonable
accommodation as "advantaging" an individual with an actual
disability.2 45 An accommodation merely refashions an existing work
site "to eliminate bias against the group of people whom that
individual represents. 24 6 Although the reasonable accommodations
rule is a "difference-based" form of equal opportunity, while a simple
antidiscrimination rule is "sameness-based," both methods achieve
242 See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 28-29 (citing a study of 1452 physically impaired
employees at E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company finding that "the disabled worker
performed as well as or better than their non-disabled co-workers," with 91% of disabled
workers rated average or better in performance, 93% rated average or better for turnover
rate, 79% rated average or better in attendance, and more than 50% rated above average
in safety); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 111-2
(explaining the enabling role played by reasonable accommodations); see also H.R. REP.
No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58-59, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 340-41 (citing the du Pont study as
evidence that "disabled workers performed as well as or better than the non-disabled co-
workers"); 136 CONG. REC. 11,460 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (citing the du Pont
study as "the first of many to show that disabled employees ... have equal or better
attendance, performance, and safety records than average"); 136 CONG. REc. 10,874
(1990) (statement of Rep. Kleczka) (stating that employers report that workers with
disabilities "usually work harder and longer than able-bodied counterparts").
243. See Conway, supra note 16, at 952 ("[T]he goal of reasonable accommodations [is]
to ensure equal opportunity to the disabled rather than requiring employers to develop
affirmative action programs."); Cooper, supra note 181, at 1428-29 (explaining why
reasonable accommodations for actual disabilities are a form of antidiscrimination, not a
form of affirmative action); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 ("The reasonable
accommodation that is required ... should provide ... equal employment opportunity[,]
[which] means an opportunity to attain the same level of performance, or to enjoy the
same level of benefits and privileges of employment as are available to the average
similarly situated employee without a disability.").
244. See 136 CONG. REc. 10,874 (1990) (statement of Rep. Matsui) (explaining that the
ADA "will make the playing field a little more even for those with disabilities to compete
in the workplace" because "[s]o many doors are now closed.., simply because their needs
do not conform to the current rules of the game"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) ("In
general, an accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things
are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal
employment opportunities.").




the same goal. Once the workplace playing field is leveled through
reasonable accommodations, the ADA requires the disabled to meet
the same employment standards as all other employees.24 7
The ADA's reasonable accommodations rule also differs from
traditional "affirmative action" in its focus on the present, rather than
the past. The traditional concept of affirmative action is remedial or
reparative in nature: it provides favorable treatment to make up for
past wrongs.248  In contrast, accommodation is not primarily
remedial.2 49 Accommodation is not directed at overcoming the effects
of past discrimination, but rather at dismantling present obstacles
created by the nondisabled majority's workplace operationsy °
Because affirmative action is remedial, it may require "more than
merely allowing the members of a protected class to compete on
equal terms with others" in order to increase participation and make
up for past inequality.Y' In contrast, accommodation simply requires
the employer to consider "unconventional" operational methods to
allow disabled individuals to demonstrate their present abilities. 2
Unlike affirmative action that temporarily may require favorable
treatment to make up for the past, accommodation does not require
the employer to change its ultimate performance criteria2 3 Critics
who oppose affirmative action because of an alleged disconnect
between the historically injured parties and the present-day
reparation recipients cannot oppose the ADA's accommodations rule
on that ground because "past disregard of people with disabilities
punishes current as well as earlier members of this class" through the
lasting, exclusionary workplace infrastructure.
Because the duty to accommodate is intended only as a form of
equal opportunity, the ADA treats the duty as part of its
247. See Frier, supra note 226, at 190; Rebecca Mastrangela, Comment, Does the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Impose an Undue Burden on Employers?, 32 DUQ.
L. REV. 269, 270 (1994); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (stating that "the
ADA seeks to ensure access to equal employment opportunities based on merit" and for
the disabled "to receive equal opportunities to compete" for a job).
248. See Silvers, supra note 182, at 128; Cooper, supra note 181, at 1431-32.
249. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1431-32; Murphy, supra note 12, at 1627-28.
250. See Cooper, supra note 181, at 1431; see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 1628
(arguing that the accommodation inquiry is simply "whether an identifiable barrier exists
that can be removed by the employer," while an affirmative action inquiry, in contrast,
asks "whether an individual belongs to a group that has been harmed by past
discrimination," which would entitle the individual to "a preference in the hiring
process").
251. Cooper, supra note 181, at 1431-32.
252. See id. at 1432.
253. See id. at 1431-32.
254. Silvers, supra note 182, at 128.
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antidiscrimination provisions.' Because the workplace design is
oriented unnecessarily toward the nondisabled, nondiscrimination
requires more than passively avoiding bias. 6  Instead,
nondiscrimination requires modifying the workplace to allow
individuals with disabilities an equal chance to competeP 7
Accordingly, the failure to make reasonable accommodations is one
of the seven forms of disability-based discrimination prohibited by
the ADAP8  Accommodation is best described as "active
nondiscrimination" because it achieves equal opportunity through
positive steps.P9 Individuals with actual disabilities who receive
255. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39 (1990) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462 ("This reasonable accommodation requirement is
central to the non-discrimination mandate of the ADA."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31
(1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (describing the accommodations duty as "a form
of non-discrimination"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1999) ("The obligation to make
reasonable accommodation is a form of non-discrimination."); EEOC TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1, at 1-5 ("Reasonable accommodation is a critical
component of the ADA's assurance of nondiscrimination."); id. § 2.3(c), at 11-22
("Reasonable accommodation is a key nondiscrimination requirement .... " (emphasis
omitted)); id. § 3.2, at I-1 (same); Colette G. Matzzie, Substantive Equality and
Antidiscrimination: Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
82 GEO. L.J 193, 211-12 (1993) ("The ADA requires that employers reasonably
accommodate their disabled employees as part of its nondiscrimination scheme, rather
than merely mandating equal treatment or viewing accommodation to be affirmative
action."); Cooper, supra note 181, at 1435 ("Congress has clearly stated its position that
reasonable accommodation is not the equivalent of affirmative action, but rather is an
integral part of the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)
(1994) (describing the ADA as an antidiscrimination statute); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
Background (same); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a) (same).
256. See Murphy, supra note 12, at 1607-09.
257. See id.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)-(b); see also Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 8-9 (explaining that the concept of reasonable
accommodation is not only "integral to defining the class of protected individuals" but
also that failure to make reasonable accommodations "constitutes a separate species of
discrimination").
259. Murphy, supra note 12, at 1607-09; see also Carol D. Rasnic, A Comparative
Analysis of Federal Statutes for the Disabled Worker in the Federal Republic of Germany
and the United States, 9 ARIz. . INT'L & COM. L. 283,327-28 (1992) ("[The ADA] is not
an affirmative action law, but is an effort by the legislature to provide whatever is needed
to put the disabled on a plane parallel to that of his non-handicapped peers.").
Because of the common use of the term "affirmative action," the ADA's
accommodation rule is better described as "active nondiscrimination." The term
"affirmative action" may be used if it is defined with sufficient precision. William Van
Alstyne provides the necessary precision with his nuanced taxonomy of the types of
conduct that at various times have been called "affirmative action." See William W. Van
Alstyne, Affirmative Action and Racial Discrimination Under Law: A Preliminary Review,
in 1 SELECTED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TOPICS IN EMPLOYMENT AND BUSINESS SET-
ASIDES: A CONSULTATION/HEARING OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS 180 (1985). Van Aistyne deems some forms of affirmative action unacceptable
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reasonable accommodations do not receive an "advantage" over
nondisabled employees.20 Those with actual disabilities are just
recipients of an appropriately difference-based form of equal
opportunity law.
While reasonable accommodations thus help "level the playing
field" for individuals with actual disabilities, the same is not true for
those whose disabilities are only perceived. To determine whether
accommodations are consistent with equal opportunity for claims
under the "regarded as" prong, we must compare those with
perceived disabilities to those without.26' As the EEOC guidelines
explain, the proper goal of the reasonable accommodations rule is to
provide "an opportunity to attain the same level of performance, or
to enjoy the same level of benefits and privileges of employment as
because they "encourage or require ... discrimination" by using "quotas," "queues,"
"targets," or "presumptions" that determine each person's civil rights at least in part by
their membership in a protected class. Id. at 180, 182, 186-87. This Article avoids the
term "affirmative action" because quotas and similar types of conduct are most likely to
be associated with a generic use of the term in the employment context.
On the other hand, Van Alstyne deems some forms of "affirmative action"
acceptable because they do not encourage or require discrimination and are "in keeping
with our mutual commitment to equal protection under the law." Id. at 180. One of Van
Alstyne's categories of acceptable affirmative action would cover the ADA's
accommodations rule for actually disabled individuals. See id. at 182. That category
includes actions taken to avoid "gratuitous discrimination." Id. According to Van
Alstyne, gratuitous discrimination is "the unintended consequence of unexamined
practices or habits that create unnecessary headwinds or hardships," when the practice or
habit "may, in fact, be quite unnecessary." Id. Van Alstyne characterizes "avoid[ing]
gratuitous discrimination" as a form of "affirmative action" because it requires positive
steps: it requires an employer to "reduce gratuitous differential treatment of persons not
necessary to distinguish in the manner one's customary practice did distinguish them." Id.
"One acts affirmatively by being sensitive to this possibility," says Van Alstyne, "and by
acting affirmatively to avoid it." Id.
Van Alstyne's use of the term "affirmative action" to describe "avoid[ing]
gratuitous discrimination" is consistent with the concept of "active nondiscrimination" that
is used in this Article. Id. As Van Alstyne explains, avoiding such discrimination is
"wholly consistent with a common resolve to make no disadvantaging use"--and no
advantaging use-of any person's membership in a particular category. Id. While such
action "is conscious of those whom it will benefit, and conscientious of those with whom
they are then treated identically," it is undertaken "without indexing or allocating by the
quotas ... of racism," id. at 183-84, and its ultimate goal "is the removal of gratuitous
barriers to each person's opportunity to be treated the same as others," id. at 182.
260. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 4 (drawing distinctions between the
ADA's reasonable accommodations rule and traditional forms of antidiscrimination
protection, but concluding that the distinctions do not show "that disabled individuals are
somehow receiving unwarranted benefit or even an unfair advantage over other groups
that have experienced exclusion from full economic participation").
261. See id. at 25 ("[The ADA's] goals presuppose a comparison with individuals who
are not disabled: to the extent possible, the disabled should be given the same
opportunities as those who are not disabled.").
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are available to the average similarly situated employee without a
disability."'262  As explained above, for some types of actual
disabilities, accommodations are needed simply to achieve this same
level of opportunity-"no more and no less. 26  In contrast, for
plaintiffs with perceived disabilities, the traditional forms of
operational accommodations indeed do more.
Unlike employees with actual disabilities, those with perceived
disabilities possess no substantially limiting impairments to
distinguish them from other nondisabled employees. The only
statutorily relevant difference between perceived disability plaintiffs
and other nondisabled individuals is an employer's misperception 26- --
"but for" an employer's mistaken belief, perceived disability plaintiffs
would not be covered by the ADA at all.265 Just like targets of racial
and other forms of invidious discrimination, a perceived disability
plaintiff faces unequal opportunity because the employer improperly
treats employees differently when they are "fundamentally the
same."266 Perceived disability discrimination therefore fits a sameness
model of antidiscrimination. Achieving equal opportunity for
perceived disability plaintiffs should require only that the employer
treat them the same as other nondisabled employees.267
262. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9; see S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 35 (1989) (Sup. Docs.
No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (describing reasonable accommodations as part of the ADA's equal
opportunity goal, which "means an opportunity to attain the same level of performance as
is available to non-disabled employees having similar skills and abilities"); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8), (9) (describing the ADA's goal of equal employment opportunity);
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (same); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a) (describing the
ADA as an "anti-discrimination" statute, which "requires that individuals with disabilities
be given the same consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are
given").
263. Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Deane v.
Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 199, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining how
reasonable accommodations serve to equalize opportunity for individuals with actual
disabilities), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
264. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208 ("[T]hat which renders [a perceived
disability plaintiff] disabled is not the individual's impairment, if impairment there be, but
the employer's unfounded stereotypes, fear or simple misperception that the impairment
is serious enough to be disabling."); see also Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12 (explaining the
employer's argument that a "'regarded as' plaintiffs only disability is the employer's
irrational response to her illusory condition").
265. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 207.
266. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 10.
267. See, e.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that it
would be "bizarre" if an employer's subjective misperception made a nondisabled
employee "entitled to accommodations for a non-disabling impairment that no similarly
situated employees would enjoy"), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 794 (2000); see also Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 47, at 10 (arguing that a sameness model "would condemn
decisions made on the basis of myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities
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Unlike some people with actual disabilities, perceived disability
plaintiffs do not need to be treated "differently" in order to achieve
equality with the nondisabled. Whereas the operational bias toward
the nondisabled majority requires "active nondiscrimination" to
equalize the playing field for those with actual disabilities, perceived
disability plaintiffs-who are really a part of the nondisabled
majority-are among those who typically benefit from the
conventional workplace design. The heart of the disability rights
movement, which was the driving force behind the ADA, was focused
in large part on the basic goals of independence, self-sufficiency,
mainstreaming, and integration for those who had been excluded
systematically from participating in society.268 Those fundamental
concerns, which were the impetus behind the reasonable
accommodations rule, are implicated rarely for those with perceived
disabilities, whose nondisabling impairments are the type frequently
possessed by the correctly perceived nondisabled majority workforce.
Therefore, there is no justification for using a "difference model" of
antidiscrimination for perceived disability claims.
Without an equality-based justification for using a difference
model, applying the accommodations rule to perceived disability
claimants gives them a "windfall."2 69 Granting perceived disability
plaintiffs the full range of traditional, operational accommodations
advantages them over other nondisabled workers because perceived
disability plaintiffs are, objectively, already similarly situated with
that assume that individuals with physical or mental impairments are not equally capable
of doing a particular job," such as an employer's "refus[al] to hire an employee with a
disfiguring cosmetic condition because he, other workers, or customers might be upset"
(internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)); Cooper, supra note 181, at 1427-28
(arguing that, when "social bias" is the cause of disability-based discrimination, a simple
antidiscrimination mandate should eliminate the harm without the need for reasonable
accommodations).
268. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS MOvEMENT 52, 144 (1993); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 10 (1989) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (describing the ADA's "critical goal" of "allow[ing] individuals
with disabilities to be part of the economic mainstream of our society"); 135 CONG. REC.
19,892 (1989) (statement of Sen. Biden) (emphasizing the goals of participation,
integration, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency).
269. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208; see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177
F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) (opining in dicta that "it seems odd to give an impaired but
not disabled person a windfall because of her employer's erroneous perception of
disability, when other impaired but not disabled people are not entitled to
accommodation"); Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12 (noting in dicta the "considerable force" of
the employer's argument that accommodations would "create a windfall for legitimate
'regarded as' disabled employees who, after disabusing their employers of their
misperceptions, would nonetheless be entitled to accommodations that their similarly
situated co-workers are not, for admittedly non-disabling conditions").
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members of the nondisabled majority. Traditional accommodations
also advantage perceived disability plaintiffs over those with actual
disabilities, who are only accommodated for disabling impairments
that the nondisabled majority does not possess. In both instances,
accommodating perceived disabilities is "unfair" because entitlement
to a legal right (and a redistribution of social goods) is tied to
irrelevant individual characteristics. Whatever physical or mental
characteristics that may prompt a perceived disability plaintiff to seek
accommodations are "irrelevant" because they do not differentiate
materially between perceived disability plaintiffs and other
nondisabled individuals and because they are not the cause of the
inequality that the ADA is trying to combat. In other words, granting
traditional accommodations to perceived disability plaintiffs creates
an advantage by using a difference model of antidiscrimination when
a sameness model would suffice.
Of course, many perceived disability plaintiffs do possess
physical or mental impairments that, although nondisabling, are
nonetheless quite real,270 and those perceived disability plaintiffs
certainly could benefit from workplace accommodations. However,
accommodating a nondisabling impairment-even if the nondisabling
impairment triggered the employer's misperception-will unfairly
advantage a plaintiff with a perceived disability claim.27 Nondisabled
individuals often may possess physical or mental impairments as well,
and, at least under current law, they are not entitled to invoke the
ADA's right to accommodation.27 2 Similarly, those with actual
disabilities are only entitled to accommodation for their actually
disabling conditions; they are then "on [their] own to deal with any
non-disabling impairments just as would any similarly impaired
person without a disability." 73  As the Supreme Court recently
explained when deciding another issue,
[b]y its terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some
270. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
271. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208.
272. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1999) ("Many impairments do
not impact an individual's life to the degree that they constitute disabling impairments.
An impairment rises to the level of disability if the impairment substantially limits one or
more of the individual's major life activities."). Of course, legislators could decide to
require accommodation of all nondisabling impairments, as well as all disabling ones.
Thus far, that step has not been taken. Legislators have been concerned primarily with
protecting individuals whose general ability to obtain employment is decreased
significantly due to prejudice, and a particular employer's misperception "will seldom limit
an individual's general ability to secure employment elsewhere." Moberly, supra note 6,
at 363-64.
273. Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208.
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physical attributes over others and to establish physical
criteria.... [A]n employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the
level of an impairment-such as one's height, build, or
singing voice-are preferable to others, just as it is free to
decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting,
impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a
job.274
Thus, providing equal opportunity to perceived disability plaintiffs
demands that the traditional forms of accommodation not apply to
any nondisabling impairments, even if those nondisabling
impairments were the source of the employer's erroneous beliefs.275
Otherwise, a perceived disability plaintiff would obtain an
"undeserved windfall" by gaining a right to accommodations "solely
by virtue of the employer's misperception[,] where others with the
same impairment would have no such right."276
In fact, granting traditional accommodations to perceived
disability plaintiffs would make it more advantageous for a
nondisabled individual to be misperceived than to be perceived
correctly. Applying the reasonable accommodations rule would
entitle our hypothetical Employee B (the misperceived but
nondisabled worker with mild carpal tunnel syndrome) to a
redesigned gurney or an assistant to help lift patients-a task that
Employee B could otherwise be fired for failing to perform. In
contrast, our hypothetical Employee C (the correctly perceived,
nondisabled worker with a knee injury) would not be entitled to a
redesigned gurney or an assistant to help lift patients and could be
fired for not performing that task. Employee C would be better off if
the employer acted on stereotypes, fears, and myths, because those
misperceptions would entitle Employee C to receive the workplace
modifications needed to perform the job.2 77 This perverse incentive
274. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (1999). Although the
language from Sutton is helpful, it does not answer the question raised in this Article. The
Court did not decide whether or not the reasonable accommodations portion of the
"qualified individual" test applies to perceived disabilities because the plaintiff failed to
show that the employer perceived her as disabled in the first place. See id.
275. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208.
276. Id.; see Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999).
277. Cf. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 915-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (using a similar
hypothetical to demonstrate why "[i]mposing liability on employers who fail to
accommodate non-disabled employees who are simply regarded as disabled would lead to
bizarre results"), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 794 (2000). One article has argued that not
applying the reasonable accommodations rule to perceived disabilities could actually harm
employers. See Major Amy M. Frisk & Major Charles B. Hernicz, Obesity As a Disability:
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further illustrates the advantaging effect of granting traditional
accommodations to those with perceived disability claims.
Denying traditional accommodations to perceived disability
claims arguably is consistent not only with the specific Supreme Court
language quoted above, but also with the general concepts underlying
most contemporary theories of antidiscrimination law.
Contemporary antidiscrimination theories have been dominated by a
range of centrist positions, which Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester
have described along a spectrum from right to mainstream to
liberal.278  The dominant mainstream centrist theory defines
discrimination narrowly around the concept of market rationalism.27 9
Under mainstream centrist theory, the law should ensure only that
employees receive their correct marginal product in a perfected,
impersonal market. 0 ° Mainstream centrists believe that the employer
is free to make decisions based on the plaintiff's value as a productive
asset and to decide how to define productivity.28' Thus, mainstream
centrists should agree that the only market irrationality that needs to
be corrected for plaintiffs with perceived disabilities is the effect of
the employer's misperceptions, which prevent perceived disability
plaintiffs from receiving their objectively correct marginal product. If
a perceived disability plaintiff remains a less productive asset than
another nondisabled employee even after the misperceptions are
corrected, a mainstream centrist presumably would not consider it
An Actual or Perceived Problem?, ARMY LAW., May 1996, at 3, 18. Frisk and Hernicz
begin by noting correctly that, with perceived disabilities, "there is no actual disability to
accommodate." Id. The authors argue, however, that employers will be worse off if
courts interpret the accommodations rule as inapplicable to perceived disability claims
because "the defendant employer is deprived of any opportunity to escape liability
through accommodation or showing of undue hardship." Id. Frisk and Hernicz contend
that, if courts do not apply the reasonable accommodations rule to perceived disability
claims, the ADA would "create[] a strict liability situation for employers who regard
employees as limited in their ability to perform." Id. The flaw in this argument is that,
without the duty to accommodate, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate the
ability to perform the job functions without an accommodation in order to state a prima
facie case. Thus, there would be no need for the employer to defend itself by
accommodating the employee or proving that accommodation is unduly burdensome: the
plaintiff will have failed to state a prima facie case if the plaintiff needs an accommodation
to perform.
278. MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILrrIES 200 (1997).
279. See id. at 200, 202-04.
280. See id.
281. See id. at 202-05 (explaining that mainstream centrism would require an employer
to treat a member of a protected group "as a factor of production paid her marginal
product," "but [that] measures of job performance remain defined by the employer").
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"discriminatory" to act upon that ground.2 2
Right centrists place even more stock in the self-correcting
power of markets and even less stock in the government's ability to
identify and fix market failures, than do mainstream centrists.m
Because right centrists contend that the law should be used even
more narrowly to address only truly intentional discrimination,2s4
right centrists also should agree that the ADA should not grant
perceived disability plaintiffs the right to workplace accommodations.
Liberal centrists, on the other hand, take a more distributive
view of discrimination law, which allows some employees to demand
more than rational market treatment and to have employment
decisions made on the basis of gross, rather than net, output., 5 In
taking such a position, however, liberal centrists need a justification
for choosing proper redistribution recipients. Liberal centrists have a
tendency to fall back on rather traditional, conservative notions of
moral-based recipient selection: they tend to justify the use of gross
output measures whenever net costs systematically fall on a
particularly deserving social group.2s6  Because nondisabled
individuals who are incorrectly perceived as disabled are not, as a
group, systematically affected by a workplace designed around the
dominant, nondisabled majority (to which perceived disability
plaintiffs actually belong), even some liberal centrists might agree
that the antidiscrimination justification for using gross output
measures does not apply. Presumably, the market will take care of
perceived disability plaintiffs like our hypothetical Employee B.
Thus far, this analysis has demonstrated that antidiscrimination
theory cannot justify treating those with perceived disabilities
differently from other nondisabled individuals when deciding who
should be entitled to traditional forms of workplace accommodation.
282. Because mainstream centrists at least acknowledge that market irrationality may
be found in majority "customs," as well as in prejudice, there is some possibility that the
theory could support granting perceived disability plaintiffs accommodations to change
aspects of the work environment that are discriminatory in impact, if not intent. See iL at
204-05. In practice, however, members of this centrist camp have only advanced this
position to challenge purportedly neutral entrance or credential requirements, not to
challenge performance criteria. See id at 205. Because mainstream centrists leave
measures of job performance up to the employer and do not analyze organizational
decisions to see if they put protected group members at a disadvantage, see id.,
mainstream centrists might agree that individuals with perceived disabilities are not
entitled to workplace accommodations.
283. See id. at 202-03.
284. See id
285. See id at 206-07.
286. See id. at 207.
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Because the ADA currently denies nondisabled individuals a right to
accommodation, the ADA cannot be interpreted to grant that right to
individuals with perceived disability claims. Beyond that doctrinal
question, however, there still lies a normative one: whether the law
should grant nondisabled individuals a right to accommodations,
thereby requiring that the same right be granted to individuals with
perceived disability claims. One could argue that the ADA simply
got it wrong and that all individuals should be entitled to reasonable
workplace accommodations for impairments, whether disabling or
not, whenever the impairment creates a functional limitation on the
job. In other words, one could agree that antidiscrimination theory
requires perceived disability plaintiffs to be treated the same as other
nondisabled individuals for purposes of determining entitlement to
accommodations (that is, our hypothetical Employee B should be
treated like our hypothetical Employee C), but one also could argue
that Congress should have drafted the ADA to provide both groups
the right to accommodations, just like individuals with actually
disabling conditions (that is, both Employees B and C should be
accommodated, just like Employee A).
While there may be moral, philosophical, political, social,
economic, or other reasons for such a normative stance, that position
cannot be defended on contemporary antidiscrimination grounds. As
David Wasserman has explained, recognizing that the disadvantages
from various physical or mental impairments are mediated by the
work environment "does not, by itself, give claims for reconstruction
greater urgency than (other) claims for the redistribution of
resources," such as claims by individuals with poor education or
obsolete skills.0 Group-based antidiscrimination norms provide one
basis for placing workplace accommodation ahead of other
redistributive claims. Group-based antidiscrimination theory posits
that the inequality in workplace design arises not just from "the
vagaries of the market or the political process," but because of
prejudice.u8 The arbitrary design of the workplace around the
unstated, able-bodied norm has its source in pervasive attitudes of
contempt, disrespect, and devaluation of those with actual disabilities,
which gives accommodation claims for those with actual disabilities
greater moral urgency than claims for eliminating distributive
inequalities from other sources, such as "greed, insularity, or





The ADA uses this antidiscrimination theory to support the right
to reasonable accommodations-in other words, to justify prioritizing
that form of redistribution over others. Antidiscrimination theory
cannot, however, provide the moral urgency necessary to prioritize
workplace accommodations of nondisabled individuals (whether
correctly or incorrectly perceived) over other forms of redistribution.
Although the conventional workplace may create some functional
limitations for nondisabling impairments, the inequalities in design
are not an expression of disrespect, neglect, or devaluation, because
nondisabling impairments are traits possessed by many of the
members of the dominant group around which the workplace is
constructed. The unequal distribution of goods among nondisabled
individuals that may result in the conventional workplace lacks the
stigmatizing aspect that would allow antidiscrimination norms to
justify prioritizing their redistributive claims over others. Thus,
contemporary antidiscrimination norms cannot, on their own, justify
extending the ADA's traditional accommodations to the nondisabled
majority workforce.
Nor can antidiscrimination theories justify a doctrinal outcome
that treats perceived disability plaintiffs differently from other
nondisabled individuals for purposes of receiving such
accommodations, which is the primary focus of this Article. When
addressing questions of statutory construction, "[the] task is to
interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress
sought to serve. '290 With the ADA, Congress sought to serve equal
opportunity, which is not promoted by granting perceived disability
plaintiffs the full array of operational workplace accommodations.
On the other hand, it is difficult to ignore the single statutory
definition of a "qualified individual" or to completely divorce the
"accommodations" language from the "regarded as" prong. While
the broader statutory context argues against granting traditional
forms of accommodation for perceived disability claims, Part IV
discusses how a more appropriate conception of "accommodation"
could, and should, apply.
289. lId
290. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600,608 (1979).
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III. DOES THE ADA UNFAIRLY ADVANTAGE PERCEIVED
DISABILITY PLAINTIFFS BY REQUIRING THEM TO PERFORM ONLY
THE "ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS" OF A JOB?
The ADA's "essential functions" limit also should not apply
identically to actual and perceived disability claims. Although
virtually all courts have reached the opposite conclusion based on the
statute's purportedly "plain language," Section A demonstrates that
the answer is far from "plain" by using a contextual reading of the
statute, the EEOC guidelines, and the legislative history. Section B
bolsters the view that the essential functions limit should not apply to
perceived disabilities by again comparing perceived disability
discrimination to employment discrimination under Title VII, which
requires employees to be qualified for all legitimately selected job
functions. Section C then explains why the same risk of unfair
advantage that results from applying the reasonable accommodations
rule to perceived disability claims also results from applying the
essential functions limit.
A. Lessons from the Statutory Text, Agency Guidelines, and
Legislative Intent
Nearly all courts have given perceived disability plaintiffs the
benefit of the essential functions limit, which allows plaintiffs to be
"qualified" even if they cannot perform marginal job tasks.291 As with
the reasonable accommodations rule, courts have taken this "all"
approach by mechanically applying the ADA's single definition of a
"qualified individual with a disability" identically to both perceived
and actual disability claims.2 2 An individual is "qualified" under the
ADA if, with or without reasonable accommodation, the individual
"can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires."2' By applying this single definition
to perceived disability claims, courts conclude that perceived
disability plaintiffs need not perform marginal job tasks either to state
an ADA claim or to be eligible for all available statutory remedies.294
Even courts that have expressed doubts about applying the
291. See supra notes 63-87, 116-17,125 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 63-87, 116-17,125, 127 aid accompanying text.
293. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). The ADA's general antidiscrimination rule says that
"[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability"
regarding the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, id. § 12112(a), and the
statute defines individuals with disabilities to include those with substantially limiting
impairments that are either actual or perceived, id § 12102(2)(A), (C).
294. See supra notes 63-87,116-17,125 and accompanying text.
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accommodations rule to perceived disability claims have applied the
essential functions limit without reservation by deeming the statutory
language to be plain and unambiguous.295 This interpretation has
been accepted by virtually all courts that have addressed the issue,
and it has gone virtually unchallenged by employers defending
perceived disability claims.2 96
Once again, however, a broader look at the statute uncovers
ambiguities that should prompt courts to look to other
interpretational sources. 97 The definition of a qualified individual-
one who can perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation-itself contains statutorily
defined terms. The ADA defines a "reasonable accommodation" to
include, among other things, "job restructuring."2 98 Congress viewed
job restructuring as the obligation to eliminate nonessential job
functions by redelegating or exchanging a disabled employee's job
assignments.2 99 The EEOC regulations clarify that job restructuring
means "reallocating or redistributing nonessential, marginal job
functions" for an individual with a disability who is unable to perform
a nonessential job task. 00 The EEOC's technical assistance manual
further elaborates: "Job restructuring or job modification is a form of
reasonable accommodation which enables many qualified individuals
with disabilities to perform jobs effectively. Job restructuring as a
reasonable accommodation may involve reallocating or redistributing
the marginal functions of a job." '' Thus, these sources indicate that
allowing a disabled employee to be deemed "qualified" without
performing the marginal job functions is itself a form of
295. See, e.g., Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 140, 146-47, 148 n.12 (3d Cir.
1998) (en banc) (applying the essential functions limit to perceived disability claims while
declining to decide the "more difficult" reasonable accommodations issue); Keck v. New
York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); see also supra note 125 (citing Rehabilitation Act cases that
reached the same conclusion).
296. See supra notes 63-87, 116-17, 125 and accompanying text. Even in the Deane
case, where the original panel decision held that the essential functions limit does not
apply and that a perceived disability plaintiff must perform all job functions, the employer
refused to support that position before the en banc court. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 140,146.
297. See supra note 135.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (1999).
299. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62 (1990) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 344 ; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31 (1989) (Sup. Does.
No. Y 1.1/5:101-116).
300. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 344-45; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 31).
301. EEOC TEcHNIcALAssisTANcEIMANuAL, supra note 3, § 3.10(2), at III-21.
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accommodation."° In other words, the essential functions limit is
really just one specific application of the reasonable accommodations
right. Requiring an employee with a disability to perform only the
essential job functions, while restructuring the job to eliminate
functions that are only marginal, is one way to create a reasonable
accommodation for the disability.
Because the essential functions limit is itself an accommodation,
a plaintiff should be entitled to that right only if the plaintiff is
entitled to be reasonably accommodated. The applicability of the
essential functions limit thereby collapses into the analysis of whether
or not the right to reasonable accommodations applies. Because the
analysis in Part II concluded that perceived disability plaintiffs are not
entitled to traditional forms of operational accommodation, that
analysis should also answer the essential functions question. In
syllogistic form: perceived disability plaintiffs do not have the right to
traditional forms of accommodation; allowing an employee to
perform only the essential job functions is a traditional form of
accommodation; therefore, perceived disability plaintiffs do not have
a right to the ADA's essential functions limit.
The vacated Deane panel decision reached this conclusion not
only as a matter of statutory interpretation, but also as a matter of
common sense.303 The "common sense notion" anchoring the court
was very basic: "[A]ny employee, disabled or otherwise, must be able
to perform all the requisite functions of a given job unless the
individual is entitled to accommodation by operation of the ADA or
a similar remedial statute.' '304  Moving from common sense to
statutory construction, the court determined that job restructuring-
"i.e., excusing the performance of nonessential functions or
reassigning them to other employees"-was "a statutorily defined
302. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198,
206 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o)(2)(ii); id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o); EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, supra note 3, § 3.10(2), at 111-21 to -22; see also Robert B. Fitzpatrick,
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA: Selected Issues, CA30
ALI-ABA 103, 112 (1995), available in WL, ALI-ABA database (listing "eliminating or
reassigning the non-essential aspects of a job that are incompatible with a worker's
disability" as an example of reasonable accommodation); Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale,
Confidentiality, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1003, 1008
(1997) (explaining that one of the "more common accommodations that may be required"
is "restructuring a job by reallocating or redistributing marginal, nonessential functions of
the job").




form of accommodation.""3 5  Because an employer may require
nondisabled individuals to perform marginal job tasks, "an employee
who is excused from performing marginal tasks is being
accommodated.""3 6 Unlike those with actual disabilities, who may
need accommodation to compete on level ground with the
nondisabled, the Deane panel held that accommodation would give
perceived disability plaintiffs an "undeserved windfall."3, Thus, the
court concluded that perceived disability plaintiffs must perform "all
the functions of the position held or sought." 308
Despite the Deane panel's careful statutory analysis, the dissent
found the panel's interpretation "unpersuasive. ' '309 The en banc court
followed the dissenting panel opinion by holding that the "plain
language" of the statute required the essential functions rule to apply
identically to actual and perceived disability claims.10 If Congress
really had wanted the essential functions limit to be viewed as an
accommodation, why did it need to define "qualified individual" with
reference to both terms? If reassigning the marginal job functions
was really a form of accommodation, couldn't Congress have defined
a "qualified individual" with reference solely to the reasonable
accommodations rule? , Although this point has merit, the answer
appears to be "no."
The reason that Congress needed to use both terms to define a
"qualified individual" is that Congress apparently wanted to treat the
reassignment of marginal functions not just as a potential
accommodation, but as a presumptively reasonable one. If Congress
simply had defined "qualified individual" as one who could perform
all job duties with or without reasonable accommodations, the Act
would have allowed employers to argue that reassigning marginal
tasks was not "reasonable" in a particular situation, and courts would
have had to analyze that issue on a case-by-case basis' The
305. Id. (emphasis omitted); see id. at 206 n.17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)).
306. l at 206.
307. Id. at 208.
308. Id. at 209 (emphasis added); see id. at 208.
309. Id. at 211-12 (Becker, J., dissenting).
310. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(adopting the dissenting opinion from the panel decision in Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at
211-12 (Becker, J., dissenting)).
311. An accommodation is not "reasonable" if it imposes an undue hardship on the
employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Whether an accommodation imposes an
undue hardship is an individualized determination based on several factors, including the
nature and cost of the accommodation, the employer's size and financial resources, the
impact that the accommodation would have on business operations, and the type of
operations involved. See id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
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legislative history indicates Congress's implicit view that reassigning,
substituting, or excusing marginal job tasks should be viewed as a
presumptively reasonable accommodation because those tasks do not
define the job and because employers could use marginal tasks as an
excuse for not hiring highly capable workers with disabilities.3 12 It is
therefore consistent not only to view the essential functions limit as
an accommodation, but also to use both the reasonable
accommodations right and the essential functions limit to define a
"qualified individual." Because, as discussed in Part II, perceived
disability plaintiffs should not be entitled to the traditional forms of
operational workplace accommodation and because excusing
performance of nonessential tasks is such an accommodation,
perceived disability plaintiffs should be required to perform all
required job tasks. Whether a particular task is essential or marginal
therefore should be irrelevant in a perceived disability case, even
though the statute's qualification language only refers explicitly to the
essential functions of the job. 3
If courts interpreted the ADA otherwise, the statute
theoretically could create an absurd result.314 An employer properly
may terminate a correctly perceived, nondisabled employee who fails
to perform a marginal, but required, job function. For example, ABC
312. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 31-34 (1990) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-
485), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,454-57; id., pt. 2, at 55-57, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
337-39; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 25-27 (1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116); 136 CONG.
REC. 11,451 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(m)
(1999) ("The purpose of this second step is to ensure that individuals with disabilities who
can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired are not denied
employment opportunities because they are not able to perform marginal functions of the
position."); U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AMERIcANs wrr- DISABILITIES Acr HANDBOOK 1-37 (1992) (same); U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N & CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Acr, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2 (1992)
("Requiring the ability to perform 'essential' functions assures that an individual with a
disability will not be considered unqualified simply because of inability to perform
marginal or incidental job functions.").
313. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 209 n.24. As the vacated Deane panel
explained,
when determining whether an individual can, with or without accommodation,
perform the essential functions, courts necessarily must look to whether the
individual may be excused from the nonessential functions that he or she cannot
perform. Indeed, the lynchpin of the ADA is that a disabled individual's
qualifications are to be assessed only after he or she is accommodated through
job restructuring or otherwise. Where that accommodation is not available, we
do not read the ADA as permitting the individual or the court to focus
exclusively on the essential functions of the relevant position.
Id at 206 n.17 (citation omitted).
314. See id. at 210; id. at 215 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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Company could fire our hypothetical Employee C, who has the
correctly perceived, nondisabling knee injury, because of Employee
C's inability to perform the marginal task of restocking supply-room
shelves. Let us say that ABC Company also fired our hypothetical
Employee B because ABC misperceived Employee B's mild carpal
tunnel syndrome as a disability. If the essential functions rule applied
to Employee B's perceived disability claim, then Employee B would
be deemed "qualified" to state an ADA claim, despite Employee B's
inability to perform the marginal restocking task. Let us say that
Employee B wins the perceived disability case and is reinstated in the
nursing assistant job. After losing the case and reinstating Employee
B, ABC Company presumably will be disabused of its misperception
about Employee B's carpal tunnel syndrome."' l At that point, ABC
Company promptly, and lawfully, could terminate Employee B for
failing to perform the marginal restocking task, just as it could fire
any other correctly perceived, nondisabled worker on that ground.316
In the end, the employer would get precisely what it wanted-to fire
the employee-even though the employer lost the case.317 And the
employee would suffer precisely the fate that the employee was trying
to avoid-losing the job-even though the employee won.18 As this
scenario demonstrates, applying the essential functions rule to
perceived disability claims would establish a statutory right to a
remedy that simply would not last. 19
That result would be difficult to defend, given the practical intent
behind the ADA.32 Courts are obligated to construe a statute "to
avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are available and
consistent with the legislative purpose.""32  The appropriate
alternative to applying the essential functions limit identically to
actual and perceived disability claims is to interpret the essential
315. See id. at 215 (Becker, J., dissenting) (explaining that an employer's misperception
of a nondisabled employee as disabled should be corrected when the employee wins a
perceived disability case).
316. See id. at 210 (describing the lawful conduct that an employer may take after
losing a perceived disability case); id. at 215 (Becker, J., dissenting) (same).
317. See id. at 215 (Becker, J., dissenting) (describing this scenario).
31& See id. (Becker, J., dissenting) (describing this scenario).
319. See id. at 210 (using this conclusion to hold the essential functions rule
inapplicable to perceived disability claims).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (1994) (listing societal participation, independence,
and self-sufficiency among the goals of the ADA); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 268, at 52,
144 (explaining that the fundamental goals behind the underlying disability rights
movement included independence, self-sufficiency, mainstreaming, and integration of
individuals with disabilities into society).
321. United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876,880 (3d Cir. 1994).
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functions limit as an example of the reasonable accommodations
right. Because excusing, substituting, or reassigning the marginal
functions is itself an accommodation and because perceived disability
plaintiffs should not be entitled to traditional forms of
accommodation, the essential functions limit should not apply to
perceived disability claims.
B. Comparing Perceived Disability Claims to Other Types of
Actionable Employment Discrimination
Comparing disability discrimination to other types of
employment discrimination also suggests that the essential functions
limit should not apply to perceived disability claims. If the essential
functions limit is viewed as a form of accommodation, then Part ll.B's
analysis of the reasonable accommodations rule should apply.3z2 As
an accommodation, the essential functions limit is part of the ADA's
distributive justice component. Accordingly, the essential functions
limit should be unavailable to perceived disability plaintiffs who do
not face the structural and/or dynamic discrimination that would
elevate their redistribution claims over the rest of the nondisabled
workforce. Because the ADA protects perceived disability plaintiffs
solely because of employers' misperceptions-like Title VII protects
against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other vocationally
irrelevant characteristics-perceived disability plaintiffs should be
ineligible for accommodation rights and, therefore, ineligible for the
essential functions limit.32
To state a case under Title VII, plaintiffs must prove that they
are "qualified" for the jobs at issue.324 Unlike the ADA's definition
of a "qualified individual" that limits an employee's required
performance to essential job functions, Title VII's provisions apply to
"any individual,"325 placing no limits on which job functions a plaintiff
must be qualified to perform. An employer therefore may require a
Title VII plaintiff to perform "all" of the employer's designated job
requirements, duties, and responsibilities,326 as long as the selected
criteria do not have an impermissible disparate impact and are not a
322. See supra notes 176-222 and accompanying text.
323. Cf Deane, 7 AlD Cases (BNA) at 206 (holding that an employee who cannot
perform a marginal job function is not qualified unless an accommodation right exists
because "any employee, disabled or otherwise, must be able to perform all the requisite
functions of a given job unless the individual is entitled to accommodation").
324. See Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773,779 (7th Cir. 1995).
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
326. See Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 669 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Title VII's
qualification rule in a failure-to-promote case).
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pretext for discriminatory intent. In a termination case, a plaintiff is
not "qualified" if the plaintiff has not met any one of the employer's
"legitimate performance expectations."'327 The Title VII plaintiff must
establish more than just the requisite educational credentials and
experience; the plaintiff must demonstrate competent performance
on all required job tasks.3'2 Accordingly, the distinction between
essential and marginal functions is irrelevant in Title VII claims. If
the plaintiff is not qualified for "any" reason, the plaintiff may not
establish the qualification requirement of a Title VII case. 29
Similarly, courts will allow an employer to defend a Title VII case by
citing a plaintiffs failure to perform any legitimate job function as a
nondiscriminatory reason for making an employment decision.30
Because the ADA shares the same goal as Title VII, the ADA's
"essential functions" limit on the definition of a "qualified individual"
must be justified as a necessary form of equal opportunity. That
justification exists for those with actual disabilities.33' Unlike the
protected categories under Title VII, people with substantially
limiting impairments may sometimes face unique employment
barriers because of their protected status, with one such barrier being
the arbitrary or unnecessary selection, assignment, distribution, or
designated method of performing marginal job tasks.3 In contrast,
327. Taylor, 69 F.3d at 779; see Santana v. United States Tsubaki, Inc., 932 F. Supp.
189, 191 (N.D. Ohio 1995); Brady v. DiBiaggio, 794 F. Supp. 663,668 (W.D. Mich. 1992).
328. See Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 1988) (focusing on
the employer's expectations); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 290 (8th Cir.
1982) (same); Johnson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 752 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (D. Utah
1990) (same); Bocage v. Litton Sys., Inc., 702 F. Supp. 846, 850 (D. Utah 1988) (same); see
also Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1993) (requiring
detailed evidence of the particular job requirements for a plaintiff to state a prima facie
case under Title VII).
329. Pafford, 148 F.3d at 669; see also Lawson v. Getty Terminals Corp., 866 F. Supp.
793, 801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff did not meet the qualification test
to state a prima facie case because the plaintiff had performed poorly by, among other
things, failing to identify a worker who called in sick one day, which the employee
characterized as a" 'little mistakeo' " (modification in original)).
330. See, e.g., Richmond v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595, 598
(8th Cir. 1992).
331. For an analysis of the equal opportunity justification for providing other forms of
accommodation to those with actual disabilities, see supra notes 177-87 and accompanying
text.
332. As one commentator has explained,
the essential-functions concept is indeed rooted in the intractable natural basis of
the individual's disability. Such a natural ground is never a basis faced in laws
against racial bias, and rarely is in other areas of prohibited discrimination.
There the protected traits are always (or nearly always) regarded as immaterial
to job performance. Only in anti-discrimination law protecting people with
disabilities does the protected trait pertain to normal job performance.
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perceived disability plaintiffs, like those protected under Title VII,
face unequal opportunities not because a protected trait pertains to
the socially constructed "normal job performance" but because of an
employer's erroneous beliefs about an "immaterial" trait.333
Although a plaintiff's nondisabling impairment may trigger the
erroneous beliefs, any such impairment also may be possessed by
other nondisabled employees, who, at least under current law, still are
required to perform all designated job functions. Because perceived
disability plaintiffs are actually part of the nondisabled majority, an
employer's choice of marginal job tasks is not likely systematically to
disfavor nondisabled workers who are perceived incorrectly over
those who are perceived correctly. Thus, unlike those with actual
disabilities, perceived disability plaintiffs should obtain equal
opportunity with the rest of the nondisabled workforce without
requiring the employer to eliminate or redistribute marginal job tasks,
which, although nonessential, nevertheless legitimately may be
desired by the employer. Like Title VII's approach, eliminating the
employer's erroneous beliefs should be sufficient to equalize
opportunity for those with perceived disability claims.
C. Distinguishing Equal Opportunity from Unfair Advantage
If the ADA's essential functions limit is viewed as a form of
accommodation, then Part II.C's "unfair advantage" analysis of the
reasonable accommodations rule is directly applicable.3 4 As a form
of accommodation, the essential functions limit is consistent with a
"difference model" of antidiscrimination. 335  Accordingly, the
essential functions limit needs an equality-based justification for
treating some people "differently" in order to end up treating them
"the same." Absent such a justification, a "sameness model" should
apply, which simply requires employers to treat all employees the
same.
An equality-based justification for the essential functions limit
W. Robert Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with
Disabilities and John Rawls's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. REV. 295, 351 (1992);
see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (1990) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/8:101-485),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337 (explaining how marginal job tasks can have the
"purpose or effect" of discriminating against individuals with actual disabilities); STAFF OF
HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., 101ST CONG., THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT 124 (Comm. Print 1990) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 4.Ed8/1:102-A) (same).
333. See Gray, supra note 332, at 351.
334. See supra notes 224-77 and accompanying text.
335. For an explanation of how accommodations represent a "difference model" of
antidiscrimination, see supra notes 238-47 and accompanying text.
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exists for people with actual disabilities, just as it exists to justify any
other form of reasonable accommodation.3 36  Because the
conventional workplace often is oriented unnecessarily toward the
nondisabled, accommodations are needed to eliminate barriers that
some individuals with actual disabilities would still face under a
"sameness model," which effectively treats the job as immutable. The
selection, distribution, and required method of performing marginal
job tasks may create such a barrier. For example, our disabled
Employee A would be excluded from the nursing assistant's job, even
if Employee A could perform all essential job functions, because the
employer unnecessarily assigned that particular position the marginal
task of restocking the top shelf and because the employer arbitrarily
required the task to be performed by moving one's body up a ladder,
rather than by using some type of reaching device. Given that such
marginal job functions are not, by definition, "essential" to
accomplishing the job, requiring individuals with disabilities to
perform particular marginal tasks, or to perform them in a particular
manner, can be unnecessarily exclusionary.337  By requiring
redistribution of such marginal tasks, the essential functions limit may
be described as "active nondiscrimination"--just like other forms of
traditional workplace accommodation-because it requires positive
steps to equalize opportunity between employees who have an actual
disability and those who do not.338
As with the ADA's general accommodations rule, the essential
functions limit does not provide preferential treatment just because it
treats individuals with actual disabilities differently from the
nondisabled. As explained in Part II.C, accommodations for actual
disabilities ensure only that the individual's abilities will be
recognized; they do not require the employer to lower legitimate
performance standards or to prefer employees with disabilities.339
This assertion, however, may be harder to defend for the essential
functions limit than for other forms of traditional accommodation.
While other accommodations merely modify the work environment,
336. For a discussion of this analysis for other forms of reasonable accommodations,
see supra notes 234-60 and accompanying text.
337. For a definition of "essential functions," see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 33,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 455-56; supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
338. See Conway, supra note 16, at 961 ("The essential function limitation is consistent
with the congressional mandate to provide equal opportunity to the disabled."). For a
discussion of how the term "affirmative action" may be used correctly to describe what
this Article refers to as "active nondiscrimination," see the description of Van Alstyne's
work, supra note 259.
339. See supra notes 226-29,243,247,253 and accompanying text.
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equipment, or methods to allow disabled individuals to perform a
task in an unconventional way, the essential functions limit also
allows disabled individuals to avoid performing tasks that the
employer could require nondisabled individuals in that position to
perform. Nevertheless, the essential functions limit is "an important
nondiscrimination requirement," not a way to give those with
disabilities a competitive edge. 4
The essential functions limit is consistent with a
nondiscrimination theory for those with actual disabilities because
basing employment decisions on marginal job functions can facilitate
discrimination in two ways. For individuals with actual disabilities,
focusing on marginal job functions may not only have the "effect" of
discriminating against the disabled by creating additional, arbitrary
barriers, but often it may have a discriminatory "purpose" as well.34'
Because of employers' historic prejudice against people with actual
disabilities, Congress recognized that a more complete qualification
test would create a significant risk that employers would use marginal
job functions to disguise illegitimate motives for failing to hire or
retain highly capable disabled employees.342 From this perspective,
Congress intended the essential functions limit to be "protective" of
people with actual disabilities by ensuring that discrimination could
not be accomplished through the arbitrary distribution of marginal
tasks.343 The essential functions limit assures a legitimate fit between
340. EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2.3(2), at 11-12; see
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 33, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 455-56 (explaining the purpose
of the essential functions rule).
341. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55-56, 71, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337-38;
STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., supra note 332, at 124.
342. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 353-54 (emphasizing
the desire to keep employers from using marginal job tasks for the "purpose" of excluding
individuals with disabilities); id& at 55, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337 (explaining the purpose of
the essential functions rule); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., supra note
332, at 124, 135 (describing how the essential functions limit prevents employers from
using marginal job tasks with the "purpose" of excluding disabled individuals); EEOC
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2.3(2), at 11-12 (explaining that the
ADA's focus only on essential job functions "is an important nondiscrimination
requirement" for the "[mI]any people with disabilities who can perform essential job
functions [but who] are denied employment because they cannot do things that are only
marginal to the job"); see also 136 CONG. REC. 10,901-02 (1990) (statement of Rep.
McColum) (arguing during floor debate that the ADA protects employees from
employers "attempting to shape the essential functions of the job to exclude" disabled
individuals).
343. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 353-54 (explaining
the purpose behind the essential functions limit); id at 55, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337
(same); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., supra note 332, at 124, 135
(same). But see Gray, supra note 332, at 307 (noting this "protective" purpose, but
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job criteria and relevant ability and works together with the broader
accommodations rule "to eliminate the current pervasive bias against
employing persons with disabilities." 4 Accordingly, individuals with
actual disabilities who receive the "accommodation" provided by the
essential functions limit are not advantaged over nondisabled
employees. Those with actual disabilities are just recipients of an
appropriately difference-based form of equal opportunity law.
While the essential functions limit thus helps "level the playing
field" for individuals with actual disabilities, the same is not true for
those whose disabilities only are perceived. Because perceived
disability plaintiffs possess no substantially limiting impairments that
materially distinguish them from other nondisabled individuals, any
unequal opportunity results from the employer incorrectly treating
similar employees differently, not from incorrectly treating different
employees the same. Accordingly, for perceived disability plaintiffs, a
sameness model should suffice.
Under a sameness model, a perceived disability plaintiff should
be held to the same qualification standards as all other nondisabled
individuals, which means an employer could require performance on
all legitimately selected essential or marginal job tasks.345 While a
perceived disability plaintiff may have a nondisabling impairment that
impacts performance of marginal job functions, any such impairment
is not the cause of the plaintiffs unequal opportunity. 46 Nor does a
nondisabling impairment objectively distinguish the perceived
disability plaintiff from other nondisabled employees, who may
arguing that the essential functions rule also ends up having an exclusionary effect).
344. H.R. RP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 353; see STAFF OF
HousE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., supra note 332, at 124,135.
345. Under this interpretation, a plaintiff with an otherwise nondisabling impairment
who is denied a job for failure to perform marginal job functions may still be protected if
there are enough employers who require the same marginal job functions for a particular
class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i)
(1999). The plaintiff could argue that the otherwise nondisabling impairment substantially
limits the major life activity of "working," thus enabling the plaintiff to bring an actual
disability claim instead of a perceived disability claim. See id. In that situation, the
marginal job tasks would have the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of a
disability, and the essential functions rule appropriately would serve the ADA's equal
opportunity objective. Nevertheless, because employers are likely to have much greater
variability in their selection of marginal job tasks than in their selection of essential ones,
this scenario probably would be rare. See Moberly, supra note 6, at 363-64. Typically,
perceived disability plaintiffs are likely to have a much greater opportunity than actual
disability plaintiffs for economic exit by finding similar employment with another
employer. See id. That fact further supports the view that the essential functions limit is
needed only to obtain equal opportunity for those with actual disability claims.
346. See supra notes 29-38,270-76 and accompanying text.
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possess similar types of nondisabling conditions. 7 Thus, perceived
disability plaintiffs should not need to have marginal job tasks
substituted, redistributed, or excused in order to receive opportunities
equal to "the average similarly situated employee without a
disability," which is all that the ADA seeks to accomplish.3 8 Instead,
applying the essential functions limit would provide a "windfall" to
those with perceived disability claims.
Because a sameness model of antidiscrimination would suffice
for those with perceived disabilities, granting them the essential
functions limit, like other traditional accommodations, would make it
more advantageous for nondisabled workers to be misperceived than
to be perceived correctly. For example, applying the essential
functions limit to our hypothetical Employee B (the misperceived but
nondisabled worker with carpal tunnel syndrome) would require
ABC Company to tolerate Employee B's inability to perform the
marginal shelf-stocking function by exchanging that task with another
employee's marginal job task, by reassigning the task, or by excusing
performance of the task altogether. In contrast, ABC Company
could fire our hypothetical Employee C (the correctly perceived,
nondisabled worker with a knee injury) for not performing the
required shelf-stocking task, even though the task is not essential to
the job. Employee C would be better off if ABC Company
misperceived Employee C's knee injury as disabling because the
misperception would prevent the Company from basing employment
decisions on the ability to perform marginal job functions. To avoid
this unintended result, and to be consistent with the ADA's equal
opportunity objective, courts should not apply the essential functions
limit to perceived disability claims.
347. See supra notes 29-38,270-76 and accompanying text.
348. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9; id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.1(a) (describing the
ADA as an "anti-discrimination" statute, which "requires that individuals with disabilities
be given the same consideration for employment that individuals without disabilities are
given"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8), (9) (1994) (describing the ADA's equal
opportunity goal); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (same).
Of course, the theoretical risk of unfair advantage from applying the essential
functions limit to perceived disability claims will only be a reality for employers who
actually base employment decisions at least in part on the performance of marginal job
tasks. If courts interpret the ADA to prevent an employer from taking action against
perceived disability plaintiffs because of their inability to perform marginal job functions,
but the employer never takes such action against other nondisabled individuals, then




To this point, this Article has argued only that courts should not
apply the ADA's reasonable accommodations and essential functions
rules identically to actual and perceived disability claims. By granting
perceived disability plaintiffs a cause of action and the full array of
statutory remedies under the same circumstances as actual disability
plaintiffs-the "all" approach-courts exceed the ADA's equal
opportunity objective and advantage those with perceived disabilities.
This Part analyzes what should be done as a result of that conclusion.
Section A first translates the theoretical advantage of the "all"
approach into practical terms by assessing whether the problem is big
enough to warrant a response at all. Section B then analyzes the only
response that has been suggested to date. That response-the
"nothing" approach-would eliminate the ADA's reasonable
accommodations and essential functions rules from perceived
disability claims altogether, leaving perceived disability plaintiffs like
our hypothetical Employee B with no cause of action and, therefore,
no remedy at all. While eliminating the reasonable accommodations
and essential functions rules from the perceived disability context
would solve the advantage problem of the majority's "all" approach,
Section B explains how the "nothing" approach misses the target in
the other direction, falling short of the ADA's level playing field goal.
Section C then proposes a middle-ground alternative that would
produce the broadest scope for the perceived disability prong
consistent with the ADA's equal opportunity goal.
A. The Size of the "Unfair Advantage" Problem
As explained in Part I.B, the vast majority of courts have applied
the reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules
identically to actual and perceived disability claims. Given the
ambiguity of the statutory language, the ease with which most courts
have applied the qualification language mechanically to perceived
disabilities, and the administrative convenience and other benefits
that may result from identical treatment of all ADA claims, is there
enough of an issue for courts to change course? Is the risk of
advantage from the majority's "all" approach significant enough for
courts to rethink the meaning of the qualification tests for perceived
disability claims? This Section attempts to answer these practical
questions before moving on to analyze potential alternatives.
The number of cases in which perceived disability plaintiffs
would receive an advantage if a court applied the traditional
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qualification standards is only a subset of all perceived disability
claims. The risk of advantage only exists in those perceived disability
cases in which the plaintiff needs a reasonable accommodation (which
may include redistributing the marginal job functions) in order to do
the job. Perceived disability plaintiffs who can perform all job
functions without accommodation will not receive a "windfall" over
other nondisabled individuals because those plaintiffs will be deemed
"qualified" without accommodation. Unfortunately, data for the
relevant subset of perceived disability claims is not available and
instead must be estimated from general records of perceived
disability litigation.
Historically, the number of reported cases involving perceived
disabilities has been smaUl. 9 Until the mid-1990s, there were so few
perceived disability cases under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation
Act that one court described perceived disability case law as "hen's-
teeth rare. '350  During the first half of the decade, allegations of
perceived disabilities were still considered "pathbreaking" claims that
required courts to enter "new frontiers" and "journey into the terra
incognita. '351 By the mid-1990s, perceived disability claims started to
increase,352 but the small number of recorded cases still provided a
349. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 902 (citing Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17,
22 (lstCir. 1993)).
350. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22.
351. Id. at 20,22, 26.
352. For a partial list and a discussion of the large number of recent perceived
disability cases, which is in stark contrast to the first half of the 1990s, see supra notes 63-
126 and accompanying text. One reason for the increase was a significant First Circuit
decision in late 1993, which "issued a number of rulings favorable to a plaintiff who
proceeds with a perceived disability claim." Karen M. Kramer & Arlene B. Mayerson,
Obesity Discrimination in the Workplace: Protection Through a Perceived Disability Claim
under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 31 CAL. W. L. REV.
41, 58 (1994) (describing Cook). The Cook case held, among other things, that the
immutability and voluntariness of a nondisabling condition do not bar a perceived
disability claim. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23-24. The court's ruling spawned a series of articles
and increased the number of perceived disability claims. See Frisk & Hernicz, supra note
277, at 19 (arguing that Cook may have been a catalyst for increasing perceived disability
claims); Charles T. Passaglia, Appearance Discrimination: The Evidence of the Weight, 23
COLO. LAW. 841, 842 (1994) ("Cook certainly provides support, and perhaps momentum,
for the often-nebulous 'perceived disability' claims brought under the ADA."); Jennifer
Shoup, Note, Title I: Protecting the Obese Worker?, 29 IND. L. REV. 207, 220 (1995)
("Cook affirmed a finding of employment discrimination based upon perceived disability.
As the Cook court pointed out, such claims have, in the past, been rare. However, it
seems a legitimate concern that, in the wake of Cook, such claims will become more
prevalent."). But see Shoup, supra, at 220 ("Cook offers some reassurance, however, by




fairly minor contribution to disability-based discrimination law."
Not until well into the decade did perceived disability cases begin to
make any significant impression on the legal landscape.5 4
Since the mid-1990s, however, the number of perceived disability
cases has increased,355 and there are several reasons to predict that the
trend will continue. Courts are beginning to clarify and narrow the
scope of the actual disability prong. 6 This trend is exemplified by
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc.35 7  In Sutton, the Supreme Court overturned the broad
interpretation of the ADA's actual disability prong previously
reached by the majority of circuit courts, and the Court greatly
restricted the potential class of individuals with actual disabilities.3 8
Despite EEOC regulations to the contrary, the Sutton Court held that
actual disability status should be based on an employee's functioning
with the use of any corrective measures that the employee uses to
reduce the impact of the impairment.3 9  Accordingly, many high-
functioning individuals with impairments may no longer rely on the
ADA's actual disability prong. As courts continue to circumscribe
the reach of the actual disability prong in this and other ways, creative
plaintiffs lawyers are and will be turning more frequently to the
perceived disability prong as an alternative, often pleading a
perceived disability as a fall-back position in the same complaint with
an actual disability claim.36 In addition, at the same time that courts
are paring back the scope of the actual disability prong, they may be
demonstrating a willingness to expand the protected class of
353. See Greenberg v. New York State, 919 F. Supp. 637, 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(observing that "few" perceived disability cases had been litigated); Smaw v. Virginia
Dep't of State Police, 862 F. Supp. 1469, 1474 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("Case law on the perceived
disability component of the Rehabilitation Act [is] scant. ....").
354. See Frisk & Hernicz, supra note 277, at 13, 19 & nn.131-32.
355. See id. at 19 (noting that perceived disability claims are becoming more common,
both before the EEOC and in federal courts); see also supra note 352 (discussing the
increase in perceived disability claims resulting from the Cook decision).
356. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How
Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV.
327, 328 (1997) (arguing that "the failure of the ADA to provide comprehensive
protection against discrimination can be attributed to judicial narrowing of its
provisions"); Locke, supra note 226, at 108 (arguing that courts have raised the standards
that disability discrimination claimants must meet).
357. 119 S. Ct. 2139,2146-49 (1999).
358. Id.
359. Id (declining to follow 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(h) (1999)).
360. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 917 ("A common scenario in perceived
disability cases involves plaintiffs alleging in the alternative that they are actually disabled
or that their employer regarded them as disabled.").
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perceived disabilities, which could further increase litigation under
the "regarded as" prong. 6' The complicated nature of perceived
disability claims makes it likely that more cases will be needed to
clarify and articulate the parameters of the "regarded as" prong than
for the more straightforward portions of the Act.3 62
While the number of perceived disability cases clearly is rising, it
is harder to determine what percentage of those cases involve
plaintiffs who require accommodation and therefore present the risk
of advantage. There is some evidence that this relevant subset of
perceived disability cases is substantial. For all types of disability
discrimination claims, the failure to provide reasonable
accommodation is the second largest form of alleged discrimination,
only behind claims of discriminatory discharge.3 6 The percentage of
all disability claims that allege a failure to accommodate is between
25% and 28%.'6
Of course, it is possible that this percentage may be less when
looking only at perceived disability cases in which the plaintiff, by
definition, lacks an actually disabling impairment.365 But plaintiffs in
two of the regulations' three categories of perceived disabilities do
possess some type of physical or mental impairment that may impact
job performance, even if the impairment is not substantially
limiting.36 Nearly all of the reported cases fall into those two
categories. 67 In fact, nondisabled individuals are most likely to suffer
361. See Dudley, supra note 63, at 391 (arguing that there is a "judicial tendency to
expand the protected class of 'regarded as' individuals under the ADA beyond those
originally intended by Congress").
362- See Wilson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171-72 n.7 (N.D. Ga.
1998).
363. See Shoup, supra note 352, at 228 & n.141 (citing William Flannery, Rights Act
Generates Few Suits, ST. Louis POST DISPATcH, April 6, 1994, at 8, available in 1994 WL
8153215).
364. See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 369
& n.114 (1997) (citing a 28% figure); Sheil, supra note 58, at 332 n.79 (placing the number
at 25% for complaints filed with the EEOC between July 26,1992, and June 30,1994).
365. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir. 1998)
(speculating in dicta that accommodation claims may occur less often in perceived
disability cases than in actual disability cases); Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 918-19
(arguing that "issues of reasonable accommodation seldom arise in 'regarded as' cases,
and when they do, they are often secondary to issues of class membership").
366. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
367. See Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 904 ("[T]he completely unimpaired plaintiffs
hypothesized by [the third category in] the regulations do not appear with any frequency
in the fact patterns found in appellate court decisions." (footnote omitted)); id. at 911
n.112 (describing perceived disability cases with "a completely unimpaired plaintiff" as
"rare"). A review of the perceived disability cases cited in supra notes 63-126 and
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from prejudiced attitudes or misperceptions when they exhibit some
visible and limiting impairment that affects job performance in some
way2 Individuals with nondisabling impairments that are "somehow
limiting" are the most likely to be misperceived as disabled and thus
the most likely to bring perceived disability claims' 69 Therefore, the
percentage of perceived disability cases involving accommodation
claims may be just as large as the percentage for all disability claims
combined.
Given the predicted increase in perceived disability claims and
the substantial portion of those claims that may involve
accommodation requests, the number of cases presenting the "unfair
advantage" issue is probably significant enough to warrant careful
examination. On the other hand, some may argue that even if the
risk of a "windfall" exists in these cases, the windfall is too small to be
consequential. Numerous studies show that the cost, if any, for most
accommodations is surprisingly small.37° That cost may be even
smaller for perceived disability cases "because the impairments
involved are not, by definition, disabling" and, therefore, the
accommodations are likely to be more minor.37
But the employer's financial outlay for accommodating
perceived disabilities is not the only cost involved. Determining the
scope of the "unfair advantage" issue also requires analysis of the
perceived scope of the problem and the costs of those perceptions.
While the windfall to accommodated plaintiffs with perceived
accompanying text supports this conclusion because virtually all involve a perceived
disability plaintiff with some type of nondisabling physical or mental impairment.
368. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 213 (3d Cir. 1997)
(Becker, J., dissenting), majority opinion rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
369. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting); see also Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 904-10
(explaining that many reported perceived disability cases involve plaintiffs with some type
of impairment and that these plaintiffs have the strongest case when, among other things,
the condition has impacted performance by necessitating time off or by disrupting the
workplace).
370. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILrrY DISCRIMINATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 86 (1995) (citing a study by Sears, Roebuck and Company finding that
"the average cost per reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities was
$121.42 and that 301 of 432 (69%) of accommodations required no cost at all" from 1978
to 1992); Cooper, supra note 181, at 1448-49 & n.149 (citing a 1982 study by the U.S.
Department of Labor finding that "51% of the accommodations imposed no cost, and
30% cost less than $500 per worker"); Murphy, supra note 12, at 1633 & nn.167-68
(summarizing studies that "have consistently found that job accommodations are generally
not expensive"); Sheil, supra note 58, at 330 n.59 (summarizing evidence that most
accommodations "will impose little or no financial burden"); Shoup, supra note 352, at 228
(citing evidence that 70% of necessary accommodations cost employers less than $100).
371. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 922.
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disabilities may be small in value, the perception of unfairness by
other nondisabled employees (and possibly by employees with actual
disabilities) may have real economic effects. Business success is tied
in part to employee morale.372 A decrease in employee morale can
involve decreases in employee enthusiasm, confidence, and loyalty,
which in turn can increase coworker friction, tardiness, absenteeism,
and employee turnover rates.3 73 Although one might suspect that
working hours or pay would impact employee morale the most,
morale is actually affected more by a sense of "fairness of treatment"
than by any tangible elements of the job.374 The most significant
cause of decreased employee morale is the "perception of injustice"
that results from perceived discrepancies between the rewards and
punishments of oneself and others 5
Seeing an individual with a perceived disability receive an
accommodation may create this "perception of injustice" in similarly
situated nondisabled coworkers, particularly if the coworkers do not
share the employer's misperception about the individual's
impairment. While there is some evidence that accommodating truly
disabled workers may not decrease and actually may increase
employee morale,376 accommodating individuals with only perceived
disabilities may have the opposite effect. To the extent that
coworkers view the accommodation as preferential treatment, their
expectations of fairness are disrupted, decreasing their morale.377
Unlike the employer, coworkers may regard a perceived disability
plaintiff accurately as nondisabled, and the coworkers actually may
share the same type of nondisabling impairments themselves. Even
without any direct impact on the coworkers' jobs, morale may
decrease as coworkers see other employees receiving
372. See Key, supra note 302, at 1007-08.
373. See id. at 1007.
374. Id. at 1006 (describing a Sears, Roebuck and Company study of more than 36,000
employees).
375. Id. at 1006-07 (discussing a Theodore Caplow study); see id. at 1033-34 ("[A]
perception that a co-worker is receiving preferential treatment can lead to legitimate
feelings of unfairness and injustice.").
376. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 28-29 (1989) (Sup. Doc. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (citing a
study of 1452 physically impaired employees of the E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Company finding that coworkers "did not resent necessary accommodations made for
employees with [actual] disabilities"); Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act
in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 567, 611-12 nn.258-59 (1994) (citing
evidence that accommodations do not decrease coworker morale and that coworkers often
volunteer to assist employees with actual disabilities).
377. See Key, supra note 302, at 1009.
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accommodations that the coworkers rationally view as a windfall. 378
This decrease in coworker morale is exacerbated when the
accommodation has a direct impact on the coworkers' jobs.379 For
example, if an employer accommodates an employee with a perceived
disability by redistributing that employee's marginal job functions to
a coworker, the coworker is likely to resent the accommodation
because of the increased workload, particularly if the redistributed
tasks are undesirable.380 When actual disabilities are involved,
coworker morale decreases the most when the disability is
nonobvious and the coworker does not know (or believe) that it
exists.38' The same result is possible when the disability is only
perceived by the employer, as coworkers will not necessarily share
the employer's view or understand the reason for the redistribution
decision.
While the economic impact from decreased employee morale
may be real, it nevertheless may be inappropriate to consider when
interpreting the scope of the ADA. To the extent that coworkers'
sentiments flow from the same stereotypes, prejudice, myths, and
misconceptions that the ADA is trying to eliminate in employers,
those sentiments should not be weighed into the employment
equation.311 Nevertheless, while the ADA does not permit employers
to consider those "illegitimate" causes of decreased morale, some
forms of decreased morale may be "legitimate" if they are caused by
actual impositions on the coworkers' expectations and rights.3  The
ADA does not require accommodations that impose an "undue
hardship," a determination that is based in part on the difficulty that
the accommodation creates, given the number of employees and the
functions of the employer's work force.3 14 An accommodation may
378. See id. at 1009-10.
379. See id. at 1010.
380. See id. at 1010-11; see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 1632 (noting that coworkers
may feel that accommodations requiring reassignment of "unpleasant or undesirable"
marginal job functions are unfair).
381. See James G. Frierson, An Employer's Dilemma: The ADA's Provisions on
Reasonable Accommodation and Confidentiality, 43 LAB. L.J. 308,308,310 (1992).
382. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(d) (1999) ("[T]he employer would not be
able to show undue hardship if the disruption to its employees were the result of those
employees fears or prejudices toward the individual's disability and not the result of the
provision of the accommodation.").
383. See Key, supra note 302 at 1030-41 (arguing that some causes of lowered
employee morale should be considered in assessing whether an accommodation imposes
an undue hardship on an employer).
384. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p); id. pt. 1630 app.
§ 1630.15(d); Murphy, supra note 12, at 1632.
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pose an undue hardship if it is "unduly disruptive" to other
employees, and an accommodation will be deemed "unduly
disruptive" only if it actually impacts other employees' ability to
perform their jobs." Because the ADA permits coworker impact to
play this narrow role in determining undue hardship, coworker
impact should play the same role in assessing the scope of the
problem created by accommodating perceived disabilities. When
decreased coworker morale stems from actual impositions on the
coworker's job and the coworker does not share the employer's
misperception about the status of the accommodated employee, the
economic results legitimately may be viewed as a cost.
In addition to the immediate economic effects caused by
decreased employee morale, advantaging perceived disability
plaintiffs also may have broader, long-term effects. Employees who
view themselves as similarly situated to perceived disability plaintiffs
may begin to readjust their expectations and start demanding
accommodations whether they are covered by the ADA or not.386 If
courts interpret the ADA to provide reasonable accommodations to
perceived disability plaintiffs, such interpretation may "permit
healthy employees to, through litigation (or the threat of litigation),
demand changes in their work environments under the guise of
'reasonable accommodations' for disabilities based on
misperceptions. ' '31 To the extent that nondisabled individuals begin
to expect what "regarded as" plaintiffs are receiving and those
expectations are not met, there may be a backlash against the ADA's
accommodation requirements more generally.38  Such a response
could undermine the critical support for the ADA by rekindling
initial views of the statute as an affirmative action and preferential
treatment provision, rather than as an equal opportunity law.389
Because the ADA obligates employers to implement active
nondiscrimination measures that do have costs attached, "support for
385. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.15(d).
386. See Deborah A. Calloway, Dealing with Diversity: Changing Theories of
Discrimination, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 481, 494 (1995).
387. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr. 142 F.3d 138, 149 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(describing the employer's argument against accommodating perceived disabilities and
noting in dicta that the argument has "considerable force").
38& See Calloway, supra note 386, at 494; see also Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 931
(arguing that "[i]ncluding persons regarded as disabled in the protected class under the
ADA subverts its distributive justice rationale," which is the basis of the duty to
reasonably accommodate).
389. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 364, at 346 (describing critics' initial opposition to
the ADA because they viewed the statute as "a preferential treatment initiative").
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the statute is crucial to its continued viability."3 9
Thus, the impact of the advantage problem may be greater than
what is indicated simply by assessing the number of perceived
disability cases involving accommodation claims. The potential direct
and indirect costs that may result from applying the ADA's
qualification standards identically to perceived disability claims
appear to be non-trivial. Accordingly, the final Sections of this
Article will suggest alternative ways to interpret the reasonable
accommodations and essential functions rules for perceived disability
claims.
B. Problems with All-or-Nothing Approaches: Why Eliminating the
Reasonable Accommodations Right and the Essential Functions
Limit for Perceived Disabilities May Fall Short of the "Level
Playing Field" Objective
Very few courts or commentators have responded to the
advantage that arises when the traditional test of a "qualified
individual" is applied to perceived disability claims.391 To the extent
that they have addressed this issue explicitly, the only real response
has been an extreme alternative to the majority's "all" approach.
This response-the "nothing" approach-sees no role at all for the
reasonable accommodations and essential functions rules in the
perceived disability context,392 leaving plaintiffs like our hypothetical
Employee B (the misperceived but nondisabled worker with carpal
tunnel syndrome) with neither a right nor a remedy. While this
"nothing" approach effectively eliminates the risk of unfair advantage
for perceived disability claims, it is also an imperfect solution.
Completely abandoning the ADA's unique qualification tests for
perceived disabilities would greatly reduce the scope of the "regarded
as" prong.393 By excluding perceived disability plaintiffs who have
390. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 937-38.
391. Most courts have assumed that the reasonable accommodations and essential
functions rules apply identically to actual and perceived disability claims, without
objection, discussion, or analysis. See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
Commentators often have made the same assumption. See, e.g., Vande Walle, supra note
127, at 919 & nn.191-92 (presuming that the reasonable accommodations rule applies to
perceived disability claims based on the statutory definition of a qualified individual).
392. This approach is exemplified by the vacated Deane panel opinion. Deane v.
Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 209 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that neither the
reasonable accommodations right nor the essential functions limit apply to perceived
disability claims), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). Other courts and
commentators have taken this "nothing" approach with respect to at least the reasonable
accommodations rule. See supra notes 88-115, 119-22 and accompanying text.
393. See Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 213 (Becker, J., dissenting).
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nondisabling but limiting impairments, the "nothing" approach would
end up falling short of the level playing field that the ADA seeks to
achieve.
Focusing on the employer's conduct provides the first reason for
rejecting the "nothing" approach. The ADA's perceived disability
prong exists not to protect individuals because of their physical or
mental status, but because the statute "condemns the employer's
behavior."3 94 When an employer acts with discriminatory animus or
bases an employment decision on improper criteria, that act is just as
reprehensible whether the disability is real or perceived. Although
our hypothetical Employee B (the misperceived but nondisabled
worker with carpal tunnel syndrome) is objectively similar to the
lawfully terminated Employee C (the correctly perceived worker with
a knee injury), ABC Company's motives for terminating Employee B
are just as invidious as its motives for terminating Employee A (the
actually disabled worker with lower body paralysis). In ABC's view,
both Employees A and B are "disabled," and ABC is using that status
improperly to make an employment decision.395
To the extent that the perceived disability prong's scope is
reduced by eliminating the right to accommodations, there will be a
greater number of improperly motivated employment decisions that
are not legally actionable. Whether an employee could bring a
perceived disability claim would depend solely on the employee's
abilities. An employee with a nondisabling but somehow limiting
impairment would not be protected, "even when her employer treats
her as though the impairment is substantially limiting," while an
employee with a nondisabling and nonlimiting impairment, "whose
employer treats her in yet the same discriminating manner," would be
394. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 899.
395. See id. at 933 ("[T]he employer discriminating against the employee [it] believes is
disabled is acting in the same way as an employer discriminating against an employee who
is truly disabled."); see also Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As"
Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REv. 587, 609 (1997) ("The
'regarded as' prong is supposed to be a catch-all for individuals who do not qualify as
disabled according to the first and second prongs of the definition of disability, but have
nevertheless been subject to an adverse disability-based employment action."); Moberly,
supra note 63, at 640-41 (explaining that "'[t]he purpose of the act is to prohibit
employers from discriminating on the basis of handicap,'" and arguing that "'[i]t would
not be consistent with that purpose to relieve employers who so discriminate of liability if,
although they acted in a prohibited discriminatory manner, it later turns out that their
belief was in fact erroneous'" (footnotes omitted) (quoting Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486
N.W.2d 657, 660 n.16 (Mich. 1992), which was construing a state disability discrimination
act analogous to the ADA)).
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protected.396 Because the employer's intent is just as bad regardless
of whether the perceived disability plaintiff needs an accommodation
or not, both employees should have some form of legal recourse.
That does not mean, however, that the perceived disability
plaintiff with a limiting impairment should be entitled to the full array
of traditional accommodations. Despite the employer's improper
motives, Congress did not intend the ADA to cause employers to
reduce legitimate performance standards.?7 Yet the fact that the
quality of the employer's conduct is the same, even if the perceived
disability plaintiff needs an accommodation, suggests that courts
should at least consider something short of completely abandoning
the ADA's unique qualification standards for individuals like our
hypothetical Employee B, who would be left without a claim at all. If
courts could interpret the qualification standards narrowly enough to
be consistent with the level playing field objective, but not so
narrowly as to eliminate the rules altogether, the number of perceived
disability claims would be greater than under an absolutist "nothing"
approach. The greater number of viable perceived disability claims,
the fewer number of improperly motivated employment decisions
that would go unaddressed.
The second and related reason for rejecting the "nothing"
approach is based on the important role that perceived disability
protection plays in preventing discrimination against those with actual
disabilities. The perceived disability prong "serves as a prophylaxis to
deter discrimination against truly disabled persons that employers
might otherwise believe would not meet the stringent statutory
definition of persons with disabilities."398  Broad protection of
perceived disabilities helps prevent "spillover discrimination" by
employers that "might be willing to take a chance that a given
individual they think is disabled might not actually be disabled" under
the technical terms of the ADA's actual disability prong.3 99 Although
396. Dudley, supra note 63, at 412-13 (describing this as the "odd" outcome that would
result if perceived disability plaintiffs who need accommodations have no form of ADA
claim available).
397. See UL at 412-13; see also Deane, 7 AD Cases (BNA) at 208 (explaining that the
ADA is intended only "'to level the playing field'" between disabled and nondisabled
employees (quoting Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir.
1995)).
398. Vande Walle, supra note 127, at 937; see also id. (stating that perceived disability
protection "also reinforces the aspect of moral condemnation of discrimination against the
disabled contained in the statute by requiring that employment actions taken against
individuals an employer perceives as disabled should be treated the same whether that
individual is truly disabled or not").
399. Id. at 933; see also, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281,287 (2d Cir. 1997)
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lawmakers generally do not cite this prophylactic benefit as a reason
for including perceived disability protection in civil rights statutes,4"0
some courts are convinced that a strong prohibition against perceived
disability discrimination helps deter discrimination against those with
actual disabilities.4°l If the reach of the perceived disability prong is
reduced by entirely eliminating the right to accommodations,
deterrence against actual disability discrimination would decrease.4 2
Thus, even though applying the qualification tests identically to
perceived disability claims may advantage some perceived disability
plaintiffs, abandoning the tests may fall short of equal opportunity for
some whose disabilities are real. Accordingly, to create the greatest
deterrence, courts should interpret the ADA to retain as many
perceived disability claims as possible, while remaining consistent
with the ADA's equal opportunity goal.
Abandoning the ADA's unique qualification tests for perceived
disability claims not only may fall short of equal opportunity for some
individuals with actual disabilities, but also for some individuals with
perceived disabilities, which provides the third reason for rejecting
the "nothing" approach. Parts II and III demonstrated that granting
the traditional forms of workplace accommodation gives perceived
disability plaintiffs a windfall. Conversely, it has been assumed that
informing the employer of its misperception would be sufficient to
equalize opportunity for all perceived disability plaintiffs because the
employer's misperception is the only thing that distinguishes them
from the rest of the nondisabled workforce. That assumption is likely
to be true for some people with perceived disabilities. If the
employer's misperception is the only cause of the employee's unequal
opportunity, "the employer need only be dispossessed of its
misperception." 4 3 When the employer's misperception is the sole
("By subjecting to liability employers who discriminate on the mistaken belief that an
individual has a disability-for example, an employer who fires an employee based on the
erroneous belief that the employee has a heart disease-the [ADA] deter[s]
discrimination against those who actually have such disabilities.").
400. See Moberly, supra note 6, at 365.
401. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 620 & n.129; see also, e.g., Francis, 129 F.3d at 287.
402. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 640-41 ("[A]n interpretation of the ADA which
holds that employers are not required to accommodate perceived disabilities conflicts with
the act's deterrent rationale."); see also Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12
(3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that the plaintiff's argument for seeking application of the
reasonable accommodations rule to her perceived disability claim was that a "failure to
mandate reasonable accommodation for 'regarded as' plaintiffs would undermine the role
the ADA plays in ferreting out disability discrimination in employment").
403. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198,208 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142
F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Deane, 142 F.3d at 148-49 n.12 (noting in dicta that
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source of the plaintiff's inequality and that inequality will disappear
once the employer is informed of its mistake, then any use of the
ADA's accommodations rule would create the advantage discussed in
Parts II and III.
For some perceived disability plaintiffs, however, simply
informing the employer of its mistaken belief will be insufficient to
return the plaintiff to level ground. In some cases, the employer's
original misperception may have a lasting impact on the work
environment, even after the employer acknowledges the mistake. In
reality, "the perception of a disability, socially constructed and
reinforced, is difficult to destroy."4°4 The employer may continue to
have reflexive reactions or misread the employee's conduct.' ° The
judgments of other individuals in the workplace, including those who
evaluate the employee's performance, may continue to be influenced
and colored by the employer's prior beliefs. In addition, some
perceived disabilities result not just from the employer's
misperceptions, but from the employer's ratification of the
misperceptions of others, such as coworkers or customers.406 The
after the employer is disabused of its improper perception of the individual's disability,
there is no reason to afford the individual any special treatment, but declining to rule on
whether perceived disability plaintiffs are entitled to accommodations); see also Wagner v.
Kester Solder Co., No. 94C6039, 1995 WL 399484, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1995) ("The
ADA protects those 'regarded as having' a disabling impairment in order to disabuse
people of myths ... ."); cf Alderson v. Postmaster Gen., 598 F. Supp. 49, 54-55 (W.D.
Okla. 1984) (holding under the Rehabilitation Act that "[i]f the Plaintiff were capable but
the employer perceived him as incapable, the Court would simply order the agency to
recognize his capability").
404. Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12; see also EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL,
supra note 3, § 2.2(c), at II-10 (noting that" 'society's [... ] myths and fears about disability
and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairments [sic]'" (quoting School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284
(1987) (alterations in original)).
405. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2157 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The ADA ... seeks to implement this mandate by encouraging employers
'to replace ... reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on
[reasoned and] medically sound judgments.' "(quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at 285 (alteration
in original))).
406. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (1999) (describing one type of perceived disability to
include individuals who have "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment");
Moberly, supra note 63, at 620-21; see also Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 n.13 (describing
"irrational fears or prejudice" by coworkers that hinder equal employment opportunities);
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2() (finding that a lack of "acceptance by coworkers" is one
of the "common attitudinal barriers that frequently result in employers excluding
individuals with disabilities"). For other examples of employment inequality that may
result indirectly from the misperceptions of third parties, see Moberly, supra note 63, at
621 nn.133-35.
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inequality created by those mistaken beliefs-which are supposed to
be covered by the "regarded as" prong-is unlikely to disappear just
by correcting the employer's views.4°
Perceived disability plaintiffs in these situations still should be
ineligible for the traditional forms of workplace accommodation,
including the redistribution of marginal job functions. Because these
plaintiffs possess no vocationally relevant traits that systematically
were ignored by the unstated norm underlying conventional
workplace design, traditional accommodations that adapt workplace
operations to the employee's characteristics would still provide a
windfall. On the other hand, eliminating the accommodations rule
altogether would fall short of equal opportunity: it may take more
than a winning lawsuit identifying the employer's misperception to
eliminate the negative effects of the mistake. The fact that more may
be required to achieve equal opportunity suggests that there is room
for the accommodations rule to play a narrow but appropriate role in
the perceived disability context. For all of these reasons, Section C
proposes an alternative that appropriately lies between the two
extremes of the current all-or-nothing approaches to perceived
disability claims.
C. An Alternative to All-or-Nothing Approaches: Restructuring the
Reasonable Accommodations Right and the Essential Functions
Limit for Perceived Disabilities
Because the majority's "all" approach to perceived disability
claims exceeds the ADA's equal opportunity goal, but the minority's
"nothing" approach falls short of that objective, this Section proposes
a middle-ground alternative. The all-or-nothing approaches suffer
from two main flaws. First, they conceptualize the ADA's
accommodations rule only in narrow, operational terms. Granting
traditional forms of operational accommodation unfairly advantages
perceived disability plaintiffs, but providing no other forms of
accommodation leaves those individuals at a disadvantage whenever
an employer's misperception has a lingering effect. Second, the all-
or-nothing approaches analyze the perceived disability problem solely
as a liability issue. Granting perceived disability plaintiffs a cause of
action (and, therefore, the full panoply of remedies) gives perceived
407. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 620-21; see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989)
(Sup Docs. No Y 1.1/5:101-116) (stating that the perceived disability prong is intended to
prevent employers from making employment decisions based on the negative reactions of
others to the protected individual).
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disability plaintiffs a windfall, but denying a cause of action (and
therefore providing no remedies) leaves perceived disability plaintiffs
without recourse for an employer's invidiously motivated act. Thus,
to come closer to achieving the ADA's goal of equal employment
opportunity for those with perceived disabilities, courts must find an
interpretation that addresses each of these fundamental flaws.
First, courts should interpret the ADA's "accommodations"
concept in a more flexible manner. Although perceived disability
plaintiffs do not need accommodations to eliminate discriminatory
barriers in the operational work environment, they may need
accommodations to eliminate discriminatory barriers in the
perceptual or social work environment. 4°8 If there is a risk that the
employer's prior misperception will continue to color future
employment interactions, "accommodation" might require additional
education in the workplace. 9  If the employer's misperception
stemmed from coworkers' assumptions or prejudices,
"accommodation" might require mandatory sensitivity training.410 If
the employer's misperception resulted from customers' erroneous
beliefs, "accommodation" might require a creative marketing plan to
reduce irrational consumer tastes.4 1' In all of these examples, the
408. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 638 ("[Wlhere an individual is being denied an
employment opportunity because of an erroneous perception, the ADA should require
the employer to consider whether a reasonable accommodation could remove that barrier
to employment." (footnote omitted)).
409. See id. at 637-38; see also Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156,
172 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("Our analysis of [the perceived disability claim] focuses on
the reactions and perceptions of the relevant decisionmakers working with [the
employee]."), overruled on other grounds by Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998);
Blanck & Marti, supra note 364, at 368 ("Studies show the central role of education in
recognizing and eliminating employment discrimination facing qualified people with
disabilities.").
410. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 637-38; see, e.g., Kent v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp.
1032, 1040 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (discussing sensitivity training as a form of accommodation
for a perceived disability caused by coworkers' misperceptions); see also S. REP. No. 93-
1297, at 50 (1974) (Sup. Does. No. Y 1.1/5:93-1297), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6400 (explaining that the "regarded as" definition was added to the Rehabilitation Act in
part because "the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to" the
difficulties imposed on individuals with various impairments); Dudley, supra note 63, at
417 ("For those individuals merely 'regarded as' disabled, the only true reasonable
accommodation that Congress foresaw is tolerance and understanding....").
411. See Moberly, supra note 63, at 637-38; see also Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58
F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The focus is on the impairment's effect upon the attitudes
of others."); Byrne v. Board of Educ., Sch. of W. Allis-W. Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 567
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the perceived disability prong "focuses on the effect that the
physical or mental condition has on others"); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442
F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that Title VII was, "to a large extent," intended to
overcome customer prejudices); Moberly, supra note 63, at 638 n.271 (discussing
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proposed "accommodation" would not advantage a perceived
disability plaintiff. Unlike traditional forms of operational
accommodation-which allocate resources based on the effects of
nondisabling impairments that are not the source of the plaintiff's
unequal opportunity-these workplace changes only eliminate
inequality caused by the perceived disability itself.
Both the statute and the EEOC guidelines allow for such an
interpretation, which avoids the advantage of traditional, operational
accommodations, but provides nontraditional accommodations to
truly eliminate the inequality caused by an employer's mistaken
belief. The statute prohibits discrimination "because of the
disability,""41 and the EEOC deems plaintiffs qualified even if,
"because of the disability," they need a reasonable accommodation.413
For perceived disability plaintiffs, inequality that results "because of
the disability" is caused by the employer's misperception, which is the
source of the statutory protection. The "because of" language does
preclude a perceived disability plaintiff from seeking operational
accommodations to eliminate the impact of an employee's
nondisabling impairment. Those types of limitations are not "because
of the disability," which resides in the employer's mind.
In contrast, the "because of" language does not preclude a
perceived disability plaintiff from eliminating the impact of the
employer's erroneous beliefs. The accommodations rule was
designed broadly "to remove barriers which prevent qualified
individuals with disabilities from enjoying the same employment
opportunities" as the nondisabled workforce.414 Determining "the
precise barrier to the employment opportunity," says the EEOC,
"will make it possible to determine the accommodation(s) that could
alleviate or remove that barrier. '415 There are many different kinds
of barriers to equal opportunity.416 Perceived disability plaintiffs are
McDonald's Corporation's "McJobs" program, which helped alter customer perceptions
and increase the number of disabled employees).
Of course, there may be limits to what an employer can do with respect to third
parties. Compare Mitchell v. Crowell, 966 F. Supp. 1071, 1079-80 n.9 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
(suggesting in dicta that it often will be "practically impossible for an employer to
accommodate an individual who is disabled based upon the perceptions of others"), with
Moberly, supra note 63, at 638 (arguing that "Congress appears to have contemplated such
employer efforts at public persuasion under many federal employment discrimination
laws").
412. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
413. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9 (1999).
414. Id. pt. 1630 app. Background.
415. Id. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.9.
416. See EEOC TEcHNIcAL AssisTANcE MANuAL, supra note 3, § 3.2, at 111-2.
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prevented from achieving equal opportunity "only by barriers in
other people's minds."417 Because the accommodations rule includes
"any change in the work environment" that eliminates barriers to
equal opportunity,418 there is no reason that the rule should not
include changes to social and perceptual baniers as well as
operational ones. In fact, "erroneous perceptions and stereotypes
appear to be the employment barriers with which the drafters of the
ADA were most directly concerned. 419
As long as the accommodations only eliminate the barriers
created by the misperceptions "in other people's minds," rather than
eliminating barriers created by irrelevant internal characteristics, they
will not exceed the ADA's equal opportunity goal for perceived
disability claims. To the contrary, accommodations of the perceptual
or social work environment would advance that goal by allowing
perceived disability plaintiffs to achieve the position in which they
would have been absent the mistaken beliefs.420 Without allowing this
417. Id.; see also Steven J. Rollins, Comment, Perceived Handicap Under the Wisconsin
Fair Employment Act, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 639, 646 ("[T]he concept of perceived handicap
requires a shift in focus from the individual's condition to the [particular] employer's
perception, attitude and state of mind." (footnote omitted)).
418. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(o) (emphasis added).
419. Moberly, supra note 63, at 619-20 n.122; see id. at 637-38 (arguing that "the
primary barriers to equal employment opportunities are often stereotypical assumptions"
and that the ADA should require the employer to consider unconventional
accommodations to eliminate those barriers through training, education, and public
persuasion).
420. Interpreting "accommodations" in the perceived disability context to have some
meaningful substance (albeit very narrow substance) is not necessarily inconsistent with
the analogy between perceived disability claims and claims under Title VII. As Moberly
explains,
the Deane court indicated that race discrimination and perceived disability
discrimination should be treated similarly because the type of discrimination
faced by those who are perceived to be disabled ... closely resembles
discrimination on the basis of race. It then proceeded to cite, as support for its
conclusion that there is no duty to accommodate perceived disabilities, its
understanding that Title VII's prohibition of race discrimination does not include
any form of accommodation.
However, the Deane court's characterization of Title VII is correct only in the
most formal sense. As the ADA regulations reflect, the employer's duty to
accommodate is a means by which barriers to the equal employment opportunity
of an individual with a disability are removed.... Even without an express
accommodation provision, Title VII similarly requires employers to remove all
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary racial barriers to employment, including
those premised upon false stereotypes and misperceptions.
Id. at 639 (quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see id. at 638 ("Congress appears to
have contemplated ... employer efforts at public persuasion under many federal
employment discrimination laws, and not merely those (like the ADA) that contain
express accommodation requirements." (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., Police Officers
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narrow role for education-related accommodations, some perceived
disability plaintiffs would be unable to achieve a level workplace
playing field.42' Thus, even though the "unfair advantage" critique
requires courts to stop applying the traditional, operational forms of
accommodation to perceived disability claims, it does not necessarily
require courts to abandon the accommodations rule altogether.
Abandoning the ADA's unique qualification test for perceived
disability claims ignores its role in punishing improperly motivated
employment decisions, in deterring discrimination against those with
actual disabilities, and in fully eliminating the barriers created by the
employer's misperception.
The second flaw in both the "all" and the "nothing" approaches
is addressing the perceived disability issue solely as a question of
liability. By recognizing a claim and simply assuming that all
remedies will attach, the "all" approach exceeds the level playing
field goal; but by denying a claim and thereby providing no remedies,
the "nothing" approach leaves some individuals below level ground.
One way to avoid the risk of unfair advantage, but also to avoid
falling short of equal opportunity, is to make an analytic distinction
between the "wrongdoing" and the "harm" in cases of perceived
disability. Specifically, courts could apply the traditional
requirements of the "qualified individual" test at the liability stage of
perceived disability claims, but not at the remedy stage. In other
words, courts could allow perceived disability plaintiffs to state a
discrimination claim if they can, "with or without reasonable
accommodation, perform the essential functions of the job," using the
standard, operational conception of those terms. Perceived disability
plaintiffs who need traditional forms of accommodation, however,
including the redistribution of marginal job tasks, would have limited
for Equal Rights v. City of Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 430 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (dismissing
the plaintiffs' claim that an employer's "no beard policy" disparately impacted blacks, who
are more likely to have a skin condition called PFB that prevents shaving, because the
employer "made adequate efforts to accommodate" by redrafting the policy to exempt
PFB-sufferers).
421. Under this interpretation, the essential functions limit would continue to play no
role in perceived disability cases. As explained in Part III.A, the essential functions limit
is really a form of traditional accommodation in which the employer substitutes,
redistributes, or excuses the performance of marginal job functions. See supra notes 298-
313 and accompanying text. That type of accommodation is what this Article
characterizes as an operational workplace accommodation, because its goal is to eliminate
the impact of the employee's disabling condition in an arbitrarily designed workplace.
Thus, accommodating a perceived disability would not include the benefit of the essential
functions limit, which would continue to create the "unfair advantage" problem discussed
in Parts II and III.
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remedies, being ineligible for reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and
front pay.
Using the traditional qualification rules at the liability stage
makes intuitive sense: because the employer was acting on the belief
that the employee was actually disabled, the employer's
"wrongdoing" should be judged according to the legal standards for
actual disability claims.41 This would avoid leaving our hypothetical
Employee B without recourse, which is the result under the
minority's "nothing" approach. On the other hand, perceived
disability plaintiffs who need traditional accommodations to perform
required job functions do not suffer a compensable "harm" from
losing a job for which they would have been ineligible if they were
perceived correctly. In order to obtain remedies related to the
specific job in question-reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and front
pay-the perceived disability plaintiff must be able to do the job with
only the perceptual and social forms of accommodation described
above. If the plaintiff requires traditional forms of operational
accommodation, then forcing the employer to hire the plaintiff or to
pay for the failure to do so would create the advantage problem of
the "all" approach, which is inconsistent with the purpose of the
ADA.
The proposed middle-ground alternative should provide the best
of both worlds. Perceived disability plaintiffs who require traditional
accommodations would be allowed to state a discrimination claim-
thereby advancing the ADA's purpose to punish and deter-but
would be ineligible for any remedies that would exceed the ADA's
limited goal of equal opportunity. This approach would allow the
greatest number of perceived disability claims possible without
creating the risk of advantaging perceived disability plaintiffs over
other nondisabled workers or workers who are truly disabled.
By distinguishing between the liability and remedy stages, this
proposal is somewhat analogous to the after-acquired evidence
422. See Sanchez v. Lagoudakis, 486 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Mich. 1992) (noting, in the
context of construing a state discrimination statute analogous to the ADA, that the proper
focus in perceived disability cases is "the employer's conduct-the employer's belief or
intent-and not the employee's condition"); Chandler v. Schlumberger, Inc., 542 N.W.2d
310, 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (explaining, in the context of construing a state
discrimination statute analogous to the ADA, that perceived disability claims are needed
to help "prevent discrimination-a process of thinking and conduct by the employer-
based on handicap"), affd, 572 N.W.2d 210 (Mich. 1998); Vande Walle, supra note 127, at
918 ("It is the employer's perception of the impairment that controls the operation of the
perceived disability test.").
2000] 1003
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
rule.4"3 The after-acquired evidence rule applies when an employer
improperly makes an employment decision based on the employee's
protected status, but the employer later discovers a proper reason
that could have supported the decision.424 The Supreme Court has
held that after-acquired evidence does not bar the plaintiff from
bringing a discrimination claim, but only limits the available
remedies.4' The Court reached that conclusion by acknowledging
that federal employment discrimination statutes serve two distinct
purposes: (1) to deter and condemn improper bias in employment
decisionmaking; and (2) to compensate individuals for the resulting
harm.4 26
Even when after-acquired evidence makes the employee
ineligible for the job in question, the Court recognized that the first
purpose of federal employment laws is still advanced by allowing the
plaintiff to state a discrimination claim.427 In an after-acquired
evidence case, the employer uses an improper basis for making its
employment decision. Even if the employer would have had a proper
basis for the decision if the employer had accurate information at the
time, that fact does not negate the "wrongness" of the employer's
conduct 4' Accordingly, in order to deter and condemn the
employer's behavior, the Supreme Court has allowed plaintiffs to
state a discrimination claim, even when after-acquired evidence
makes them ineligible to retain the job.429
On the other hand, the Court also has recognized that after-
acquired evidence must be considered at the remedy stage to ensure
that the second purpose of federal employment laws remains solely
compensatory in nature.4 0  The Court acknowledged that federal
employment discrimination statutes are not intended to be general
workplace regulations.43' While federal employment statutes prohibit
discriminatory conduct, they do not "constrain employers from
exercising significant other prerogatives and discretions in the course
423. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 355-56 (1995)
(describing the after-acquired evidence rule).
424. See id. (deciding an after-acquired evidence issue in a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
425. See id. at 356-62.
426. See id. at 357-58.
427. See id.
428. See id. at 356-62.
429. See id.
430. See id.
431. See id. at 361.
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of the hiring, promoting, and discharging bf their employees."4 32
Even though discrimination statutes "eliminate[] certain bases for
distinguishing among employees," they should "otherwise preserv[e]
employers' freedom of choice. 4 33 The Supreme Court has held that
this "freedom of choice" would be infringed if the full range of
remedies were permitted in an after-acquired evidence case, because
the employer would end up paying an employee for a position that
the employee was not legitimately eligible to retain.434
The proposed middle-ground approach to the ADA's "regarded
as" prong would act much like an after-acquired evidence rule for
perceived disability plaintiffs who need traditional accommodations.
By allowing such an individual to state a discrimination claim, this
proposal would serve the ADA's purpose to punish and deter by
imposing liability for an employer's bad act. An employer who
believes that an employee is disabled and who refuses to
accommodate the employee is acting with an improper motive,
regardless of the fact that an accurate perception would have
provided a proper motive for the act. Allowing perceived disability
plaintiffs to state ADA claims, even if they need traditional
accommodations to perform the jobs, would condemn the employers'
use of improper employment criteria and maximize the deterrent
effect of the "regarded as" prong. Just as in the after-acquired
evidence context, the employee's inability to perform job functions
would have provided a proper basis for the job decision if the
employer had perceived the employee accurately as nondisabled.
Like after-acquired evidence, however, that fact does not negate the
employer's wrongdoing. Therefore, the perceived disability plaintiff
who needs traditional accommodations should be allowed to state a
discrimination claim.
On the other hand, once the employer is informed that the
perceived disability plaintiff is really nondisabled, the plaintiff's need
for traditional accommodations becomes a legitimate basis for an
employment decision, just like after-acquired evidence. Once ABC
Company is disabused of its misperception about our hypothetical
Employee B (the misperceived but nondisabled employee with carpal
tunnel syndrome), Employee B becomes similar to our hypothetical
Employee C (the correctly perceived, nondisabled employee with a
knee injury), who lawfully may be terminated for failing to perform
432. Id.
433. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
434. See id. at 361.
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any required job tasks. Although Employee B should be entitled to
the perceptual and social forms of accommodation needed to level
the playing field with respect to Employee C, Employee B already
has achieved level ground without receiving any operational
accommodations. In the after-acquired evidence context, the
Supreme Court correctly recognized that reinstatement of such an
unqualified employee would be "pointless" because, once the
employer is aware of the proper grounds for termination, the
employer "will terminate, in any event and upon lawful grounds.""43
Just as in the after-acquired evidence context, forcing the employer to
employ an individual who needs traditional accommodations once the
employer correctly perceives the individual as nondisabled would
infringe on the employer's freedom to set legitimate workplace
standards.4 36 Therefore, forward-looking remedies requiring hiring,
reinstatement, promotion, or front pay should be unavailable for
perceived disability plaintiffs who need traditional accommodations,
just as they are unavailable in an after-acquired evidence case.437
435. Id. at 362. The vacated Deane panel decided not to apply the reasonable
accommodations rule to perceived disability claims for this very reason. Deane v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 210-11 (3d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir.
1998) (en banc). The Deane panel noted the "absurd" result that would occur if an
employer, who finally was disabused of its misperception after losing a lawsuit, then could
terminate the plaintiff lawfully for the inability to perform all required job tasks. See idL
Where the Deane panel went wrong was in using this "absurd" result as a reason for
eliminating an otherwise valid claim of discrimination, rather than as a reason merely for
limiting the plaintiff's remedies.
436. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (1994)
(incorporated by reference into the ADA at 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994)) (stating that
when a plaintiff proves employment discrimination and the employer proves that it would
have taken the same action even without the impermissible motivating factor, "the court
... may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief.., and attorney's fees and costs ... and
... shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or [back pay]").
437. See McKennon, 513 U.S. at 361-62. Perceived disability plaintiffs who need
traditional accommodations also may face a limit on back pay awards. In the after-
acquired evidence context, the Supreme Court has held that limited back pay usually is
appropriate. See id. at 362. Because the employer lawfully could terminate the
employment once the employer discovers the after-acquired evidence (which often occurs
midway through the lawsuit), back pay typically ends at the point of discovery in order to
avoid "undue infringement upon the employer's rights and prerogatives." Id. On the
other hand, some back pay is necessary to "give proper recognition" to the fact that the
employer's original employment decision was discriminatory. Id. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has directed lower courts to begin the back pay calculation "from the date
of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was discovered" and then to
modify that amount for any "extraordinary equitable circumstances that affect the
legitimate interests of either party." Id. In the perceived disability context, the analogous
cut-off would be the point at which the employer discovers that its perceptions are wrong,
that the employee is really nondisabled, and that the employee's need for accommodation
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Although the after-acquired evidence rule usually applies when
the employer discovers employee misconduct (such as falsifying
information on a resum6), this fact does not distinguish the after-
acquired evidence analysis materially from the ADA context. The
Supreme Court explained that after-acquired evidence limits the
employee's remedies not as a way to "punish" the employee or
because of the employee's "moral worth." '43 s Rather, after-acquired
evidence limits an employee's remedies in order to "take due account
of the lawful prerogatives of the employer in the usual course of its
business." '439 That rationale applies equally to the ADA's perceived
disability context, in which an employer has the "lawful prerogative"
to terminate an employee who needs traditional accommodations
once the employer correctly recognizes that the employee does not
have an actual disability.
Under this middle-ground approach to the ADA's "regarded as"
prong, perceived disability plaintiffs who require traditional
accommodations still would be eligible for some types of remedies.
As long as the remedy does not require the employer to employ a
plaintiff who needs traditional accommodations (or to pay for not
employing such a plaintiff), the remedy would not go beyond the
ADA's equal opportunity goal. Thus, a perceived disability plaintiff
who needs traditional accommodations may still seek injunctive
relief, which may advance the statutory purposes by "instructing
employers to comply with federal law," by "subjecting employers to
the contempt power of the federal courts for future violations," and
by "reducing the chilling effect of employers' alleged
discrimination."'  The plaintiff also may be compensated for other
harms flowing from the employer's disparate treatment441 and may be
therefore is a valid ground for termination (perhaps at the time of judgment). That cut-off
point is difficult to determine and likely would require case-by-case judicial inquiry, just
like in an after-acquired evidence case.
438. Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
439. Id.
440. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing
EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987)). Although the en
banc Third Circuit declined to decide whether or not the reasonable accommodations rule
should apply to perceived disability claims, the court pondered the possibility that
eliminating the rule might have an impact only at the remedy stage. See id.; see also
Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that,
"even if" the perceived disability plaintiff was not entitled to reasonable accommodations,
"he may well be entitled to other forms of relief, such as injunctive relief and damages, as
well as attorney's fees").
441. See Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Unlawful discrimination under the ADA includes both discriminatory [treatment] and
the failure to provide reasonable accommodation."); HADLEY, supra note 167, at 1007
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eligible for punitive damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs.44 Even if there are no compensable damages, an award of
nominal damages may vindicate the plaintiff's rights and advance the
"national policies respecting nondiscrimination in the work force."" 3
This middle-ground approach to "regarded as" claims is not only
the most consistent with the ADA's goal of equal opportunity, but
also is consistent with the statutory language. Restricting the
traditional difference-based elements of the "qualified individual"
test to the liability phase should appease those who view the statute's
"qualified individual" test as unambiguously applying to both actual
and perceived disability claims.' Under that "plain language" view,
the single definition of a "qualified individual" means that perceived
disability plaintiffs must be able to state ADA claims even if they
need traditional accommodations, which this proposal would allow.
At the same time, plain language proponents should not take
issue with limiting the available remedies for perceived disability
plaintiffs who need more than the perceptual and social forms of
accommodation described above. The ADA incorporates the
remedies from Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of
1991.1-5 Under Title VII, as amended, courts may order limited
(suggesting that perceived disability claims under the Rehabilitation Act "do not raise true
issues of reasonable accommodation" and that such claims "properly are analyzed as
disparate treatment cases"); Moberly, supra note 63, at 631 & n.215 (noting that "courts
have indicatedl [that] the failure to accommodate an employee's disability, and treating
the employee differently because of that disability, are separate and distinct forms of
discrimination").
The EEOC has distinguished between reasonable accommodations claims and
disparate treatment claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Howard v. Widnall,
No. 01931905, 1994 WL 747979, at *5 (EEOC May 12, 1994). In Howard, a plumber with
a back injury was limited in his ability to lift, bend, twist, and turn his spine and hips. See
id. at *5, *9 n.1. The plumber brought a perceived disability claim against the Air Force,
arguing that the Air Force discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his
limitations and by intentionally assigning him duties that exacerbated his condition. See
id. at *5-6 The EEOC held that "an individual who is merely regarded as having a
disability ... does not require reasonable accommodation" and therefore dismissed the
accommodation claim. Id. at *5. However, the EEOC upheld the disparate treatment
claim. See id.; see also Coleman v. Keebler Co., 997 F. Supp. 1102, 1119 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
("[L]ogic dictates that if the evidence supports a regarded as theory of disability, the case
must then proceed under a disparate treatment, not a reasonable accommodation,
theory.").
442. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 148 n.12.
443. McKennon, 513 U.S. at 358-59; see also E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp.
1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980) ("It is of little solace to a person denied employment to know
that the employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous. To such a person the
perception of the employer is as important as reality.").
444. See supra notes 63-87, 127,291-96 and accompanying text.
445. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994).
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compensatory and punitive damages, 46 reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs, 7 an injunction against the unlawful employment practice, and
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate."'4
This provision requires courts to determine when equitable
remedies are "appropriate." Based on the analysis in Parts II and Il1,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, and front pay are not "appropriate"
for perceived disability plaintiffs who need traditional
accommodations, including the redistribution of marginal job tasks.
Courts should deny these remedies because granting more than the
perceptual and social forms of accommodations would go beyond the
ADA's level playing field objective. This conclusion fits with the
plain language of the statute because it is linked to the determination
of "appropriateness" that the statute explicitly requires at the remedy
stage.
Those who find the ADA's language to be more ambiguous may
support the proposed approach as well. The ambiguity arises because
the statute prohibits discrimination "because of the disability," which
arguably limits the employer's accommodation duty only to
limitations that are caused by the disability itself.449 When looking at
perceived disabilities objectively, the only performance limits that are
caused by the disability are those that flow from the employer's
mistaken beliefs, thereby precluding traditional forms of
accommodation that modify the operational work environment. The
proposed approach accounts for this interpretation at the remedy
stage. Under the proposed approach, plaintiffs may only obtain job-
related remedies, such as reinstatement or promotion, if they can
perform the job solely with accommodations to the perceptual or
social work environment, such as workplace training or education. In
other words, they may obtain such remedies only if they can perform
the job with accommodations that eliminate barriers caused by the
perceived disability. At the liability stage, in contrast, the causal link
should be judged from the employer's subjective point of view. At
the time the employer makes the employment decision, the employer
believes that performance limits are caused by an actual disability,
making the failure to provide traditional accommodations an
446. See id. § 1981a(a)(2), (b).
447. See id. § 2000e-5(k).
448. Id. §2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis added).
449. Id § 12112(a); see supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
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actionable wrong. Thus, the middle-ground proposal for the
"regarded as" prong is one way to remain more consistent with both
the letter and the spirit of the ADA.
CONCLUSION
The conclusions reached in this Article ultimately may provide
additional ammunition for those, like myself, who believe that the
ADA should embrace a broader conception of equality than it does:
"[T]hat we must do more than formal equality requires to structure
jobs and tasks so as to give people, impaired or not, a fair or adequate
opportunity to display talent and competence."450 Unfortunately, the
ADA's current goals are far less lofty in stature.
Within the confines of the ADA's current goals, the ADA's
"regarded as" prong forces courts to draw the line between
Congress's competing desires. On one hand, Congress wanted the
ADA to provide broad protection for perceived disabilities,
recognizing that "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." 451 On the other hand,
Congress wanted the ADA to infringe upon an employer's freedom
as narrowly as possible, leaving an employer's "prerogatives and
discretions" intact.452 The line between these competing desires is
marked by the goal of equal employment opportunity, which the
ADA conceptualizes only in terms of formal equality and equal
access to compete. "Congress intended not to erect impenetrable
spheres of protection around the disabled, but hoped merely 'to level
the playing field'" between those who do and do not have
450. Wasserman, supra note 13, at 274.
451. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (interpreting the
congressional intent behind the Rehabilitation Act's "regarded as" prong, which later was
adopted by the ADA); see H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29-30 (1990) (Sup. Does. No.
Y 1.1/8:101-485), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 452-54 (quoting Arline, 480 U.S. at
284); id., pt. 2, at 53, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 335-36 (same); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24
(1989) (Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.1/5:101-116) (same).
452. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 361 (1995) (describing
the congressional intent behind federal antidiscrimination laws generally); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2142 (1999) (same); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 55-57,1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 337-38 (emphasizing that the ADA does not undermine an
employer's freedom to select the most qualified applicants); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26-27
(same); 136 CONG. REC. 11,460 (1990) (statement of Rep. Owens) (same); 136 CONG.
REC. 10,839 (1990) (statement of Rep. Gordon) (emphasizing the need to balance
business concerns and costs); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. Background (1999) (interpreting the




Applying the reasonable accommodations and essential functions
rules identically to actual and perceived disability claims overshoots
this narrow conception of equal opportunity. That approach
advantages perceived disability plaintiffs over other nondisabled
workers and workers with actual disabilities by reallocating resources
based on irrelevant individual differences that are not the source of
the plaintiffs' protected status. But abandoning the reasonable
accommodations and essential functions rules altogether would have
the opposite effect. Eliminating the rules from perceived disability
claims would undershoot the ADA's equal opportunity target by
ignoring improperly motivated employment decisions, decreasing
deterrence of actual disability discrimination, and leaving perceived
disability plaintiffs on their own to face the long-term effects of an
employer's mistaken beliefs. This Article's proposed approach
should come closer to hitting the ADA's intended mark. Allowing
perceived disability plaintiffs to state discrimination claims, even if
they need traditional accommodations, would maximize the ADA's
effectiveness, while limiting their remedies would allow the
workplace playing field to remain on level ground.
453. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 7 AD Cases (BNA) 198, 208 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995)), rev'd on other
grounds, 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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